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Residents of Chester, Pennsylvania were distraught. For the
fifth time in a decade, their community had been selected to host a
hazardous waste site. Indeed, a pattern seemed to be emerging.
Between 1986 and 1996, the Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Protection (PADEP) issued seven permits for commercial
waste facilities in Delaware County, the predominately white county
in which Chester is located, and five of those facilities were sited in
Chester,' whose population is sixty-five percent African-American.2
The siting pattern reeked of "environmental racism"-the targeting
of minority areas to host polluting and waste facilities.' A group of
Chester residents was determined to do something.
The residents weighed their options. Because PADEP, the state
permitting agency, is a state actor, the residents could have sued
the agency for violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. The United States Supreme Court, however, has
held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits only intentional
discrimination,4 and it would have been all but impossible for the
residents to prove invidious discrimination by PADEP. There were,
after all, a number of non-racist reasons for placing the new plant
* John M. Olin Fellow, Northwestern University Law School. B.A., 1993, Wheaton
College (Illinois); J.D., 1998, University of Chicago Law School. For helpful comments, I
thank David Dana, Neil Devins, Julian Ku, and participants at Colloquia at Marquette,
Northwestern, and William & Mary Law Schools. For financial assistance, I am grateful to
the John M. Olin Foundation.
Jimmy White, Environmental Justice: Is Disparate Impact Enough?, 50 MERCER L.
REV. 1155, 1177 (1999).
2 Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif 132 F.3d 925,927 n.1 (3d Cir.
1997).
' See, e.g., Daniel Kevin, "Environmental Racism"and Locally Undesirable Land Uses:
A Critique of Environmental Justice Theories and Remedies, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 124-26
(1997) (defining environmental racism).
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-46 (1976).
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in Chester--chiefly, the availability of cheap property and Chester's
proximity to Philadelphia. An Equal Protection suit, then, did not
seem the way to go. Indeed, in the few reported environmental
racism cases in which plaintiffs have sued for violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the intent requirement has prevented
plaintiffs from achieving meaningful relief.5
The residents' other option was to sue PADEP, which receives
some federal funding, for violating Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. Title VI prohibits racial discrimination by federally funded
entities.6 While the prohibition in the statute itself directly reaches
only intentional discrimination,7 nearly every federal agency,
including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has adopted
implementing regulations under Title VI that prohibit not only
intentional discrimination but also "disparate impact"-i.e., agency
actions that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of race,
regardless of whether they were intended to do so.8 The Title VI
' See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991) (finding disparate impact
but no intentional discrimination in siting waste facilities); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood
Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989)
(finding nondiscriminatory siting process was followed because minority residents were given
adequate participation in siting process); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.,
482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (denying preliminary injunction on ground that plaintiffs
had not shown purposeful discrimination).
Courts have been more receptive to a finding of discriminatory intent when the issue
has been unequal provision of municipal services. See, e.g., Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d
982 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (holding that evidence of disparity in provision of services was sufficient
to permit inference of discriminatory intent); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181 (1 lth
Cir. 1983) (inferring discriminatory intent from government's knowledge of existing disparity
in municipal services); Baker v. Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (holding same).
6 Title VI provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
See infra Part II (discussing Title VI reach).
6 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1999) (providing by EPA regulation that "[a] recipient
shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program which have the effect of
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sex");
34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1999) (stating, in Department of Education regulation, that recipients
of federal funding may not"utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect
of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or
have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the
program as respect individuals or a particular race, color, or national origin"); 5 C.F.R. §
1156
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regulations would permit residents of Chester to establish unlawful
discrimination by PADEP based solely on the fact that PADEP's
decision to permit a hazardous waste facility in Chester had a
disproportionate adverse effect on minorities. The residents thus
would not need to prove any intent to discriminate.
The residents opted to pursue relief under Title VI. In an action
styled Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif 9 the
residents sued PADEP, alleging violations of the Title VI prohibition
against racial discrimination and the EPA regulations adopted to
effectuate the statutory prohibition. The complaint alleged that
PADEP's decision to permit the hazardous waste facility in Chester
had the effect of discriminating against minority residents."0 The
complaint did not allege intentional discrimination by PADEP."
The district court granted PADEP's motion to dismiss. It held
that Title VI itself bars only intentional discrimination, which the
plaintiffs did not allege, and that the disparate impact regulations
adopted pursuant to Title VI are not enforceable through a private
right of action. 2 On appeal, the residents abandoned their claim
based on Title VI itself'3 and focused exclusively on the claim that
PADEP violated the EPA's disparate impact rules. The residents
were successful. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
900.404(b)(2) (1999) (including similar disparate impact regulation for Office of Personnel
Management); 7 C.F.R. § 15.3(b)(2) (2000) (Dep't of Agric.); 7 C.F.R. § 1901.202(a)(2)(vii)
(Dep't of Agric.); 10 C.F.R. § 4.12(b) (1999) (Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n); 10 C.F.R. §
1040.13(c),(d) (Dep't of Energy); 14 C.F.R. § 1250.103-2(b) (2000) (NASA); 15 C.F.R. §
8.4(b)(viii)(2) (1999) (Dep't of Commerce); 18 C.F.R. § 705.4(b)(2) (1999) (Water Resources
Council); 18 C.F.R. § 1302.4(b)(2),(3) (Tenn. ValleyAuth.); 22 C.F.R. § 141.3(b)(2) (1999) (State
Dep't); 22 C.F.R. § 209.4(b)(2),(3) (Agency for Int'l Dev.); 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2), (i)(3) (1999)
(Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.); 28 C.F.R. § 42.104.(b)(2), (3) (1999) (Justice Dep't); 29
C.F.R. § 31.3(b)(2), (S) (1999) (Dep'tof Labor); 32 C.F.R. § 195.4(b)(2) (1999) (Dep'tof Defense);
38 C.F.R. § 18.3(b)(2) (1999) (Dep't of Veterans Affairs); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1999) (Dep't
of Health and Human Servs.); 45 C.F.R. § 611.3(b)(2) (Nat'l Science Found.); 45 C.F.R. §
1203.4(b)(2) (Corp. for Nael & Community Serv.); 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (1999) (Dep't of
Transportation).
9 944 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997).
10 Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 927 (3d Cir.
1997).
" Id. at 928.
12 Chester Residents, 944 F. Supp. at 417.
" The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim under Title VI itself (not the
implementing regulations) without prejudice, offering the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend
their complaint to allege intentional discrimination. The plaintiffs declined this offer.
Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 928.
20001 1157
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Circuit reversed the district court and held that there is an implied
private right of action to enforce federal agencies' disparate impact
regulations adopted pursuant to Title VI."4 PADEP then appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari 5 but
later dismissed the appeal and vacated the Third Circuit's opinion
when the operating permit that started this brouhaha was
revoked.16 The Court reasoned that the revocation of the permit
rendered the appeal moot. 7
In Chester Residents, the Third Circuit became the first federal
appeals court to address the availability of a Title VI action for
plaintiffs claiming to be victims of environmental racism. While
numerous commentators have suggested that the disparate impact
regulations promulgated under Title VI, with their lower (i.e., non-
existent) intent requirement, offer the best avenue of relief for
victims of environmental disparity," the legal theory remained
'4 Id. at 937.
's Seifv. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 524 U.S. 915, vacated as moot,
524 U.S. 974 (1998).
16 Seifv. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 524 US. 974 (1998).
17 Id. (citing United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950)).
IS See, e.g., Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Public Wrongs, Private Rights: Private Attorneys
General for Civil Rights, 9 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 321, 325 (1998) (stating "private rights of action
should be recognized to enforce regulations promulgated pursuant to privately enforceable
civil rights statutes"); Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Environmental Justice and the EPA The
Brief History of Administrative Complaints Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9
J. ENvrL. L. & LITIG. 309, 396 (1994) (encouraging use of Title VI regulations); Luke W. Cole,
Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone inDavid's Sling, 21 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 523,
531-34 (1994) (arguing for use of disparate impact rules to remedy environmental disparity)
[hereinafter Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation]; Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism
Claims Brought Under Title Vl of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 311 (1985) (arguing
same); Barry E. Hill, Chester, Pennsylvania-Was It a Classic Example of Environmental
Injustice?, 79 VT. L. REV. 423, 482 (1999) (arguing same); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing
"EnvironmentalJustice: TheDistributional Effects ofEnvironmentalProtection, 87 Nw.U.L.
REV. 787, 834-39 (1993) (arguing same); Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Title
VI: Making Recipient Agencies Justify Their Siting Decisions, 73 TULANE L. RV. 787, 842
(1999) (arguing that disparate impact regulations should control unless it can be proven that
"no less discriminatory alternatives exist") [hereinafter Mank, Environmental Justice];
Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Cause of Action Under EPA's Title VlRegulations?: The
Need to Empower Environmental Justice Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 12 (1999)
(advocating private actions to enforce Title VI) [hereinafter Mank, Is There a Private Cause
of Action]; Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need for a
Disparate Impact Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility Siting Decisions, 19
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 211, 228 (1994) (arguing same); White, supra note 1, at 1165-71
(advocating same); James H. Colopy, Note, The Road Less Traveled;- PursuingEnvironmental
Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 152-71
1158 [Vol. 34:1155
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untested until Chester Residents.
But the opinion's reasoning and holding reached well beyond the
environmental racism arena. The opinion also contains the first
express holding by a federal appellate court that there is a private
right of action to enforce the disparate impact regulations federal
agencies have adopted pursuant to Title VI. Though numerous
federal courts have implied that the disparate impact regulations
are enforceable by private plaintiffs, 9 no court prior to Chester
Residents had conducted an in-depth analysis of Title VI's enforce-
ment scheme and explicitly held that the Title VI regulations
provide a private right of action.
Of course, the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari and subse-
quent vacatur of Chester Residents may have signaled that the Third
Circuit erred in finding an implied private right of action to enforce
the Title VI disparate impact regulations; at least one district court
(1994) (advocating same); Amanda C.L. Vig, Casenote, Using Title Vito Salvage CivilRights
from Waste: Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir.
1997), 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 907 (1999) (arguing same); cf. Leslie Ann Coleman, Comment, It's
the Thought that Counts: The Intent Requirement in Environmental Racism Claims, 25 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 447, 481 (1993) (arguing that discrimination should be determined on basis of
effects test rather than intent test).
19 See, e.g., Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486 (10th Cir. 1996) (permitting, without
analysis, private right of action under Title VI implementing regulations and stating that
"[allthough Title VI itself proscribes only intentional discrimination, certain regulations
promulgated pursuant to Title VI prohibit actions that have a disparate impact on groups
protected by the act, even in the absence of discriminatory intent"); City of Chicago v. Lindley,
66 F.3d 819, 827-29 (7th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging, without analysis, private right of action
for disparate impact discrimination under Title VI implementing regulations); New York
Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) (permitting plaintiffs to
assert disparate impact claim under Title VI implementing regulations); Elston v. Board of
Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406-07 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that district court properly applied
disparate impact analysis to actions private plaintiffs challenged under Department of
Education's Title VI regulations); Roberts v. Board of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.
1993) (stating, in reviewing Title VI action by private plaintiff, that administrative
regulations incorporating disparate impact standard were valid and ultimately concluding
that "the district court did not err here in failing to require proof of discriminatory intent');
David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988) ("It is clear that plaintiffs may maintain
a private cause of action to enforce the regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act."); Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 465 n.11 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting, in
addressing claim brought by Mexican-American teachers alleging intentional discrimination
in hiring, that "a Title VI action can now be maintained.., in the guise of a disparate impact
case, involving employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different
groups but that fall more harshly on one group than another"); Larry P. by Lucille P. v. Riles,
793 F.2d 969, 984 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming judgment for private plaintiff on disparate impact
claim following trial).
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has so read the tea leaves.2" But the Third Circuit itself has not
been dissuaded. After the vacatur of Chester Residents, the court,
in Powell v. Ridge,2 reaffirmed the existence of a private right of
action to enforce the disparate impact rules.2 The Third Circuit
acknowledged the Chester Residents vacatur but insisted that its
holding, which the court reaffirmed, was not radical at all. Indeed,
the court reasoned, numerous courts have permitted private actions
to enforce the disparate impact regulations.23
The Third Circuit, however, was the first court to engage in any
analysis of, and give explicit approval to, private actions enforcing
federal agencies' Title VI regulations. In so doing, it paved the way
for all sorts of private disparate impact suits, for every Cabinet
department and about forty agencies have adopted Title VI regula-
tions prohibiting disparate impact discrimination. 4  If private
citizens may sue to remedy all federal actions that have racially
disproportionate effects, which is the logical result of the Third
Circuit's holding in Powell and Chester Residents, then the federal
courts will soon be flooded with claims of "discrimination" based on
well-meaning (and perhaps objectively good) decisions that inciden-
tally have a racially disparate impact.
This Article argues that the Third Circuit, and the courts that
have implicitly approved private disparate impact suits, have erred
in construing Title VI to permit private plaintiffs to sue federally
funded entities for discrimination based on disparate impact alone.
' See New York City EnvtL Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 50 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 184 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting Supreme Court's action); South Bronx
Coalition for Clean Air, Inc. v. Conroy, 20 F. Supp. 2d 565, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting
Supreme Court's vacatur of Third Circuit's opinion in Chester Residents and questioning, in
light thereof, whether there is " 'disparate impact' private cause of action under federal
regulations promulgated pursuant to Section 602 of Title VI).
21 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999).
' Id. at 396-400. The regulations at issue in Powell were promulgated by the United
States Department of Education. Id. at 390. The regulations prohibit a funding recipient
from "utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting
individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect
of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the program as respects individuals
of a particular race, color, or national origin." 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1999).
Powell, 189 F.3d at 399.
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 592 n.13 (1983) (White, J.,
concurring). For examples of such regulations, see supra note 8 and sources cited therein
(listing citations for various agencies' disparate impact regulations).
1160 [Vol. 34:1155
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From a policy standpoint, permitting private disparate impact suits
is a bad idea, for the threat of such suits will lead to deterrence of
actions and decisions that have incidental disparate effects but are,
on the whole, good. Decisions that have disparate racial effects
("disparity-causing decisions"), unlike intentionally discriminatory
decisions, are not always undesirable, and private plaintiffs should
not be empowered to stop all decisions that have disparate impacts.
Instead, federal funding agencies should act as screeners, determin-
ing which disparity-causing decisions to punish. Agencies are
institutionally well-suited to perform such a screening function.
In addition to these policy concerns, there is a strong legal case
against permitting private suits to enforce federal agencies'
disparate impact regulations. First of all, the rules are themselves
invalid. Supreme Court dicta, which the lower courts have followed,
suggest otherwise, but basic principles of administrative and
constitutional law dictate that the regulations under Title VI cannot
prohibit all disparate impacts if the statutory prohibition itself
reaches only intentional discrimination. Even if the regulations
were valid, however, private suits to enforce the regulations would
not be appropriate. The statutory provision authorizing Title VI
regulations does not provide for private suits, and there is insuffi-
cient evidence that Congress intended to provide a private right of
action. Whereas federal courts previously inferred private rights of
action freely in order to ensure that statutes achieved their
ostensible remedial objectives, the Supreme Court has now rejected
such a willy-nilly approach to implication. Hence, absent evidence
of legislative intent to provide a private cause of action, courts may
not permit private suits. Because there is no evidence that Con-
gress intended to provide a private right of action to enforce agency
regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI-and there is, in fact,
evidence to the contrary-private disparate impact suits are not
legally warranted.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II summarizes Title VI and
the agency regulations promulgated thereunder. It also outlines
current Title VI jurisprudence, highlighting the questions decided
by the United States Supreme Court, those the Court has left open,
and the trend among the lower courts to permit private actions to
enforce agencies' disparate impact regulations. Part III argues that
20001 1161
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policy considerations counsel against private actions to enforce the
disparate impact rules. That Part first discusses how disparate
impact is not absolutely undesirable and then, after considering
several enforcement options, contends that a system of exclusive
agency enforcement will best ensure that desirable disparity-
causing decisions are not deterred. Part IV then analyzes whether
private disparate impact suits are legitimate as a matter of positive
law, concluding that the law does not permit such suits. Part IV.A
argues that the disparate impact regulations are themselves invalid
as legislative regulations (the only type of regulation that is
privately enforceable), and Part IV.B contends that, even if the
regulations are valid, there is no implied private right of action to
enforce them.
II. TITLE VI AND ITS IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits racial discrimi-
nation by federally funded entities. Section 601 of Title VI contains
the primary prohibition, providing that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance."25
Section 602 authorizes federal agencies to adopt regulations to
effectuate the provisions of section 601. It states, in relevant part:
"Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to
extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity...
is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of § 601 of
this title . . .by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general
applicability."26 Title VI thus includes a direct prohibition on racial
discrimination by federally funded entities (section 601) and an
enabling provision (section 602) empowering federal agencies to
promulgate regulations to effectuate that prohibition.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
Id. § 200Od-1.
1162 [Vol. 34:1155
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In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of the City
of New York,2" a contentious case that resulted in five opinions, a
majority of Justices concluded that Title VI direct prohibition on
racial discrimination by federally funded entities (i.e., section 601)
reaches only intentional discrimination. The seven Justices who so
concluded28 relied on a prior Supreme Court holding that the Title
VI prohibition is co-extensive with that of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution,2" which the Court previ-
ously construed as prohibiting only intentional discrimination."0 A
separate five-Justice coalition in Guardians concluded, however,
that federal agencies may adopt regulations under section 602 that
"effectuate the provisions" of section 601 by banning federally
funded actions that, while not intentionally discriminatory,
disproportionately affect minorities. 31
Two years after Guardians, the Supreme Court decided Alexan-
der v. Choate,32 in which Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous
Court, stated in dicta that Guardians had held: (1) that Title VI
itself prohibits only intentional discrimination, but (2) that the
agency regulations promulgated under Title VI may ban uninten-
tional disparate impact. 3 Part IV of this Article argues that Justice
Marshall's dictum incorrectly states Guardians's holding and that
the agency regulations banning unintentional disparate impact
cannot be valid. So far, however, the federal agencies (in adopting
disparate impact regulations pursuant to Title VI)3 and the lower
27 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
" The seven Justices were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist (in
a concurring opinion authored by Justice Powell, id. at 607), Justice O'Connor (in her own
concurring opinion, id. at612), andJustices Stevens, Brennan, andBlackmun (in a dissenting
opinion by Justice Stevens, id. at 635).
" See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that Title Vrs
prohibition of racial discrimination is co-extensive with that of Fourteenth Amendment).
'o Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
-" The five Justices were Justice White (in his own concurring opinion, Guardians, 463
U.S. at 593), Justice Marshall (in his own dissenting opinion, id. at 623), and Justices
Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun (in a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens, id. at 644-45).
3 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
33 Id. at 293 'First, the [Guardians] Court held that Title VI itself directly reached only
instances of intentional discrimination. Second, the Court held that actions having an
unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities could be redressed through agency regulations
designed to implement the purposes of Title VI.").
' See supra note 8 (listing citations for various agencies' disparate impact regulations).
2000] 1163
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courts (in recognizing the validity of the disparate impact regula-
tions and permitting private suits to enforce them)35 have accepted
without question Justice Marshall's construal of Guardians's
holding. The prevailing view, then, is that section 601 of Title VI
prohibits only intentional discrimination but that agency regula-
tions under section 602, which agencies adopt "to effectuate the
provisions of section 601," may ban all disparate impacts.
The Supreme Court has approved a private right of action to
enforce section 601 of Title VI. In Cannon v. University of Chicago,3"
the Court held that a private plaintiff could sue to enforce Title IX
of the Civil Rights Act. 7 In so concluding, the Court reasoned that
Title IX-which contains language virtually identical to that of Title
VI, differing only in that it prohibits discrimination "on the basis of
sex" rather than "on the ground of race, color, or national ori-
gin" S-is modeled after Title VI, which has been correctly inter-
preted as including an implied private cause of action.39 The Court
thus indirectly approved the existence of a private right of action to
enforce the Title VI prohibition of race discrimination by federally
funded entities.
The issue before the Cannon Court was whether a private cause
of action exists to enforce the Title IX (and thus Title VI) intentional
discrimination prohibition (section 901 of Title IX and section 601
of Title VI). The Court did not address whether there is also a
private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations
promulgated pursuant to section 902 of Title IX40 and section 602 of
Title VI.4 The Cannon Court likely did not address this issue
' See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 396-400 (3d Cir. 1999) (providing private right
of action for disparate impact under title VI); Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175,
1202-03 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating same); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding same); New York Urban League v. City of New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d
Cir. 1995) (stating same); City of Chicago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 819, 827-29 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding same); Elston v. Board of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406-07 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating
same); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding same).
6 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
37 Id. at 688-89.
' Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) (containing Title VI) with 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994)
(containing Title IX).
' Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-700.
40 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
4' 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
1164 [Vol. 34:1155
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because Guardians had not yet been decided, and there had thus
been no suggestion that agency regulations under Titles VI and IX
could reach further than the statutory prohibitions by banning
disparate impact as well as intentional discrimination.
Despite the Supreme Court's silence on the issue of whether
there is a private cause of action to enforce disparate impact
regulations promulgated pursuant to section 602, the lower courts
have permitted such private actions.42  Most of those
courts-apparently assuming that because section 601 private suits
are permitted, section 602 suits ought to be permitted as
we1 43-- have not engaged in an extended analysis of the question of
whether there is a private right of action to enforce agencies'
disparate impact regulations. Only two federal appellate courts
have examined this issue with any rigor. First, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit analyzed a number of factors
in concluding, in Chester Residents and Powell, that there is an
implied private right of action to enforce the disparate impact
regulations promulgated under Title VI." In addition, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Sandoval v.
Hagan,45 analyzed the issue with some rigor and joined the Third
Circuit in concluding that private disparate impact suits are
authorized.46 The clear trend of the federal courts, then, is to
' See, e.g., supra note 19 and sources cited therein (permitting private right of action
under Title VI).
43 See Mank, Is There a Private CauseofAction?, supra note 18, at 53-58 (contending that
"consistency with section 601 argues for inferring a congressional intent to create an implied
right of action under section 602 of Title VI").
"' Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999); Chester Residents Concerned for Quality
Living v. Self, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997).
45 197 F.3d 484 (11th Cir. 1999).
' The Third Circuit based its conclusion that there is a private right of action to enforce
the disparate impact regulations on its reading of its own precedents (all of which were
conclusory and did not involve in-depth consideration of the issue), the practice of other
circuits (which have permitted private disparate impact suits without reflection), and its
reading of several Supreme Court opinions. Id. at 502-07. The reasoning in the district court
opinion, Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 1998), which also held that the
regulations are privately enforceable, was more novel. In addition to the Chester Residents
coures arguments, which the Sandoval district court adopted verbatim, id. at 1255-62, and
which this Article criticizes, see infra Part IV.B, the Sandoval district court relied on a novel,
but unconvincing, "third.party beneficiary" argument in supportof its conclusion thatprivate
plaintiffs may enforce agencies' disparate impact regulations. The court reasoned that
private plaintiffs may sue to enforce the regulations because the rules, adopted under statutes
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recognize an implied private right of action to enforce federal
agencies' disparate impact regulations promulgated pursuant to
section 602 of Title VI. Part III argues that this trend is misguided.
III. THE POLICY ARGUMENT AGAINST PRIVATE
DISPARATE IMPACT SUITS
The previous commentators who have considered the question of
whether the Title VI regulations are privately enforceable have
concluded, in accordance with the practice of the lower courts, that
there should be a private right of action to enforce agencies'
disparate impact rules." Most of these commentators have
considered this issue in light of environmental justice concerns.
Searching for the easiest way to empower plaintiffs complaining of
environmental racism, the commentators have argued that private
enacted pursuant to Congress's Spending Clause power, essentially state the terms of a
contract between the funding agency and the regulatee, and disparately impacted private
plaintiffs are third-party beneficiaries of that contract. Sandoval, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1262-64.
The district court noted that defendant regulatees typically agree to abide by the disparate
impact regulations as a condition of receiving federal money. Id. at 1263-64. It concluded
that when fund recipients breach the terms of this contract by taking an action that creates
a disparate impact, disparately impacted individuals--the intended beneficiaries of the
contract-have standing to sue to enforce the contract terms. Id.
The Sandoval district courtes analysis is unpersuasive because it would render every
Spending Clause statute-and numerous regulations promulgated pursuant to Spending
Clause statutes-privately enforceable. It strains credibility to suppose that Congress
intended every statute it adopted under the Spending Clause to permit private enforcement.
Because congressional intent does, see infra Part IV.B.1, and should, see infra note 272,
control whether a statute includes an implied private right of action, courts should not adopt
the presumption that all Spending Clause statutes and regulations are privately enforceable.
As with the disparate impact regulations under Title VI, there may be good reasons to restrict
the power to enforce many Spending Clause statutes and rules to publicly accountable entities
that have a measure of expertise. See generally infra Part III (arguing that policy
considerations counsel against private actions). Thus, Sandovars presumption that all
statutory and regulatory provisions adopted pursuant to the Spending Clause are privately
enforceable is both legally unjustified and unwise from a policy standpoint.
47 See, e.g., Carrasco, supra note 18, at 345-47 (advocating private right of action); Hill,
supra note 18 (praising Third Circuit for permitting private enforcement of EPA's disparate
impact rules in order to achieve environmental justice); Mank, Is There a Private Cause of
Action?, supra note 18, at 48, 53 (promoting Third Circuit approach); Saleem, supra note 18,
at 229 (arguing that a privately enforceable disparate impact standard is needed to protect
victims of environmental racism); White, supra note 1, at 1183 (arguing same); Vig, supra
note 18, at 929 (arguing same); Valerie P. Mahoney, Note, Environmental Justice: From
Partial Victories to Complete Solutions, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 361, 414 (1999) (praising Third
Circuit in same fashion).
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plaintiffs should be permitted to sue federally funded environmental
agencies that make permitting decisions that disproportionately
affect minority groups.48 The commentators' reasoning is rather
simplistic: Disparate impact discrimination, they reason, is bad
(and violative of agency regulations), so private plaintiffs should be
empowered to stop it, just as they have been empowered to stop
intentional discrimination.49
I contend that the commentators who have argued in favor of
private disparate impact suits (and the lower courts who have
generally followed the commentators' suggestions) have erred in
assuming that disparate impact discrimination should be treated
the same as intentional discrimination. As I will show in this Part,
disparity-causing decisions, unlike intentionally discriminatory
decisions, are sometimes "good" on the whole and should not be
deterred absolutely. Hence, administrative agencies should be given
exclusive authority to enforce the disparate impact rules so that
they may weed out "good" disparity-causing decisions. They are
institutionally well-suited to perform this screening function.
' See, e.g., Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation, supra note 18, at 531-33 (advocating
private right of action); Copoly, supra note 18, at 180 ("By simultaneously filing a complaint
[alleging a violation of the Title VI regulations] with the agency and initiating litigation
against a funding recipient .... environmental justice plaintiffs can place considerable
pressure upon a recipient... [and can] utilize the resources of the agency's investigative
powers while at the same time obtaining their 'day in court.' "); Vig, supra note 18, at 929
C'[D]isparate impact alone is a harm in addition to, and separate from, intentional
discrimination .... Therefore, making disparate impact more easily actionable is particularly
needed and helpful in the environmental justice context."); Mahoney, supra note 47, at 414
C'Undoubtedly, Title VI holds more promise for environmental justice litigants than do Equal
Protection Clause claims, primarily due to its disparate impact standard (under the
implementing regulations."). In particular, if future cases reiterate the Third Circuit's
reasoning in Chester Residents, citizens will be able to challenge siting decisions directly, thus
increasing their credibility as worthy opponents for hazardous waste facility developers.").
49 Both secticns 601 [the intentional discrimination prohibition] and 602 [the
provision enabling the disparate impact rules] serve the same dual
purpose of combating discrimination by fund recipients and of protecting
individual rights. If serving these dual purposes was sufficient in Cannon
and Guardians to infer that Congress intended to create a private right
of action under Titles IX and VI, it should be sufficient to infer the same
intent under Section 602 of Title VI.
Mank, Is There a Private Cause ofAction?, supra note 18, at 54; see also Carrasco, supra note
18, at 346-47 (reasoning that, as there is private right of action to enforce intentional
discrimination ban, there should be private right of action to enforce disparate impact
regulations).
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Two broad but simple points underlie my policy argument. The
first is the observation that legal rules, to varying degrees, occasion-
ally misfire-that is, their strict application sometimes leads to
undesirable results. As every first year law student learns, the "No
Vehicles in the Park" law should not be used to ban, say, fire trucks
or bicycles. The second point is that, given that rules sometimes
misfire and that some do so more than others, the mechanisms we
use to enforce particular rules should reflect the extent to which
they are prone to misfire. Rules that almost never misfire should be
easily enforced by a large class of potential enforcers (and perhaps
we should offer a reward, beyond compensatory damages, to the
enforcers); those that misfire more frequently should be more
selectively enforced-perhaps exclusively by experts that are
accountable to society as a whole. As I will show, other areas of law
(in particular, negligence doctrine) display sensitivity to the need to
limit the class of law enforcers in situations where technically
violative behavior is nonetheless desirable on the whole.
In a nutshell, my argument is that disparate impact, unlike
intentional discrimination, is not always "bad," and there may thus
be a reason to permit more liberal enforcement of the Title VI
intentional discrimination ban. To make this argument, I will first
draw an analogy between disparate impact and "efficient negli-
gence" and attempt to show that, just as the law aims to avoid
overdeterrence of efficient (but not willful and wanton) negligence
by limiting the class of individuals who may sue for negligence, the
law should similarly avoid overdeterrence of disparate impact (but
not intentional discrimination) by limiting who can sue for that type
of "discrimination." I will then explain why the enforcement option
I favor-exclusive agency enforcement-is superior to competing
enforcement schemes that permit private enforcement of the
disparate impact rules. Finally, I will respond to criticisms of
exclusive agency enforcement.
A. TAILORING THE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM TO AVOID OVERDETER-
RENCE: AN ANALOGY TO EFFICIENT NEGLIGENCE
As noted, the law should reflect sensitivity to the extent to which
a rule's strict application leads to undesirable results (that is, to the
[Vol. 34:11551168
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rule's tendency to misfire), and the rule's enforcement mechanism
should be tailored accordingly. In Subparts III.A.2 and III.A. 3below,
I demonstrate that agencies' disparate impact prohibitions, unlike
the Title VI intentional discrimination ban, frequently misfire, and
that courts should thus limit enforcement of the disparate impact
rules to agency action so as to avoid deterrence of "good" disparity-
causing decisions. First, however, I will briefly discuss how, in
another area, the law limits the class of duty-enforcers in order to
avoid overdeterrence of behavior that is, on the whole, desirable.
1. "Efficient Negligence" and Tort Doctrine's Response. As Dean
Mark Grady has persuasively argued, some apparently negligent
behavior is efficient, and other such behavior is inefficient. 50
Inefficient negligence is easy to imagine; it occurs whenever a
person consciously, and with indifference, fails to take a cost-
effective precaution. An example is a driver who gets drunk and
then drives eighty-miles-an-hour through a school zone. 1 Efficient
negligence, on the other hand, occurs when a cautious person,
engaging in an activity that requires high-rate obligations (that is,
obligations that occur again and again within a brief period of time,
such as looking out for pedestrians, checking for traffic, or making
repetitive inspections), just accidentally slips up because he is
incapable of performing all his precautionary duties.5 2 An example
of efficient negligence is "a driver who is unusually careful in
looking for pedestrians and was so on the day that he accidentally
ran into one."53
Efficient negligence may actually be desirable because it is an
inevitable by-product of wealth creation. As Dean Grady explains:
Negligence law creates obligations that nobody
could ever satisfy all of the time.... Given human
nature, it would not maximize social wealth for
people infallibly to observe their obligations of
precaution. People who never make mistakes are
Mark F. Grady, Efficient Negligence, 87 GEO. L. J. 397, 400-02 (1998).
•' Id. at 402.
52 Id. at 400-01.
" Id. at 402.
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too busy not making mistakes to create much
wealth, either for themselves or for others.54
In other words, efficient negligence, though it has a downside, is not
undesirable on the whole. Were we to punish it severely, we might
stymie beneficial, wealth-creating activities. Tort law, then, should
be careful not to overdeter apparently negligent behavior by
deterring efficient, as well as inefficient, negligence.
Dean Grady contends that this need to deter inefficient negli-
gence without deterring efficient negligence explains a number of
nuances in the law of negligence. Most obviously, it explains the
general rule that punitive damages are available only for intentional
torts and "willful and wanton" negligence.5 The idea, of course, is
that intentional torts and willful and wanton negligence almost
never create wealth (or have any net upside) and thus ought to be
deterred absolutely. Efficient negligence, on the other hand, may
actually create net social gains and thus should not be overdeterred
with the "tax" of punitive damages.5"
" Id. at 400. One might quarrel with Dean Grady's characterization of failure to take
care because of other pressing demands as "negligence." If negligence is defined as failure to
take a cost-effective precaution, such lapses may not be negligent at all: If the lapses are
necessary to permit the actor to engage in activity that creates more wealth than the act of
taking care, then the failure to take care is not cost.ineffective and is thus not negligent.
This nuance is not important to the argument presented here. The important points
to glean from Dean Grady's article are: (1) that not all seemingly negligent behavior is, on
the whole, bad; (2) that such "negligence" should not be deterred absolutely; and (3) that a
number of tort doctrines can be explained as an attempt to avoid overdeterrence of this type
of apparent negligence.
' According to one survey, fourteen states require "malice," defined as intent to harm
the plaintiff, before punitive damages may be awarded. ROBERT G. SCHLOERB ET AL.,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 18-20 (1988). Another twenty-three states permit imposition of punitive
damages only upon a showing of conscious indifference to risk or some similar mental state.
Id. at 21-24. Eight states appear to permit punitive damages when the defendant has
committed gross negligence, but many of these states also add a subjective element or make
clear that the large deviation from due care is merely evidence of the defendant's wrongful
mental state. Id. at 24-26. The Restatement suggests that punitive damages are available
not when negligence is gross but when the defendant's conduct is "outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
' See Grady, supra note 50, at 417-19. Though he does not speak in terms of "efficient
negligence" (and would likely reject Dean Grady's idea that negligence may be efficient),
Judge Posner similarly makes the point that punitive damages for negligence would overdeter
efficient behavior. Referring to the famous "Hand Formula," which defines negligence as a
situation where the cost of accident prevention (B) is less than the probability of an accident
1170
HeinOnline  -- 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1170 1999-2000
2000] PRIVATE DISPARATE IMPACT SUITS 1171
The need to avoid deterrence of efficient negligence also influ-
ences courts' decisions regarding to whom a duty of care is owed
(and thus who may sue for negligence).57 Consider, for example, the
famous duty case, Ultramares Corp. v. Touche.58 In Ultramares, the
plaintiff suffered a financial loss when he relied on an accounting
certification prepared by the defendant accounting firm for its own
client, who borrowed from the plaintiff.59 The defendant, although
it had a contract with its client the borrower, lacked a contract with
the plaintiff who had made a bad loan in reliance on the defendant's
negligently conducted audit."0 In denying the existence of a duty,
the court, speaking through Judge Cardozo, emphasized that the
defendant's negligence might have been efficient and that liability
(P) times the magnitude of loss resulting from the accident (L)-i.e., where B < PL, Judge
Posner explains:
We would expect, and find, the law to be much more willing to award
punitive damages in "real" intentional tort cases [i.e., those that
resemble common law crimes and involve not a conflict between
legitimate (productive) activities but a coerced transfer of wealth to
the defendant in a setting of low transaction costs] than in cases,
whether classified as intentional or unintentional, that lack the
characteristics of a "real" intentional tort case, that is, that do not
involve a pure coercive transfer. We know that in a strict liability
case punitive damages would lead to overdeterrence. Less obviously,
the same thing is true in a simple negligence case. Because of
judicial mistake and the strict liability component in negligence,
negligence cannot be completely avoided by spending B on care. So
if PL is artificially raised by adding punitive damages to L, potential
injurers will be induced to spend more than B on accident preven-
tion, and that is inefficient. But since the gap between B and PL is
so much larger in the "real" intentional tort case, the danger of
deterring socially valuable conduct by making the damages award
greater than L is minimized and other policies come to the fore, such
as making sure that the damages award is an effective deterrent by
resolving all doubts as to the plaintiffs actual damages in his favor;
this can be done by adding a dollop of punitive damages to the
estimate of his actual damages.
RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 227 (5th ed. 1998).
57 See Grady, supra note 50, at 403 Cqif negligent behavior were always inefficient,
negligence duties could be totally comprehensive. For, if negligent behavior were
synonymous with inefficiency, defendants should always be encouraged to avoid ineffi-
ciency.").
58 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
6, Id. at 442-43.
ea Id.
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would therefore entail an unmanageable insurance obligation for
accountants. Judge Cardozo explained:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip
or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery
beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose
accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indetermi-
nate class. The hazards of a business conducted
on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt
whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of
a duty that exposes to these consequences.61
The point is that we want a large, fast accounting industry, and as
we must put up with some slip-ups in order to foster such an
industry, we will not allow third parties to sue for blunders even if
the blunders resulted from apparently negligent behavior.
Ultramares thus illustrates how the need to avoid deterring efficient
negligence has led courts to limit the number of individuals who
may bring suit on account of a defendant's negligence.62
51 Id. at 444.
s Dean Grady points to several other famous negligence cases in which courts similarly
limited the class of plaintiffs in order to avoid deterring efficient negligence. Grady, supra
note 50, at 404-07. In H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928), the
court--again, speaking through Judge Cardozo--held that a water company with a city
contract to supply water to fire hydrants was not liable to the owners of a warehouse that
burned down when the defendant negligently allowed the water pressure to sink. The key
to the decision seems to be the possibility that the negligence was efficient. Judge Cardozo
explained that if the defendant's negligence had been clearly inefficient-if the water
company had acted intentionally or recklessly-the case would have been different. See id.
at 899 ("We do not need to determine now what remedy, if any, there might be if the
defendant had withheld the water or reduced the pressure with a malicious intent to do injury
to the plaintiff or another. We put aside also the problem that would arise if there had been
reckless and wanton indifference to consequences measured and foreseen.").
The coures allocation of the duty of care in Ryan v. New York Central R.R., 35 N.Y. 210
(1866), similarly seems to reflect a concern for not deterring efficient negligence. In that case,
the defendant's locomotive negligently started a fire that spread to the plaintiffs house and
burned it down. Id. In holding that the plaintiff could not sue the defendant, the court
stressed, in essence, that the defendant's negligence mighthave been efficient and thatpeople
in the plaintiffs class were better insurers of the fire risk than was the defendant. The court
explained:
To sustain such a claim as the present [where the plaintiff had
nevertheless proved negligence on the part of the defendant], and to
1172
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2. The Possibility of Desirable Disparity-Causing Decisions. Just
as some instances of apparently negligent behavior are, on the
whole, good and should not be deterred absolutely, not every
decision that has a disparate racial effect is undesirable. Indeed,
some disparity-causing decisions are, on balance, "good" because
they are necessary to attain other worthy objectives. All else being
equal, basic notions of fairness and equality require that
policymakers refrain from taking actions that have the effect of
harming or benefiting members of one race over another. But all
else is almost never equal. Nearly every policy decision a federally
funded entity makes involves consideration of a number of impor-
tant criteria, and those other criteria (besides racial equity in
effects) will rarely line up equally when the agency is choosing
between two options, one racially disparate and the other not.
Suppose, for example, that a federal agency is choosing between
option A and option B. (Assume the only other option, option C, is
to do nothing.) The agency is concerned about a number of
issues-say, the ease of administration of the two options, the social
wealth the options will produce, and the racial effects of the options.
First assume that option A is extremely easy to administer (a "five"
on a one-to-five scale), creates ten million dollars of social wealth,
and has perfectly equitable racial results. Option B is harder to
administer (a "three"), creates only $750,000 of social wealth, and
adversely affects only Hispanic citizens. Obviously, policymakers
should choose option A.
Now consider another set of options. This time option A is tough
to administer (a "one") and creates relatively little wealth (one
thousand dollars) but has perfectly equitable racial effects. Option
B, on the other hand, is simple to administer (a "five") and creates
follow the same to its legitimate consequences, would subject to a
liability against which no prudence could guard, and to meet which
no private fortune would be adequate. Nearly all fires are caused by
negligence, in its extended sense. In a country where wood, coal, gas
and... oils are universally used... and where children find their
home in all houses, it is impossible that the most vigilant prudence
should guard against the occurrence of accidental or negligent fires.
Id. at 216; see also Goldberg v. Kolsman Instrument Corp., 191 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 1963)
(holding that manufacturer of faulty altimeter, who had clearly been negligent, owed no duty
to plaintiff, whose decedent had been travelling on downed airplane).
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ten billion dollars in social wealth, but has a slight disparate racial
impact (eighteen percent of the one thousand people it adversely
affects are African-Americans, and African-Americans make up only
fifteen percent of the relevant population). Option B is probably the
wiser choice, despite its slightly disproportionate adverse impact on
African-Americans.
These are, of course, extreme examples. Most decisions by
federally funded entities probably fall within a gray area in which
the choice between avoiding disparity and pursuing other worthy
objectives is much tougher. In such cases, the entity's best option
may be C-do nothing. The extreme examples, however, do
highlight the quite simple point of this discussion: Racial equality
in end result is certainly an important criterion by which to judge
the desirability of an action, decision, or policy, but it is by no means
the only important criterion. Many times, options that fail to meet
the "no disparate impact" criterion will do exceedingly well on other
important criteria, and it is impossible to say, ex ante, that such
options are bad and should not be pursued. To the contrary, they
are like efficient negligence: They have a downside (disparate racial
effects) but they are, on the whole, good. As in all of life, tradeoffs
are ubiquitous.
Recent debates over novel uses of Title VI disparate impact
regulations provide examples of good, or at least arguably good,
decisions that have incidental disparate impacts. In the educational
arena, policymakers and commentators have been debating whether
high-stakes testing should be eliminated on the ground that it
produces racially disparate results.63 The vast majority of American
colleges, most of which receive federal funding, base admissions
' See, e.g., Statements of Norman V. Cantu, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, and
Linda Chavez, President of the Center for Equal Opportunity, Policies and Enforcement
Activities of the Office for Civil Rights at the Department of Education: Hearings Before the
House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Education
and the Workforce, 1999 WL 20009189 (June 22, 1999) (containing statement of Linda
Chavez, President of the Center for Equal Opportunity) [hereinafter Statements of Norman
Cantu and Linda Chavez]; Symposium: Should Washington Police the Use of Standardized
Assessment Tests?, INSIGHTMAGAZINE, Aug. 30, 1999, at 40 (presenting debate between Rep.
Pete Hoekstra (no) and Monty Neill (yes), Executive Director of the National Center for Fair
and Open Testing); Should the SAT Account for Race?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 27, 1999,
at 26 (containing debate between Professor Nathan Glazer (yes) and author Abigail
Thernstrom (no)).
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decisions, at least in part, on candidates' test scores." There is no
question that use of the widely employed Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT) in making admissions decisions has a disparate impact on
some-minority groups; African-Americans routinely do worse on the
SAT-than similarly situated white and Asian test-takers. 5 All else
being equal, then, colleges should choose another means of selecting
among applicants.
As usual, however, all else is not equal. On two important
criteria that colleges consider when determining what means they
will use to select among applicants-administrative convenience and
ability to predict future academic success-the SAT is simply
unmatched; it is an extremely easy metric for colleges to use, and it
is anexcellent predictor of how a test-taker will perform in college.66
So far, there is no practical alternative means by which colleges can
obtain the important likelihood-of-success information the SAT
conveys,6" though testing experts are attempting to design a test
that measures future academic success without yielding racially
disparate results." Being able to gauge applicants' future academic
success permits colleges to maintain academic standards and avoid
demoralizing students who are simply unable to compete with their
See Roger Clegg & Lenore Ostrowsky, Test Guidelines Will Coerce Colleges and Cheat
Students, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 2, 1999, at B8 (noting that 82% of four-year
undergraduate institutions require admissions tests).
' See Douglas Lederman, Persistent Racial Gap in SATScores FuelsAffirmative-Action
Debate, CHRON. HIGHEREDUC., Oct. 30, 1998, atA36 (noting racial gap of 200 points on the
1600-point SAT).
' Recentered SAT I Scores as a Predictor of College Grades (copy on file with author);
see Clegg & Ostrowsky, supra note 64 ("Yet how a student does on standardized tests such
as the SAT and ACT remains the single best means of addressing future aptitude for
learning."); StuartTaylor, Jr., CivilRights CopsAim at Educational Tests, NATILJ., June 12,
1999, available in 1999 WL8102577 CAvast body ofatudies shows the SAT, when considered
together with high school grades and other criteria (as is usual), to be the most reliable
known predictor of academic success in college.").
6 See Brian O'Reilly, Measuring the SAT. The SAT is the Most Efficient Predictor of
College Success (visited Dec. 13, 1999) <http:/lwww.collegeboard~orgindex.thislsat/
htmlfcounselors/measurelmeasurec.html> (Nothing delivers so much predictive power in so
little time.").
' See Nathan Glazer, Should the SATAccountforRace? Yes., THBENEWREPUJBLIC, Sept
27, 1999, at 26 (discussing Educational Testing Services development of "Strivera SAT,"
which will"take into account a student's socioeconomic background and race, increasing the
scores of those whose socioeconomic background or race is considered to put them at a
disadvantage").
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classmates. 69 Hence, continued use of the SAT is at least arguably
good, even though use of the test has a disparate impact on some
minority groups.
Indeed, the recent suggestion by the Department of Education
Office of Civil Rights that use of the SAT might be illegal under the
regulations implementing Title V17° sparked a tremendous outcry
from the education establishment 7 1-a group that typically displays
serious concerns about minority under-representation in colleges.7"
Educators realize that avoiding racial disparity is a very worthy
goal, but it is not the only goal a college should pursue in making
admissions decisions. Because of other important considerations,
such as administrative convenience and the need to predict future
academic success with accuracy, using testing devices such as the
SAT is "good," even though doing so may have some incidental
racially disparate effects.
The environmental permitting arena provides a second example
of a type of decision that has disparate racial effects but is, on the
' Numerous commentators have documented the demoralization resulting from
"academic mismatch." See generally THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK EDUCATION: MYTHS AND
TRAGEDIES (1972) (noting negative effects of lowering standards); SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM
DEFERRED: THE SECOND BETRAYAL OF BLACK FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1998) (noting same);
Clyde W. Sumners, Preferential Admissions: An Unreal Solution to a Real Problem, 1970 U.
TOL. L. REV. 377, 385 (discussing same); Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom,
Reflections on the Shape of the River, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1583, 1601 (1999) (book review)
(identifying mismatch theory).
70 See Marc Berley, Good-bye to Merit, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1999, atA19 (noting Stance
of Department of Education that "the use of any educational test which has a significant
disparate impact... is discriminatory"); Clegg & Ostrowsky, supra note 65, at B8 (discussing
draft guidelines, entitled "Nondiscrimination in High Stakes Testing," released by Education
Department's Office of Civil Rights); John Leo, The Feds Strike Back, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., May 31, 1999, at 16 (noting that guidelines specify "that 'the use of any educational test
which has a significant disparate impact on members of any particular race, national origin,
or sex is discriminatory' unless the school using the test can prove otherwise").
71 See Amy Docker Marcus, Standardized Test Guide Could Lead to Lawsuits, WALL ST.
J., May 26, 1999, at A2 (reporting outcry by College Board and American Council on
Education, the nation's largest college trade group).
72 See Statements of Norman Cantu and Linda Chavez, supra note 63 (noting that
colleges routinely handicap standardized test scores of African-Americans and sometimes
those of Hispanics in admissions in order to increase minority representation and referring
to published studies documenting this trend); see also Center for Equal Opportunity
Affirmative Action Publications (visited Dec. 13, 1999) <http://www.ceousa.org/html/
racepub.html> (cataloging full text of studies documenting use of affirmative action to
eliminate racial under-representation at service academies and at public universities in
Minnesota, Virginia, Washington, California, North Carolina, and Colorado).
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whole, good. Contrary to the claims of many environmental justice
advocates (and to the reasoning of the decisions permitting private
lawsuits to prevent disparate impacts caused by environmental
permitting decisions), not every instance of racially disparate siting
of polluting and waste facilities is bad. Facilities that pollute or
store waste are, after all, big business. They may bring job opportu-
nities, increased tax revenues, and numerous other benefits to their
host communities.73 Of course, they may also bring inconveniences,
stigma, and health risks. Given that each facility provides its
community with a "mixed bag" of blessings and curses, it is
impossible to say ex ante that polluting and waste facilities should
not be sited in certain types of communities.
The fact is, siting a polluting or waste facility in a disproportion-
ately minority community may actually be good for the community.
This is because the owners of facilities, who generally face opposi-
tion to siting,74 frequently offer host communities lucrative compen-
sation packages that mitigate the negative effects of hosting the
facilities and thereby diminish local opposition. 5 Such compensa-
tion packages-which, in economic terms, "internalize the externali-
ties" created by the facilities7 -- may leave the residents better off
than they would have been had the facilities been sited elsewhere."
"' See generally Christopher Boerner & Thomas Lambert, Environmental Injustice, 118
PUB. INTEREST 61, 74-76 (1995) (discussing benefits); Thomas Lambert & Christopher
Boerner, Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14 YALEJ.ONREG.
195, 217-21 (1997) (discussing same).
" See generally MICHAEL O'HARE ETAL., FACILITY SITINGAND PUBLIC OPPOSITION (1983)
(discussing opposition to siting); Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of
Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived
Crisis, 68 TUL. L. Rlv. 1047 (1994) (noting same); Herbert Inhaber, OfLULUs, NIMBYs, and
NIMTOOs, 107 PUB. INTEREST 52 (1992) (discussing same).
" Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is it Time to Pay Attention?, 21 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 787, 822-23 (1994).
76 See TOMTIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTALAND NATURALRESOURCEECONOMICS 51-59 (3d
ed. 1992) (discussing pollution as "negative externality"-negative because it is undesirable,
and an externality because it affects those who are outside the process that creates it).
" Consider, for example, the advantages minority residents of Sumter County, Alabama
have reaped from Chemical Waste Managemenes controversial Emelle landfill. Because
Sumter County residents are predominately African-American, outside observers frequently
refer to the Emelle landfill as a prime example of despicable environmental racism. See A
Place at the Table, SIERRA, May-June 1993, at 52 (arguing that the location of Emelle landfill
is an example of environmental racism); Robert Bullard, The Threat of Environmental
Racism, NAT. RESOURCES &ENVT, Winter 1993, at 25 (noting threat of environmental racism
present in location of plants like those in Emelle). In actuality, Emelle ended up in Sumter
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Because of the benefits polluting and waste facilities may provide
their host communities, the majority of residents in non-white
communities sometimes support siting in their neighborhood. For
example, poll results showed that over seventy percent of the
residents of St. James Parish, a predominately minority community
in Louisiana, supported the siting of Shintech Incorporated's
polyvinyl chloride manufacturing plant in the parish.v St. James
Parish, facing an unemployment rate of twelve percent (sixty
County because of the area's sparse population, arid climate, and location atop the Selma
chalk formation--seven hundred feet of dense, natural chalk. See Lynn Blais, Environmental
Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REv. 75, 109 (1996) (noting that prior to Chemical Waste
Management's decision to purchase the Emelle site, EPA had identified the property as one
of ten most protective sites for disposal of hazardous waste). These factors, along with
millions of dollars of state-of-the-art technology, make Emelle one of the world's safest
landfills. See Charles McDermott, Balancing the Scales of Environmental Justice, 21
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 689, 697 (1994) (discussing location-specific factors making Emelle a
perfect location for the facility).
The Emelle landfill has been an economic boon to Sumter County. See Tom Arrandale,
When the Poor Cry N!MB Y, GOVERNING, Sept. 1993, at 40 (noting statement of Robert Smith,
black elementary school principal who was also chairman of Sumter County Commission, that
"[flinancially, the landfill's been positive, very positive for the county," and reporting that in
light of economic benefits the landfill has provided, the Commission has opposed state
proposals that would have reduced amount of waste the Emelle landfill may accept). And the
economic benefits have created other non-economic advantages. The landfill provides over
four hundred jobs (sixty percent of which are held by county residents), a ten million dollar
annual payroll, and a guaranteed $4.2 million in annual tax revenue. See McDermott, supra,
at 697 (noting flow of revenue the Emelle landfill brings to minority community). This money
has enabled the community to build a fire station and a town hall, improve schools, upgrade
the health-care delivery system, and begin reversing rates of illiteracy and infant mortality.
Since the landfill was built in 1977, economic growth in Sumter County has brought about
improved health care and led to a dramatic decline in infant mortality rates. Id. at 698. For
the years 1975-1977, the county's infant mortality rate was twenty-seven deaths per
thousand, while the overall state average was 18.8 per thousand. For the years 1985-1987,
the rate in Sumter County had fallen to 14.4 per thousand, while Alabama's was 12.7 per
thousand. By 1991, when the state infant mortality rate stood at 11.4 per thousand, Sumter
County's had fallen to 8.5 per thousand. Id. The county's impressive gains in public health
cast doubt on the widespread notion that compensation packages to host communities require
residents to sacrifice health for financial gain. They also illustrate the point that not all
environmental permitting decisions that have a disparate impact are bad. The fact is, Sumter
County was desperate for business, and the Emelle landfill provided economic growth that
left residents better off than before. Thus, the decision to grant an operating permit to the
facility was good, even though it did have a disparate impact on African-Americans.
78 See Sara Shipley, Race, Jobs, Pollution In Bayou Test Case, CHRISTIANSCI. MONITOR,
Jan. 1, 1998, at 1 (noting results of poll conducted by local NAACP). But see Chris Gray,
Shintech Foes Live Closest to Site, Poll Says, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 18, 1998,
at Al (reporting results of another poll showing that, while majority of parish residents
supported construction of Shintech facility, 52% of parish residents living closest to the site
opposed construction of facility).
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percent in Convent, the town in which the facility was to be
located)," was desperate for jobs and tax revenue, and Shintech
promised to provide 165 full-time jobs, 90 contract positions, and
1,800 temporary construction jobs, plus $500,000 for a job training
program that would ensure that local residents were qualified to
perform the jobs the plant would provide.8" Moreover, Shintech
promised to pay its employees twelve dollars an hour plus
benefits--definitely a step up from many residents' sugar cane
farming jobs, which paid six dollars an hour with no benefits.8' The
local support for the plant is therefore not surprising. Nor is the
fact that the local chapter of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) actively lobbied for the
facility, and the state NAACP adopted a resolution in favor of siting
the Shintech plant in St. James Parish.82
St. James Parish's experience is not unique. Black resi-
dents-including the local chapter of the NAACP-in Brooksville,
Mississippi similarly supported construction of an incinerator and
hazardous waste landfill in that town,83 and residents of the all-
" See Shipley, supra note 78, at 1 (also noting that Louisiana's unemployment rate, by
contrast, was six percent).
80 See id. (noting results of poll by NAACP); Henry Payne, Planting Prosperity or Sowing
Racism? EPA Policy That Bars Polluting Plants from Minority Communities Comes Under
Attack, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, June 15, 1998, at A9 (noting criticism of EPA's policy of
barring pollution plants from minority communities).
8" See Payne, supra note 80, at A9 (noting more favorable hourly wages available at waste
disposal plants).
82 See State NAACP Takes Pro.Shintech Stance, ASSOCIATEDPRESSPOL. SERV., Sept. 22,
1997, available in 1997 WL 2551041 (indicating NAACP's support of Shintech landfill in St.
James Parish). The context in which the Louisiana NAACP gave its support to the Shintech
plant indicates that the plant was indeed a special case of beneficial environmental disparity.
In a single meeting, the state NAACP voted to adopt separate resolutions that would: (1)
back the Shintech plant, (2) request that the governor set up an environmental justice task
force, and (3) ask the state attorney general to file lawsuits against industrial facilities
polluting the air and water. Id. The fact that the organization approved the Shintech plant
while simultaneously adopting "pro.environmental justice" resolutions indicates that even
individuals sensitive to environmental equity concerns could see that Shintech was good for
the local community, despite the disparate impacts caused.
83 In the early 1990s, Federated Technologies Industries (FTI) of Mississippi offered a
compensation package to small, mostly African-American Brooksville in exchange for
permission to build an incinerator and hazardous waste landfill. The company agreed to pay
$250,000 every year into the county's general revenue fund and $50,000 a year for roadway
construction and maintenance. FTI also agreed to build a civic center, finance a research
center, and allot between seventy percent and eighty percent of the proposed facility's jobs
to local residents, at starting wages of between seven and eight dollars an hour. Opposed by
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black town of Robbins, Illinois, on Chicago's south side, overwhelm-
ingly supported hosting a waste-to-energy incinerator, despite the
claims of outside groups that Robbins was a victim of environmental
racism.8 ' The Mescalero Apaches in southern New Mexico have also
actively supported waste storage on their property.85 Minority
a group of local business owners, most of whom paid employees minimum wage or slightly
above, the local chapter of the NAACP actively lobbied for the plant's approval. See Lambert
& Boerner, supra note 73, at 221 n.81 (indicating division in community over location of work
facility); Keith Schneider, Blacks Fighting Blacks on Plans for Dump Site, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
13, 1993, at A12 (noting division in community over plans for dump site).
s' See generally Lambert & Boerner, supra note 73, at 217-19 (discussing approval oflocal
residents for waste disposal plant despite claims of racism). In the late 1980s and early
1990s, officials in Robbins actively pursued the chance to host a large capacity waste facility
in the town. They did so largely out of desperation. The per capita income in the town (just
over $8,000 in 1990, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERIS-
TICS-ILLINOIS 20 (1993)) ranked 262 out of 263 communities in the Chicago metropolitan
area, and almost one-quarter of the town's families lived below the poverty line. See Bonnie
Miller Rubin, Robbins Has Many Uses of Windfall, CHICAGO TRIS., Dec. 2, 1994, at MSS1
(noting lack of economic development in Robbins). Between 1980 and 1991, the town's
population fell fifteen percent to eight thousand. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra, at 20.
Robbins had no gas station, no bank, no laundromat, and no restaurant that stayed open past
six p.m. Police and fire protection operated at a bare minimum, and churches (thirty-four)
outnumbered tax-paying businesses (twenty-six). Rubin, supra.
Facing such dire circumstances, residents of Robbins were quite happy to host a large
waste-to-energy incinerator that promised to double the town's yearly revenue and fund
scholarships for local students. See Jon Jeter, Poor Town that Sought IncineratorFinds More
Problems, Few Benefits; Environmentalists, State, Neighbors Foil Cash-for-Trash Plan, WASH.
POST, Apr. 11, 1998, at A3 (noting conflict among local residents). Some even attended
hearings wearing hats proclaiming "Yes, In My Back Yard." Id.
Unfortunately, things did not work out as Robbins residents had hoped, but not
because they were duped by the company building the incinerator. Before the incinerator
even opened, the Illinois state legislature, under pressure from environmental groups,
repealed the state's "retail rate law," which had subsidized waste-to-energy incinerators like
the one built in Robbins. Id. Without the state subsidy, the Robbins incinerator has not been
able to turn a profit, and the promised compensation has not been forthcoming. Id. At
present, Foster-Wheeler, the company that operates the incinerator, is suing the State of
Illinois for repealing the retail rate law without "grandfathering in" the Robbins facility. Id.
Black officials in Robbins blame the state, not the incinerator company, for ruining its plan
to rejuvenate its economy with money from the incinerator. See Irene Brodie, State Burns
Robbins in Incinerator Deal, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at 38 (letter to editor by black
mayor of Robbins, who contends that "[b]y taking away the funding upon which the
incinerator was built, the state is demonstrating its resolve to force the incinerator into
bankruptcy ... [so that] all that Robbins will have left will be remnants of its noble efforts
to become self-sufficient").
" On March 10, 1995, the Mescaleros voted to permit their tribal leaders to enter into
an agreement with approximately thirty utility companies to provide temporary storage for
the companies' radioactive waste until the United States Department of Energy's planned
Yucca Mountain permanent disposal facility is opened. George Johnson, Nuclear Waste
Dump Gets Tribe's Approval in Re-Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995, at 6. The tribe expected
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support for facility siting in St. James Parish, Brooksville, and
Robbins, and on the Mescalero reservation debunks the myth that
all environmental permitting decisions that create a disparate
impact are bad. Indeed, when a facility is in compliance with all
health-based regulations and its operation is supported by local
residents and the facility owner, the "bad" outcome, it seems, would
be to forbid the win-win situation that would result from siting the
facility.
Use of the SAT and environmental permitting in minority
communities, then, are two examples of arguably "good" disparity-
causing measures that should not be banned. There are many
others.8 6
to receive $250 million in direct and indirect benefits from storing the waste until the federal
facility is completed. Id. Unfortunately, the tribe has not yet been able to reach an
agreement with nuclear power companies and regulators over how storage will occur, and the
deal may be permanently thwarted. Nuclear Waste: NSP and Mescaleros Drop Site
Negotiations, GREENWIRE, Apr. 22, 1996.
" For example, each of the following decisions or policies is arguably good but would
likely have a racially disparate impact:
(1) a federally subsidized landlord's decision not to rent to drug
addicts in a community where a disproportionate number of addicts
are non-white, Roger Clegg, The Bad Law of 'Disparate Impact," 138
PUB. INTEREs 79, 81 (2000);
(2) a college's rule prohibiting athletic participation by athletes
who do not maintain a certain grade point average, cf. Cureton v.
NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 715 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that athletes
state case of disparate impact discrimination), rev'd on other
grounds, 198 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 1999) (reversing on ground that
Title VI does not apply because NCAA is not federal fund recipient);
(3) a public school's decision to serve milk at lunch (because a
disproportionate number of African-American and Asian children
are lactose-intolerant);
(4) the Corporation for Public Broadcasting's decision to fund
National Public Radio (NPR) and public television (PBS) (because
the listenerslviewers of NPR and PBS are disproportionately white);
(5) federal funding of local public transportation systems in most
cities (because a disproportionate number of public transportation
riders in most cities are non-white-a reverse disparate impact), cf
Mark Murray, Seeking Justice in Roads and Runways, NAT'L J.,
Mar. 4, 2000, available in 2000 WL 6436907 (cataloguing local
transportation decisions that are potentially actionable under Title
VI regulations); and
(6) the National Endowment for the Arts' decision to fund 'high
culture" (i.e., the sorts of exhibits that attract a disproportionately
white crowd).
This list could continue for pages.
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3. The Need to Limit the Class of Disparate Impact Plaintiffs in
Order to Avoid Overdeterrence. Because not all disparity-causing
decisions are undesirable, permitting private disparate impact suits
is problematic. Permitting private enforcement of the disparate
impact regulations will all but guarantee that "good" disparity-
causing actions are not taken. A private right of action for mere
disparate impact effectively allows a single aggrieved member of a
disparately impacted class to stop an action or decision that has a
racially disparate effect, even if the action or decision is, on the
whole, beneficial.8" In essence, each member of the disparately
affected group is given veto power, making it necessary for federally
funded entities to achieve absolute consensus among the members
of the disparately affected group before undertaking any action
causing disparate impact. Obviously, requiring such consensus will
make disparity-causing actions and decisions next to impossible.
Consider the problems private disparate impact suits cause in the
environmental permitting arena. If each member of a disparately
affected minority group may sue to stop the disparate impact, each
member essentially has veto power over siting decisions. Hence, if
just one member of the disparately impacted group opposes a project
that every other member of the group supports, he may sue to block
the project. Allowing private suits would thus make it very difficult
to site industrial facilities in many areas of the country, where
granting a pollution permit would (because minority residents
outnumber white residents) cause a privately actionable disparate
impact.88 Recognizing how this veto power could stymie industrial
" If there is a justification defense-i.e., if courts may refuse to enjoin disparity-causing
decisions that they deem to be "justified"--then private plaintiffs may have a harder time
vetoing desirable disparity-causing decisions. The disparate impact regulations themselves,
however, include no justification defense (and thus differ from Title VII, which expressly
exempts disparity-causing employment decisions that are taken as a matter of business
necessity). See infra note 101 and accompanying text (listing citations to disparate impact
regulations). Moreover, permitting court nullification through a general justification defense
is, as a policy matter, less desirable than relying on agency nullification via prosecutorial
discretion. See infra notes 106-115 and accompanying text (noting distinction and arguing
for agency nullification over court nullification).
" For example, if permitting a polluting facility in a city or county that has a higher
minority population than the nation as a whole is a privately actionable disparate impact,
then individual members of minority groups will be able to veto siting in all of Delaware and
the District of Columbia; over ninety percent of the counties in Mississippi, South Carolina,
and Louisiana; over seventy percent of the counties in Alabama, Georgia, and Maryland;
[Vol. 34:11551182
HeinOnline  -- 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1182 1999-2000
2000] PRIVATE DISPARATE IMPACT SUITS 1183
development (and "brownfields" redevelopment) 9 in minority
communities, the National Black Chamber of Commerce has filed
amicus briefs asking courts not to permit private disparate impact
suits to remedy alleged environmental disparity.'
The case of the proposed Shintech facility in St. James Parish
provides a compelling example of how much-needed industrial
development may be halted by empowering each affected member
of a disparately impacted minority group to enforce the disparate
roughly fifty percent of the counties in New Jersey, Arkansas, and Virginia; and the cities of
Memphis, New York, Detroit, Jacksonville, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Houston. All of these
cities and counties contain higher percentages of African-Americans than the national
population as a whole. COUNTY AND CITY EXTRA (Deidre Gaquin & Mark S. Littman eds.,
1998).
" 'Brownfielda' are abandoned, inactive, or underutilized industrial sites that are
difficult to redevelop because they may contain some historic contamination that poses minor
health or environmental risks and requires potentially cost-prohibitive cleanup work." Brief
of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, National Black
Chamber of Commerce, Inc., and Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry in Support
of Petitioners, at 22. Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 524 U.S. 915
(1998) (No. 97-1620) [hereinafter, Amicus Brief in Support of Chester Residents Petitioners].
Brownfields are generally located in urban areas and tend to be surrounded by minority and
low-income communities. Id. Estimates of the number of such sites range from 130,000 to
425,000. Id. (citing General Accounting Office, Community Development: Reuse of Urban
Industrial Sites, GAO/RCED-95-172, at 3 (June, 1995)). "A recent survey found over 20,000
brownfields sites in just 39 cities, with 'lost' tax revenues totaling hundreds of millions of
dollars each year." Id. (citing UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, IMPACT OF
BROWNFIELDS ON U.S. CITIES: A 39-CITY SURVEY 1 (1996)). Congress has undertaken
numerous initiatives aimed at encouraging brownfield redevelopment. See, e.g., Department
of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-65, 111 Stat. 1372 (1997) (funding Superfund and
authorizing EPA to provide funds to cities and counties to assess possibilities of brownfield
remediation); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-297, at 34, 39 (1997) (authorizing economic
development grants for brownfields and authorizing use of community development block
grants for environmental cleanup and economic development related to brownfields). Many
states have done the same. See Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams"?: Challenges and
Limits of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 915 (noting
that, by 1996, 29 states had statutes and regulations providing incentives for voluntary
cleanup of contaminated sites). In addition, the states have declared that attracting active
industrial facilities to brownfields in minority and low-income areas is an important public
policy goal. SeeThe Council ofState Governments, AResolutionRegardingStateBrownfields
Initiatives (updated Dec. 8, 1996) <http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/DEPUTATE/
AIRWASTEIWMILANDREC/facts/Brownfields.htm> (recommending guidelines for
brownfields programs). Ofcourse, redeveloping brownfields into working industrial areas will
require the issuance of environmental permits, and if private citizens may sue for disparate
impact whenever a federally funded permitting agency grants an operating permit in a
minority area, brownfield redevelopment efforts will be thwarted.
00 See Amicus Brief in Support of Chester Residents Petitioners, supra note 89 (arguing
against private suits to remedy environmental disparity).
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impact regulations (and thereby giving each individual a de facto
veto right). The threat of a private disparate impact suit was
largely responsible for thwarting the siting of the Shintech
facility-a facility that most local residents (and the local and state
chapters of the NAACP) supported. 1 Despite such widespread local
support, law students from the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic
were able to find some minority residents who opposed the siting
and thus were able credibly to threaten to file suit on behalf of those
individuals under Title VI disparate impact regulations. 92 Because
the Title VI regulations absolutely prohibit disparate impacts,93 the
Tulane students could have blocked Shintech's permit, regardless of
what benefits Shintech promised residents or what degree of local
support it enjoyed. After months of trying (with the help of the local
NAACP) to convince the Tulane clinic to drop its disparate impact
attack, Shintech finally gave up and decided to site its facility
elsewhere.94 The threat of a private disparate impact suit thus
deterred a good disparity-causing decision. Had it been settled law
that private individuals may not sue to stop mere disparate impacts,
the Tulane students could not credibly have threatened to bring a
private lawsuit against the state agency for permitting Shintech's
facility. Instead, they would have to convince the EPA to initiate
action to stop the disparate impact-a task that would have been
difficult, given the local support for the facility and the obvious
benefits the plant would provide to its host community.
The threat of private disparate impact suits also endangers
colleges' continued use of standardized tests to make college
admissions decisions-a practice that, while disparity-causing, is
arguably good on the whole. 5 Private plaintiffs have already
brought a disparate impact suit against the University of California
51 See supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting support of NAACP).
Shintech Reaffirms Plan to Locate $700MPlant in Louisiana, CAP. MKT. REP., Jan. 16,
1998.
See infra note 101 (noting prohibition of disparate impacts).
See generally Activism on the Bayou: Shintech Case Redefines Outreach, CHEMIcAL
WEEK, May 26, 1999, available in 1999 WL 9309888 (describing environmental justice case
involving Shintech).
" See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text (describing use of standardized tests).
[Vol. 34:11551184
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at Berkeley,96 and the logic of their case is unquestionable: Berkeley
relies heavily on the SAT in making admissions decisions, and non-
Asian minority test-takers, who routinely do worse than whites and
Asians on the SAT, are disparately impacted by Berkeley's policies."
Regardless of the soundness of Berkeley's admissions procedures,
they do technically violate the disparate impact regulations, and if
private plaintiffs may sue to enforce the regulations, Berkeley is in
trouble. Indeed, one federal district court, which permitted a
private disparate impact suit by African-American student athletes,
recently enjoined the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) from imposing a minimum SAT score as a condition of
freshman athletic eligibility. 8 It is a very short step from this
ruling to say that colleges generally may not use the SAT to make
admissions decisions.
B. EXCLUSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT AND COMPETING
ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS
In essence, the argument presented here is in favor of an
enforcement approach that permits "agency nullification" of the
disparate impact regulations in order to avoid overdeterrence of
disparity-causing decisions. The Shintech example shows that, just
as the law limits the damages available for efficient negligence and
restricts the class of plaintiffs who may sue for such negligence in
order to avoid overdeterrence, it should similarly limit who may sue
to stop disparity-causing decisions. Disparate impact, like some
apparently negligent behavior, is often an inevitable result of
actions that are, on the whole, desirable. Indeed, practically every
decision a federally funded entity makes will have some disparate
" See Berley, supra note 70, at A19 (noting lawsuit against Berkeley); Marcus, supra
note 71, at A2 (arguing that federal guidelines of use of standardized tests will lead to legal
challenges).
See Marcus, supra note 71, at A2 (describing lawsuit).
" Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 715 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 198 F.3d
107, 116 (3d Cir. 1999) (reversing on ground that Title VI did not apply because NCAA was
not federal fund recipient).
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impact (perhaps on white citizens-a "reverse" disparate impact).99
Thus, our mechanism for enforcing the disparate impact regulations
should include some way to weed out the good disparity-causing
decisions, which are like efficient negligence, from the bad ones,
which are like willful and wanton negligence. If courts limit
enforcement of the disparate impact regulations to agency action,
then administrative agencies could perform a screening function,
picking out the bad disparity-causing actions for prosecution but
allowing the good ones (such as the decision to permit the Shintech
plant) to slide by.1" In other words, agencies could engage in
nullification when strict application of the disparate impact
prohibition would lead to bad results. The law could thereby
address the concern about deterring beneficial disparity-causing
decisions. The following Subparts explain why exclusive adminis-
trative enforcement is superior to competing private enforcement
options and demonstrate that the pathologies frequently besetting
agencies given exclusive enforcement authority do not raise concerns
in this context.
1. Superior to Private Enforcement of the Regulations as Drafted.
The disparate impact regulations, as drafted, forbid all disparate
impacts. 1 ' Thus, any flexibility in the disparate impact ban must
I Federal funding of public transportation in urban areas provides an example of
"reverse" disparate impact that would appear to be actionable under the Title VI regulations.
Assuming a disproportionate number of public transportation riders (i.e., beneficiaries) are
members of racial minorities, the decision to use tax money to fund public transportation
systems has a disproportionate adverse impact on white taxpayers.
"00 Note that intentional discrimination, like an intentional tort, is always undesirable and
thus ought to be deterred absolutely. The argument presented here is therefore fully
consistent with Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), in which the Court held
that there is a private right of action to enforce the Title VI intentional discrimination ban.
101 See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1999) (including Department of Education's absolute
disparate impact ban, which prohibits, without qualification, all use of "criteria or methods
of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because
of their race, color, or national origin"); 5 C.F.R. § 900.404(b)(2) (1999) (containing similar
regulation for Office of Personnel Management); 7 C.F.R. § 15.3(b)(2) (1999) (Dep't of Agric.);
7 C.F.R. § 1901.202(a)(2)(vii) (Dep't of Agric.); 10 C.F.R. § 4.12(b) (1999) (Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n); 10 C.F.R. § 1040.13(c),(d) (Dep't of Energy); 14 C.F.R. § 1250.103-2(b) (NASA)
(1999); 15 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(viii)(2) (1999) (Dep't of Commerce); 18 C.F.R. § 705.4(b)(2) (1999)
(Water Resources Council); 18 C.F.R. § 1302.4(b)(2)-(3) (Tenn. Valley Auth.); 22 C.F.R. §
141.3(b)(2) (1999) (State Dep't); 22 C.F.R. § 209.4(b)(2),(3) (Agency for Int'l Dev.); 24 C.F.R.
§ 1.4(b)(2)(i),(3) (1999) (Dept of Housing and Urban Dev.); 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2),(3) (1999)
(Justice Dep't); 29 C.F.R. § 31.3(b)(2)-(3) (1999) (Dep't of Labor); 32 C.F.R. § 195.4(b)(2) (1999)
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come from selective enforcement of the rules. A few moments'
reflection reveals that agencies are better-suited than private
citizens to engage in such selection. First, agencies are at least
somewhat democratically accountable.. 2 and are therefore likely to
consider the interests of many different groups and individuals in
determining which disparity-causing actions to prosecute. Private
individuals, on the other hand, are completely unaccountable to the
rest of society and will thus consider only their own private costs
and benefits in determining whether to take steps to stop disparity-
causing decisions."0 3
(Dep't ofDefense); 38 C.F.R. § 18.3(b)(2) (1999) (Dep't ofVeterans Affairs); 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b)
(1999) (EPA); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1999) (Dep't of Health and Human Servs.); 45 C.F.R. §
611.3(b)(2) (Nael Science Found.); 45 C.F.R. § 1203.4(b)(2) (Corp. for Nael & Community
Serv.); 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (1999) (Dep't of Transp.).
"' The President is ultimately responsible for how most federal administrative agencies
perform their discretionary tasks, and the heads of agencies, who are under the Presidents
direction, therefore tend to be responsive to constituents' needs and desires. See KENNETH
CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINIsTRATrIV LAw § 1.7, at 25 (3d ed. 1994)
('[B]ureaucrats are accountable to the people through their relationship with the politically
accountable President."). As the Supreme Court explained in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984):
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly
rely upon the incumbent administration's view of wise policy to
inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable
to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate
for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices ....
Id. at 865.
'" For an example of how democratic pressures may constrain an agency's--but not a
private plaintiffs-overzealous enforcement of the disparate impact regulations, consider the
Department of Education's recent ill-fated announcement that it might use the regulations
to prohibit colleges from employing the SAT and similar standardized tests in making
admissions decisions. Edward Blum & Marc Levin, Washington's War on Standardized
Tests, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1999, at A22. The Department's statement that use of the SAT
technically violates the disparate impact regulations was legally correct: Use of the SAT
undoubtedly violates the rule prohibiting recipients of federal funding from "utiliz[ing]
criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin." 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1999)
(containing Department of Education's disparate impact rule). Enforcement of the
regulations in this context, however, would have been unwise, see supra text accompanying
notes 63-72 (discussing arguments against enforcement), and citizens let the Department
know as much. The Department's implicit threat to enforce the regulations was subjected to
intense media criticism. See, e.g., Blum & Levin, supra, at A22 (indicating criticism); supra
notes 71-72 (indicating same). Congress immediately held hearings to consider the wisdom
of the Department's proposed enforcement actions. See Statements of Norman Cantu and
Linda Chavez, supra note 63. In light of these democratic pressures, the Department backed
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In addition, agencies are better equipped to engage in the fact-
finding necessary to make good decisions about which disparity-
causing actions should be stopped. Whereas private individuals
tend to be aware of only the costs and benefits they face as the
result of a decision, administrative agencies, who are charged with
preventing disparate impacts and achieving other regulatory
objectives, take a more comprehensive, systematic view of the costs
and benefits of various decisions and have the resources to engage
in the factfinding necessary for analysis of societal costs and
benefits. For example, an environmental permitting agency will be
motivated and able to take account of any disparate impact caused
by a permitting decision and of such factors as the need for the
permit and the availability and cost of various alternatives;
individuals, on the other hand, will not be privy to the agency's "big
picture" view and will not be able to engage in sophisticated analysis
of the societal costs and benefits of denying a permit. Thus, as long
as the regulations forbid all disparate impacts, as they do now,
104
agencies, with their superior democratic credentials and fact-finding
abilities, should be in charge of deciding when the regulations
should be enforced. Selective agency enforcement is the best way to
work flexibility into the disparate imiact rules so as to avoid
deterrence of good disparity-causing decisions.
2. Superior to Private Enforcement with a General Justification
Defense. An alternative approach to an exclusive administrative
enforcement scheme in which agencies engage in nullification in
appropriate cases would be to permit private suits for disparate
impact but to allow the courts adjudicating such suits to throw out
those that are based on disparate impacts that are somehow
down, indicating that it would not enforce the disparate impact regulations against colleges
that use standardized tests. Id.; see also supra note 66 (noting that Arthur Coleman, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Education, had insisted that Department of Education would not use
Title VI to eliminate SAT use). By contrast, unaccountable private plaintiffs that sued the
University of California at Berkeley for violating the disparate impact rules by using the SAT
have not relented. Why should they? It is in their private interest to eliminate SAT use, and
the concerns of the general public are, in their minds, irrelevant.
104 See supra note 101 (describing prohibition).
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"justified."'0 5 Under such an approach, courts could weed out the
good disparity-causing decisions and ensure that only bad ones are
punished."0 6 This seems to be the approach taken by a number of
lower courts that have modeled their Title VI jurisprudence on Title
VII cases.0 7 Following the Title VII burden-shifting scheme, courts
could render inactionable all disparity-causing decisions that
defendants showed to be justified (i.e., "good," on the whole), and
there would be no need to worry about overdeterring disparate
impacts.
There are, however, several good reasons for favoring agency
nullification (through prosecutorial discretion) over court nullifica-
tion (through reading in a general justification defense). First of all,
the text of the disparate impact regulations is absolute: It prohibits
" See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1334 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(stating that "challenged practice must not only affect disproportionately, it must do so
unnecessarily"); Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110,
127 (S.D. Ohio 1984) CDefendants are not per se prohibited from locating a highway where
it will have differential impacts upon minorities. Rather, Title VI prohibits taking actions
with differential impacts without adequate justification."); see also Mank, Environmental
Justice, supra note 18, at 798-806 (discussing justification defense under Title VI); Gregory
L. Maxim, The EPA's Title VI Bout-Remedying One Injustice With Another, 30 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 1091, 1117-22 (1999) (same).
1" We might refer to this approach as nullification via a "court-enforced justification
standard." The approach involves a standard because the substance of the justification
defense is determined ex post on a case.by-case basis, not exante as a rule. See Louis Kaplow,
Rules Versus Standards: An EconomicAnalysis, 42 DUKEL.J. 557,557 (1992) (defining rules
and standards). The standard is court-enforced, because it is the court, not an administrative
agency, that applies the justification defense. Cf. note 119, infra (describing agency-designed
justification rule).
"o See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 393-94 (3d Cir. 1999). The court there
explained:
[A] plaintiff in a Title VI disparate impact suit bears the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case that a facially neutral
practice has resulted in a racial disparity. If the plaintiff meets that
burden, then the defendant must establish a "substantial legitimate
justification," or a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason[]," for the
practice. Once the defendant meets its rebuttal burden, the plaintiff
must then establish either that the defendant overlooked an equally
effective alternative with less discriminatory effects or that the
proffered justification is no more than a pretext for racial discrimi-
nation.
Id. (citations omitted); see also New York Urban League, Inc., v. City of New York, 71 F.3d
1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying Title VII principles); City of Chicago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d
819, 828-29 & n.12 (7th Cir. 1995) (invoking same); Elston v. Board of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394,
1407 (11th Cir. 1993) (applying same); Damian, 608 F. Supp. at 127 (invoking same).
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actions that have disproportionate racial effects, and it does not
exempt such actions if they are somehow justified.10 8 By contrast,
Title VII, the law from which the lower courts have borrowed the
burden-shifting regime that enables court nullification, expressly
exempts disparity-causing employment decisions that are
justified.109 As neither Title VI nor its implementing regulations
include a justification defense, courts that recognize such a defense
are engaging in unabashed judicial lawmaking.
In addition to this formalistic concern (which, of course, could be
eliminated by amending the regulations), concerns about institu-
tional competence favor agency nullification over court nullification.
Agencies, with their specialized expertise, are better able than
courts to determine (1) what is an actionable disparate impact, and
(2) what is an adequate justification for a disparity-causing decision.
The term "disparate impact" is deceptively simple-sounding; in
actuality, it is often difficult to choose an appropriate comparison
group for determining whether an action or decision genuinely has
disparate racial effects. "0 If the selected comparison group is over-
or under-inclusive, strange results may follow. For example, amici
in Chester Residents noted that under the logic of the disparity
criterion presented in the plaintiffs' complaint, actionable disparate
impact would have resulted if a federally funded agency permitted
siting of a hazardous waste facility in Delaware; the District of
Columbia; over ninety percent of the counties in Mississippi, South
Carolina, and Louisiana; over seventy percent of the counties in
108 See supra note 101 (listing various disparate impact regulations with no exceptions).
109 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994). Specifically, Title VII exempts the use of
disparity-causing criteria and methods that are "job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity." Id.
110 Even Professor Bradford Mank, an advocate ofprivate lawsuits to enforce the disparate
impact regulations, admits that it is often difficult to determine what constitutes a disparity.
Referring to the difficulties of determining whether there is genuine disparate impact in
environmental permitting, he writes:
Defining the relevant affected population groups and comparison
groups is more complicated in an environmental siting case.
Depending on the facts in a particular case and type of pollution, the
relevant populations could be those living within one mile of a
facility, or several miles from the site. There are even more complex
problems in measuring the risks of carcinogenic and
noncarginogenic pollutants.
Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 18, at 801.
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Alabama, Georgia, and Maryland; roughly fifty percent of the
counties in New Jersey, Arkansas, and Virginia; and the cities of
Memphis, New York, Detroit, Jacksonville, Philadelphia, Chicago,
and Houston."' Nevertheless, the Third Circuit, ill-equipped to
evaluate the demographic and statistical methodology underlying
the plaintiffs' complaint, permitted the action to go forward,
apparently determining that actionable disparity had been
alleged."' An environmental permitting agency that was accus-
tomed to evaluating similar demographic and statistical arguments
might well have determined that the plaintiffs' comparison group
was over-inclusive.
Agencies are also likely to be better than courts at determining
what is an adequate justification for a disparity-causing decision.
As experts in the fields they oversee, agencies are well-equipped to
distinguish legitimate proffered justifications from illegitimate ones.
For example, the EPA is in a good position to evaluate claims of
topographical necessity, such as that used to justify siting of the
Emelle landfill in Sumter County, Alabama," 3 and the Department
of Education is well-equipped to evaluate the necessity of high-
stakes testing procedures, like the SAT, that disproportionately
affect minorities.
In addition, agencies are particularly well-suited to gauge the
extent to which adversely affected racial and ethnic groups may
consent to a disparity-causing action or decision. For example,
because of their extensive interaction with the residents of Robbins,
Illinois and St. James Parish, Louisiana through public hearings
and community meetings, EPA officials were in a good position to
evaluate the extent to which public consent could justify the
disparity-creating decision to permit industrial facilities in those
areas. Agencies also possess better democratic credentials than
unaccountable federal courts and may thus be more sensitive to
community sentiment when determining what is an actionable
. Amicus Brief in Support of Chester Residents Petitioners, supra note 89, at *17-18.
m Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 524 U.S. 915, 937 (1998).
" See supra note 77 (discussing Emelle landfill).
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disparate impact and what is an adequate justification for
disparity. 1
14
Finally, agency nullification through prosecutorial discretion is
likely to impose lower total administrative costs than court nullifica-
tion through a justification defense. Under an agency nullification
system, a party's attempt to prosecute a good disparity-causing
decision can be stopped fairly easily. When a party petitions the
agency to enforce its disparate impact rules, the agency may simply
look at the claim, weigh the competing concerns, and decide that
nullification is appropriate." 5 Under a court nullification system,
the plaintiffs frivolous claim must persist until at least the
summary judgment stage. A court could not throw out the com-
plaint on a motion to dismiss, because any complaint that alleges a
disparate impact will have sufficiently stated a prima facie case. 116
Even if the disparity at issue is plainly justified, the regulatee-
defendant will not be able to get the action stopped until it submits
a formal motion for summary judgment and establishes that, based
on the summary judgment record, a rational jury could not return
a verdict finding that the action was unjustified."7 In short, there
is no way, in a court nullification system, to "nip in the bud"
disparate impact prosecutions where the disparity at issue is
obviously justified. By contrast, when agencies have exclusive
authority to enforce or decline to enforce their disparate impact
rules, they may quickly review disparate impact allegations and
easily weed out those where the disparity is clearly justified. If this
concern about frivolous disparate impact suits sounds academic, one
14 See supra note 103 (discussing democratic pressures in context of standardized
testing).
15 The agency's decision not to enforce the disparate impact regulations would not be
subject to costly judicial review. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) C'[A]n
agency's decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial
review.. . ."). Part III.D.3, infra, argues that this lack of expost judicial review is not cause
for concern.
116 See FED.R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (stating requirements for dismissing a complaint for failure
to state claim upon which relief can be granted).
-l See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating test for summary judgment).
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need only consider some of the silly disparate impact actions that
have been filed and litigated.1
To summarize, agency nullification through prosecutorial
discretion is superior to court nullification through a justification
defense because (1) there is no justification defense in the regula-
tions (so recognition of one amounts to judicial lawmaking); (2)
agencies are better suited to determine what is actionable disparate
impact and what constitutes adequate justification; and (3) agency
nullification is administratively more efficient because agencies,
unlike courts, can "nip in the bud" disparate impact actions where
the disparity is plainly justified.
3. Superior to Private Enforcement with an Elaborate, Agency-
Crafted Justification Rule. But what about a system where the
funding agency, not the court, takes control of the weeding out
process but does so ex ante rather than ex post? That is, what if
funding agencies beefed up their disparate impact rules to specify
in advance what constitutes actionable disparity and what an
adequate justification would be? This approach would seem to
eliminate the problems inherent in leaving those determinations to
institutionally incompetent courts.'1  Agencies' institutional
11s See, e.g., New York City Envtl. Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 50 F. Supp. 2d 250
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (arguing that destruction of "community gardens" had disparate impact).
Plaintiffs in that case argued that New York City was creating an unjustified disparate
impact by destroying community gardens on city-owned property in minority areas in order
to build housing for low-income residents. The court determined that there was a "tremen-
dous" need for affordable housing in the areas where the community gardens were located,
and it ultimately dismissed the suit on the ground that there is no private right of action to
enforce the disparate impact regulations. Id. at 252-53. This is the only federal court in the
country to have so held. But it is quite telling that this lawsuit got as far as it did. The
plaintiffs' claims were really rather silly: They wanted to use the disparate impact rules to
stop much-needed low-income housing from being constructed over gardens planted on city-
owned plots that were in disproportionately minority neighborhoods. Any reasonable
decisionmaker would have realized that the alleged disparate impact was justified. Had
agency approval been a prerequisite to the action being brought, the complaint would have
gone nowhere. But since the parties believed the court was the nullifier, the action went
forward until the court rejected the complaint. If nullification happens via a court-enforced
justification standard, actions such as this will have to proceed until at least the summary
judgment stage, despite the fact that they are obviously frivolous.
"1 We might refer to this approach as nullification via an "agency-designed justification
rule." The justification defense is in the form of a rule because its substance is determined
ex ante. See Kaplow, supra note 106 (defining rules and standards). It is agency-designed
because an administrative agency, not an unaccountable, non.expert court, determines the
substance of the justification defense. Cf. supra note 106 (describing "court-enforced
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competence, then, does not necessarily support prohibiting private
lawsuits to enforce the disparate impact regulations, for agencies
could specify in their regulations what is a disparate impact and
what is adequate justification for disparity, and courts could then
just mechanically apply those rules in adjudicating private lawsuits.
The problem with this approach is that it is extremely difficult to
state ex ante what factors will render a disparity-causing decision
justified and thus inactionable. 20 Even in the narrow field of
employment law, in which Congress has attempted to spell out a
prospective "business necessity" rule for determining which
disparity-causing employment decisions are justified and thus
inactionable under Title VII,'2 1 it has been impossible to state, ex
ante, what type of business necessity will justify disparity. 2' It is
even harder to make prospective rules about what disparities will
be justified when the statute bans disparate impact in all ar-
eas-not just a narrow field like the employment context. Moreover,
the rules stating what disparate impacts are justified would have to
account for instances in which the affected individuals consent to
the disparity, as in Robbins and St. James Parish. As consent is
almost never present in the employment context-i.e., disparately
affected groups almost never consent to their disparate treat-
ment-there is no need to incorporate a consent defense into the
broader business necessity justification. Outside the employment
context, however, consent might be present and could provide a
justification for disparate impacts. Agency rules delineating which
justification standard").
" See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on
Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 455 (1999).
The inability of ex ante constraints to foresee the myriad of contexts
in which regulators will have to apply [agency] rules, along with the
abstract nature of decisionmaking norms, make ex ante constraints
on agency discretion, constraints that prevent the agency from
making policy or deviating from it once made, unlikely means of
balancing the need for constraints against the need for regulatory
flexibility.
Id.
m See 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(k) (1994) (codifying business necessity rule).
'" See Linda Lye, Comment, Title VII's Tangled Tale.- The Erosion and Confusion of
DisparateImpact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEYJ. EMP. &LAB. L. 315,343
(1998) (documenting confusion among courts as to what business necessities justify disparity).
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disparate impacts are justified and thus inactionable would
therefore need to account for consent.
The point of this discussion is that, given the myriad ways in
which disparate impacts may arise outside the employment context,
it would be extremely difficult for agencies to specify, ex ante, which
disparate impacts are "good" and should be permitted and which are
"bad" and should be eliminated. It would thus be difficult for
agencies to codify in advance a generally applicable justification
defense that courts could then mechanically apply. Accordingly,
agencies should be given discretion to make determinations about
which disparate impacts are bad, and thus actionable, expost (i.e.,
after the disparities arise or are proposed). They cannot play this
screening role, however, if private plaintiffs may sue to enforce the
disparate impact regulations. The need for agency nullification,
then, favors banning private disparate impact suits.
C. RESPONSES TO CRITICISM OF EXCLUSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCE-
MENT
Critics of the agency nullification approach I advocate will
undoubtedly contend that private enforcement is necessary to guard
against the pathologies to which agencies are susceptible. This
Subpart briefly discusses three such pathologies and argues that
they are not particularly troubling in this context. 2 '
'" In addition to emphasizing the agency pathologies addressed in this subpart, critics
of exclusive agency enforcement may assert that, given agencies' limited enforcement
resources, private enforcement is necessary as a supplement to agency enforcement. This
'limited enforcement resources" argument is frequently used to justify private enforcement
schemes, such as qui tam actions under the False Claims Act or private citizens' suits under
environmental statutes. In this context, however, the argument is not persuasive because
limited enforcement resources are not much of a constraint on an agency's ability to enforce
its disparate impact rules. To enforce the disparate impact rules, the agency need not
prosecute any claim, dig up any privately possessed information, or prove any point; it simply
has to cut off funding to the offending fund recipient in the face of a readily observable
disparate impact. "Thus, this is not a situation, like a fraud action under the False Claims Act
or an environmental violation subject to a citizens' suit, where enforcement is difficult and
requires the collection of information possessed by private citizens. Accordingly, there is no
need to permit private enforcement in order to supplement agencies' limited enforcement
resources.
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1. Capture. Critics are first likely to express concerns about
agency "capture." Capture theory, developed in the 1960s and
1970s124 and now referred to almost reflexively by critics of agency
enforcement discretion, asserts that "in carrying out broad legisla-
tive directives, agencies unduly favor organized interests, especially
the interests of regulated or client business firms and other
organized groups at the expense of diffuse, comparatively unorga-
nized interests such as consumers, environmentalists, and the
poor."'25 Agency capture is most likely to occur when a particular
agency decision has "concentrated benefits and diffuse costs" or
"concentrated costs and diffuse benefits"-that is, when a discrete
group (the recipient of the concentrated benefit or burden) is
particularly interested in the agency decision, and the general
public, among whom the corresponding costs or benefits will be
diffused, remains disinterested. 126  Professor Richard Stewart
explains why a situation of concentrated benefits (or costs) with
diffuse costs (or benefits) will lead to agency capture:
Limited agency resources imply that agencies
must depend on outside sources of information,
policy development, and political support. This
outside input comes primarily from organized
interests, such as regulated firms, that have a
substantial stake in the substance of agency policy
and the resources to provide such input. By
contrast, the personal stake in agency policy of an
individual member of an unorganized interest,
' See, e.g., George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT.
Sc. 3 (1971) (arguing that industries promote regulations beneficial to them in design and
operation); Roger C. Crompton, The Why, Where, and How of Broadened Public Participation
in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525 (1972) (arguing that broadening of public
participation in decisionmaking process improves decision).
12 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669, 1684-85 (1975).
11 SeegenerallyMANcUROLsoN,JR,THELGIcOFCOLLEcrIvEAcTION (1965) (analyzing
dynamics of group action and concluding that individuals in large, diffuse groups will not
attempt to achieve group goals absent coercion). Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKEIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 51-56 (1988)
(discussing how proposals with concentrated benefits/diffuse costs or concentrated
costs/diffuse benefits fare in legislative process).
1196 [Vol. 34:1155
HeinOnline  -- 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1196 1999-2000
PRIVATE DISPARATE IMPACT SUITS
such as a consumer, is normally too small to justify
such representation.127
An agency's decision on the issue of whether or not to enforce the
disparate impact regulations in a particular case is not likely to fit
in the "concentrated benefits (or costs)/diffused costs (or benefits)"
category. This is because there will always be two discrete groups
that will conversely benefit or suffer from whatever decision the
agency makes. For instance, if the agency decides to enforce the
regulations, the otherwise disparately impacted minority group will
benefit (concentrated benefits), and the regulatee will suffer
(concentrated costs). If the agency decides not to enforce the
regulations, the regulatee will receive concentrated benefits, and the
disparately impacted minority group will face concentrated costs.
In short, the agency's decision to enforce or nullify the disparate
impact regulations occurs within a "concentrated costs/concentrated
benefits" context; neither the costs nor the benefits are diffused
among the general public. Accordingly, there is no need to worry
about one side lacking a sufficient incentive to lobby the agency for
its desired outcome, and no side is likely to dominate-or cap-
ture-the agency.
2. Tunnel Vision. Critics may also complain that agencies are ill-
suited to retain exclusive power to enforce the disparate impact
regulations because agencies are likely to develop "tunnel vision"
with respect to their primary mandates and to ignore the regula-
tions' mandate to avoid disparate impact. A number of theorists
have posited that administrators, typically charged with enforcing
a relatively limited and homogenous set of statutory mandates, are
poorly equipped to take account of concerns outside their narrow
areas of expertise.128 For example, an agency charged with protect
" Stewart, supra note 125, at 1686.
", See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Formalism, Functionalism, Ignorance, Judges, 22
Hitv. J. L. & PUB. POLY 13, 19 (1998) C'Agencies start pursuing their own agendas, with
tunnel vision adherence to the goal of their statute at the expense of other, equally worthy
objectives."); Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi.Constitu-
tional Law in Judicial Review of EnvironmentalDecisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air
Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 713, 763 (1977) (concluding that courts serve as important forums for
complaints of individuals because agencies become obsessed with their mandates); cf.
STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKINGTHE VICIOUS CIRCLE 11-19 (1993) (discussing different aspect of
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ing the environment may ignore the degree to which the rules it
adopts stifle economic growth, and an agency whose mandate is to
oversee transportation projects is likely to pay insufficient attention
to the environmental issues raised by various construction endeav-
ors.
But the fact that agencies, in their zeal to fulfill their statutory
mandates, may lose sight of the need to avoid disparate impact does
not imply that there is a need for a private right to sue to stop
disparate impact. Indeed, there are other ways to motivate agencies
to consider the distributive effects of decisions regarding fund
recipients. First of all, the disparate impact regulations themselves
include detailed complaint procedures by which individuals may
notify agencies of disparate impacts. 129  It is thus not likely that
agencies will be "unaware" of racial disparity resulting from the
decisions of the fund recipients they oversee. In addition, orders
from the President expressly direct federal agencies to take account
of, and guard against, disparate impact resulting from decisions by
federally funded entities.' Finally, public interest groups and the
tunnel vision-the tendency of agency, by focusing on single mission, to take its actions to
their extremes).
2 See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 900.407(b) (1999) (containing Office of Personnel Management
regulation providing that "[a]ny person who believes himself or any special class of persons
to be subjected to discrimination prohibited by this subpart [which forbids disparity-causing
decisions] may by himself or by a representative file with the Director . . . a written
complaint'); 7 C.F.R. § 15.6 (1999) (including similar complaint procedure for Dep't ofAgric.);
10 C.F.R. § 4.42 (1999) (Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n); 10 C.F.R. § 1040.104 (Dep't of Energy);
14 C.F.R. § 1250.106(b) (1999) (NASA); 15 C.F.R. § 8.8(a) (1999) (Dep't of Commerce); 18
C.F.R. § 705.7(b) (1999) (Water Resources Council); 18 C.F.R. § 1302.7(c) (Tenn. Valley Auth.);
22 C.F.R. § 141.6(b) (1999) (State Dep't); 22 C.F.R. § 209.7(b) (Agency for Int'l Dev.); 24 C.F.R.
§ 1.7(b) (1999) (Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev.); 28 C.F.R. § 42.107(b) (1999) (Justice Dep't);
29 C.F.R. § 31.7(b) (1999) (Dep't of Labor); 32 C.F.R. § 195.8(b) (1999) (Dep't of Defense); 34
C.F.R. § 100.7(b) (1999) (Dep't ofEduc.); 38 C.F.R. § 18.7(b) (1999) (Dep't of Veterans Affairs);
40 C.F.R. § 7.120 (1999) (Envtl. Protection Agency); 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(b) (1999) (Dep't of Health
& Human Servs.); 45 C.F.R. § 6 11.7(b) (Nael Science Found.); 45 C.F.R. § 1203.7(b) (Corp. for
NaVl & Community Serv.); 49 C.F.R. § 21.11(b) (1999) (Dep't of Transp.).
" See Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72995 (Nov. 2, 1980) Leadership and
Coordination of Nondiscrimination Laws, Nov. 2,1980 (instructing executive agencies on how
to implement nondiscrimination laws); Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1994) Federal
Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations, Feb. 11, 1994 (instructing agencies to "make achieving environmental justice
part of [their] mission"); Department of Justice, Attorney General's Memorandum for Heads
offDepartments and Agencies that Provide Federal Financial Assistance, UseoftheDisparate
Impact Standard in Administrative Regulations Under Title Vlof the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(updated July 14, 1994) <http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/tabl5.pdf> (memorandum from
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media have proven extremely responsive to complaints that
particular federally funded decisions have a racially disparate effect.
As noted above, the "victims" of a disparity-causing decision are a
discrete group (i.e., members of a particular race). They are
therefore usually represented by interest groups, such as the
NAACP, and are thus able to complain to agencies and the media.
Tunnel vision, like agency capture, is more likely to be a problem
when the victims of the pathology are not part of a discrete group
that is easily organized.
3. Unavailability of Ex Post Review. Finally, critics may contend
that granting agencies exclusive power to enforce the disparate
impact regulations is undesirable because there can then be no ex
post check on an agency's decision not to enforce the rules. The
Supreme Court has held that enforcement decisions, unless
otherwise specified, are committed by law to agency discretion and
are therefore immune from judicial review."' 1 Thus, these critics are
technically correct; private plaintiffs may not sue agencies for failing
to enforce the disparate impact rules, and there can therefore be no
"official" judicial review of an agency's decision to nullify the rules.
But, given that the Title VI intentional discrimination ban is
vindicable by private plaintiffs, the lack of judicial review of a
decision not to enforce the disparate impact rules is not troubling.
The need for judicial review of a decision not to enforce the
disparate impact regulations really only arises when the disparate
impact created by a fund recipient's decision is particularly
egregious. In cases in which the disparate impact at issue is not
particularly pronounced, a reviewing court would likely conclude
that the agency declined to enforce the regulations because it
decided that the disparity-causing decision was, on balance, a good
decision. As Part III.B.2 showed, agencies are institutionally better
suited than courts to determine when disparity-causing decisions
are justified and should be allowed, so a reviewing court's decision
to defer to the agency in cases of mild or moderate disparate impact
would make sense. As we generally would want courts to defer to
Attorney General to agencies).
. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) C'[A]n agency's decision not to take
enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review....').
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agencies' decisions not to enforce the disparate impact regulations
in cases of mild or moderate disparate impact, the case for judicial
review of agencies' enforcement decisions in such cases is tough to
make. After all, permitting judicial review would simply increase
litigation costs. Accordingly, for mild to moderate disparate impact
cases, the lack of judicial review of agencies' enforcement decisions
does not damage the case for exclusive agency enforcement.
In cases in which the disparate impact at issue is egregious,
however, judicial review might be desirable as an expost check on
an agency's exercise of enforcement discretion, and the impossibility
of such reviewi1 2 arguably weakens the case for leaving enforcement
decisions exclusively to agencies. But egregious cases are suscepti-
ble to de facto judicial review, even if the disparate impact regula-
tions are enforceable only by agencies, because courts may view such
cases as instances of intentional discrimination, which is privately
vindicable.'33
Consider how such de facto judicial review would proceed: If an
agency declines to enforce the disparate impact regulations in a case
of extreme disparity, a private plaintiff, barred from suing the
agency for failing to enforce the regulations,1 34 could sue the fund
recipient, alleging that the extreme disparity gives rise to an
inference of intentional discrimination. In a number of private suits
based on intentional discrimination in violation of Title VI, courts
have inferred intentional discrimination from a fund recipient's
awareness, and disregard, of the extremely disparate results of its
decision."3 5 Hence, egregious disparate impact cases-the only
disparate impact cases in which judicial review is desirable--could
be converted into intentional discrimination cases, and there could
be an ex post check on agencies' decisions not to enforce the
13 Id.
" See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688-89 (1979) (holding that there
is private right of action to enforce Title VI's ban on intentional discrimination).
'34 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832.
11 See, e.g., Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that evidence
of disparity in provision of services was sufficient to permit inference of discriminatory
intent); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983) (inferring discriminatory
intent from government's knowledge of existing disparity in municipal services); Bakerv. City
of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (reaching same result).
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disparate impact regulations.1 36 The lack of judicial review of
agency enforcement decisions is therefore no reason to oppose a
system of exclusive agency enforcement of the disparate impact
regulations.
In sum, Part III has shown that permitting private disparate
impact suits represents unsound public policy because disparity-
causing decisions are sometimes, on the whole, good decisions. As
such decisions should not be deterred absolutely, the law should not
provide every disparately impacted individual a right of action to
enforce the disparate impact ban. Instead, administrative agencies,
whose democratic credentials and fact-finding abilities are superior
to those of private individuals, should retain exclusive power to
enforce or nullify the regulations. A system of exclusive agency
enforcement is superior to an approach under which courts may
nullify the regulations for "justified" disparity-causing decisions,
because agencies are institutionally better suited than courts to
determine what constitutes actionable disparity and which in-
stances of disparity are justified. Moreover, agency nullification
through prosecutorial discretion is administratively less costly than
court nullification through a justification standard. Exclusive
agency enforcement is also superior to private enforcement of the
regulations with an elaborate justification defense, because the
factors rendering a disparity-causing decision justified are impossi-
ble to codify ex ante. The agency pathologies that frequently render
exclusive agency enforcement undesirable in other contexts do not
apply in the context at hand. Table A summarizes the enforcement
options Part III has considered.
" Indeed, in Chester Residents itself, the court offered the plaintiffs an opportunity to
amend their complaint to allege intentional discrimination rather than mere disparate
impact. Seifv. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 624 U.S. 915, 928 (1998).
The plaintiffs could have easily done so by stating in the complaint that the egregious nature
of the disparity gave rise to an inference of intent to discriminate. They decided not to take
the court up on its offer. Id.
2000] 1201
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TABLE A:
OPTIONS FOR ENFORCING THE DISPARATE IMPACT REGULATIONS




































































As Part TI.c shows,
these are of little
concern in this con-
text.
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IV. THE LEGAL CASE AGAINST PRIVATE
DISPARATE IMPACT SUITS
Whereas Part III focused on why private disparate impact suits
are a bad idea, this Part demonstrates why such suits are unjusti-
fied as a matter of positive law. First of all, they are legally infirm
because the disparate impact regulations-certainly to the extent
they purport to be legislative rules that bind private parties-are
themselves invalid. Despite the lower courts' unquestioning
acceptance of the validity of the disparate impact regulations, the
Supreme Court has never actually held that the regulations are
valid, and basic principles of administrative and constitutional law
dictate otherwise. Part IV.A attacks the validity of the regulations.
In addition, even if the regulations were valid, implication of a
private right of action to enforce the rules would be improper. The
Supreme Court has now established that implication of such a right
is unwarranted absent evidence of a congressional intent to permit
private enforcement. As there is no competent evidence that
Congress intended to provide a private right of action to enforce the
regulations adopted pursuant to section 602 of Title VI (indeed,
there is evidence to the contrary), the lower courts have erred in
permitting private enforcement of the disparate impact rules. Part
IV.B presents the argument that implication doctrine does not
support a private right of action.
A. THE REGULATIONS ARE THEMSELVES INVALID
Perhaps the strongest legal argument against private disparate
impact suits is that the regulations on which the suits are based are
legally invalid. No lower court has questioned the validity of the
regulations, most likely because the Supreme Court has stated in
dicta that the regulations represent valid exercises of agency
discretion.'3 7 Careful analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions
examining the disparate impact regulations indicates, however, that
"' See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1985) (stating in dicta that "actions
having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities could be redressed through agency
regulations designed to implement the purposes of Title Vr').
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the Court has never actually held that the regulations are valid, and
basic principles of constitutional and administrative law indicate
that the regulations must be invalid.
1. Guardians's Holding, Alexander's Dictum. The original source
of the lower courts' mistaken belief that the Supreme Court has
upheld agencies' disparate impact regulations under Title VI is the
Justices' opinions in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission. "8
A careful reading of those opinions, however, reveals that the Court
did not hold that the disparate impact regulations are valid, though
five of the Justices did opine that such regulations are acceptable.
The issue in Guardians was narrow: Did Title VI entitle
plaintiffs-black and Hispanic police officers-to a compensatory
remedy (back seniority) for "discrimination" they suffered?"3 9 The
alleged discrimination was not intentional; the plaintiffs based their
claim of discrimination on the police department's adoption of a "last
hired, first fired" policy. 4" The policy had a disparate adverse
impact on black and Hispanic employees because officers were hired
in order of their examination scores, and the examinations tended
to favor white test-takers.'" The Second Circuit had denied the
compensatory relief awarded by the district court on the grounds
that Title VI is not violated absent discriminatory intent.142
In a decision that generated five opinions, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Second Circuit's denial of compensatory damages. 43
Four Justices-Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell and Rehnquist
(in an opinion authored by Justice Powell),' and Justice O'Connor
138 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
"9 Id. at 585-89.
'40 Id. at 585-86.
141 Id. at 586.
1 GuardiansAss'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d. Cir. 1980), affd, 463 U.S. 582
(1982). All three members of the Second Circuit panel agreed that the award of compensatory
damages could not be sustained, but the panel members divided on the rationale for their
conclusion. Two judges concluded that the district court erred by concluding that Title VI
does not require proof of discriminatory intent. Id. at 270 (Kelleher, J., concurring); id. at
274-75 (Coffrin, J., concurring). The third member of the panel, Judge Meskill, declined to
reach the question of whether Title VI requires proof of discriminatory intent. Id. at 255.
Instead, he concluded that the "compensatory remedies sought by and awarded to plaintiffs
in the case at bar are not available to private litigants under Title VI." Id.
'4 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 (White, J., concurring) (announcing judgment of Court).
"' Id. at 607 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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(in her own opinion)-' 45 concluded that affirmance was proper
because Title VI prohibits only intentional discrimination.146 Justice
O'Connor further asserted that, as Title VI forbids only intentional
discrimination, federal agencies have no power to adopt implement-
ing regulations that prohibit mere disparate impact.14 Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist expressly approved this
portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion.
14
Four other Justices-Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun
(in a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens) 149 and Justice Marshall
(in his own dissenting opinion) 5 -- would have reversed the Second
Circuit.' Justice Marshall would have done so on the ground that
Title VI prohibits disparate impact as well as intentional discrimi-
nation.152 Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun would have
done so because, while Title VI itself reaches only intentional
discrimination,' the agency regulations under Title VI, which
forbid disparate impact, are valid exercises of agency discretion and
are authorized by the statute. 5 4
This split put Justice White, the remaining Justice, in the
position of tie-breaker on the question of whether to affirm the
Second Circuit's denial of compensatory relief for disparate impact
resulting from the police department's policies. Justice White voted
to affirm the Second Circuit's denial of compensatory damages on
the ground that compensatory remedies under Title VI are available
only if intentional discrimination is established.'55 Justice White
i Id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
' Id. at 610 (Pcwell, J., dissenting); id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
" Id. at 611 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
,4 Id. at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 615 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
,s, Id. at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 615 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 623 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ('I would hold that Title VI bars practices that
have a discriminatory impact and cannot be justified on legitimate grounds.").
' Id. at 642 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Today, proof of invidious purpose is a necessary
component of a valid Title VI claim.").
154 Id. at 644-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that "an 'effects' regulation is an...
appropriate means for an administrative agency to implement' Title VI prohibition on
discrimination).
" Id. at 593 (White, J., concurring) C([Tihe [compensatory] relief denied petitioners...
is unavailable to them under Title VI, at least where no intentional discrimination has been
proved, as is the case here.").
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did not limit his opinion to this assertion, however. He further
opined that Title VI's prohibition reaches disparate impact as well
as intentional discrimination.'56
Tallying the Justices' positions indicates that seven Jus-
tices-Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Brennan, Stevens, and Blackmun-concluded that Title
VI prohibits only intentional discrimination. Only Justices Marshall
and White concluded that Title VI forbids disparate impact that is
not intentional. On the issue of whether agency regulations may
forbid disparate impact, five Justices--Justices Marshall, Brennan,
Stevens, Blackmun, and White-concluded that they may, and four
Justices-Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor--concluded that they may not. A cursory reading of the
opinion, then, would suggest that the Court had held: (1) that Title
VI prohibits only intentional discrimination, and (2) that agency
regulations implementing Title VI may prohibit disparate impacts
that are not intentional.
A mere tallying of positions announced in the opinions, however,
fails to account for the fact that Justice White, the tiebreaker, voted
to affirm the Second Circuit's denial of compensatory damages on
the ground that compensatory relief is not available absent inten-
tional discrimination. 5 ' He also stated that Title VI forbids
disparate impact, 5 ' but that portion of his opinion was not neces-
sary to his conclusion and is therefore dicta.'59 The Supreme Court
has explained that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and
no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those members who concurred in the judgments on the
56 Id. ('[]t must be concluded that Title VI reaches unintentional, disparate-impact
discrimination as well as deliberate racial discrimination.").
"' Id. ('As an alternative ground for affirmance, respondents defend the judgment on the
basis that there is no private right of action available under Title VI that will afford
petitioners the relief that they seek. I agree ...
" Id. at 598.
IS A dictum is "[a] judicial comment made during the course of delivering a judicial
opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore notprecedental
(though it may be considered persuasive)." BLACIes LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining "obiter dictum") (emphasis added).
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narrowest grounds.' "16 Accordingly, Justice White's statements
concerning the intent requirement under Title VI are not part of the
"holding of the Court." The question of whether agency regulations
under Title VI may forbid only disparate impact, not intentional
discrimination, thus remains open. Table B tallies the Justices'
votes on the various issues raised in Guardians.
TABLE B: A TALLY OF VOTES IN
GUARDIANS ASSOCIATION V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
("T" indicates a "yes" vote; "m" indicates that the
Justice was Part of the majority.)
JUSTICE Compensatory relief Title V bars only The regulations
is available under intentional under Title VI
Title V only when discrimination. may prohibit
discrimination is unintentional
intentional. disparate im-










White Y(m) ..... _ Y(m)
TOTAL: 5 JUSTICES 7 JUSTICES 5 JUSTICES
TOTAL IN 5 JUSTICES 4 JuSTIcES 1 JUSTICE
MAJORITY:
Despite the fact that Justice White's approval of the disparate
impact regulations was dictum, the lower courts have read Guard-
ians as holding that such regulations are authorized by Title VI.161
'0 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citation omitted).
1 See, e.g., New York Urban League, Inc., v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995)
('[Tihe [Guardians] Court concluded that Title VI delegated to federal agencies the authority
to promulgate regulations incorporating a disparate impact standard."); Roberts v. Colorado
Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir. 1993) (referring to "the additional holding of
Guardians, that 'although Title VI itself requires proof of discriminatory intent, the
administrative regulations [under Title VI] incorporating a disparate-impact standard are
valid' ") (quoting Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 (White, J., concurring)).
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Even the Supreme Court, in dicta in another case, mistakenly stated
that Guardians held that agency regulations implementing Title VI
may prohibit disparate impact as well as intentional discrimination.
In Alexander v. Choate,162 the Court held that the State of Tennes-
see's reduction in annual inpatient hospital coverage did not
constitute actionable discrimination under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.163 In addressing a threshold
issue-whether proof of discriminatory animus is always required to
prove a violation of the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing
regulations-Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court,
discussed Guardians's holding. He explained:
In Guardians, we confronted the question whether
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ... which
prohibits discrimination against racial and ethnic
minorities in programs receiving federal aid,
reaches both intentional and disparate-impact
discrimination. No opinion commanded a majority
in Guardians, and Members of the Court offered
widely varying interpretations of Title VI. None-
theless, a two-pronged holding on the nature of the
discrimination proscribed by Title VI emerged in
that case. First, the Court held that Title VI itself
directly reached only instances of intentional
discrimination. Second, the Court held that actions
having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minori-
ties could be redressed through agency regulations
designed to implement the purposes of Title V7.'64
In a wonderful example of dictum becoming "holding," a number
of lower courts have citedAlexander's dictum as establishing that the
Supreme Court has held (in Guardians) that disparate impact
'6 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
'6 Id. at 309.
'" Id. at 292-93 (emphasis added).
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regulations under Title VI are valid.'65 But the Guardians Court did
not so hold! Justice White's statements approving a disparate
impact standard were surplusage; they did not support his vote to
affirm the Second Circuit's denial of compensatory relief, and they
are therefore dicta that should not be considered in determining
Guardians's holding.
166
Of course, under the rule of decision that generates this narrow
reading of Guardians, the Guardians Court also did not hold that
Title VI prohibits only intentional discrimination. Seven Jus-
tices-Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens-stated that intentional
"s See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999) (indicating validity of
regulations); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d469, 479 n.10 (4th Cir. 1999) (indicating
same); City of Chicago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 819, 827-28 (7th Cir. 1995) (indicating same);
Elston v. Board of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993) (indicating same); Craft v.
Board of Trustees, 793 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir. 1986) (indicating same).
' There is a possible counter-argument against this narrow reading of Guardians's
holding. As Justice White noted in his concurring opinion, the plaintiffs' petition for certiorari
"claimed error solely on the basis that proof of discriminatory intent is not required to
establish a Title VI violation." Guardians, 463 U.S. at 589 (White, J., concurring). Hence,
in granting the plaintiffs' petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court essentially agreed to
decide that issue. One might argue, then, that the section of Justice White's opinion
discussing the Title VI intent requirement is not dicta; it is, rather, directly responsive to the
sole question the Supreme Court implicitly agreed to answer in granting a writ of certiorari.
This argument, however, runs into constitutional difficulties. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly asserted throughout its history that it does not render advisory opinions but
instead merely settles concrete disputes between parties. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for
a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1016 (1998) (noting that advisory opinions have been
"disapproved by [the Supreme Court] from the beginning"); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755,
761 (1987) (noting that "[t]he real value of the judicial pronouncement-what makes it a
proper judicial resolution ofa 'case or controversy' rather than an advisory opinion-is in the
settling ofsome dispute"); Muskratv. United States, 219 U.S. 346,361-62 (1911) (stating that
Court is to determine only "actual controversies"); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 409, 410
(1792) (stating that Court is only to decide issues before it). The contours of a holding, then,
must be determined by asking"What decisions were necessary to resolve the concrete dispute
between the partiesT' not "What question was presented in the petition for certiorari?'
Simply because a granted petition for certiorari construes the legal question presented more
broadly than necessary does not mean the Court must, or is entitled to, answer the broad
question posed if it need not reach the whole question in order to resolve the conflict between
the parties. Otherwise, the Court would end up issuing advisory opinions as well as resolving
cases and controversies. Article III of the United States Constitution limits the Court to
performing the latter task. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 761
(discussing "case or controversy" constraints on advisory opinions). Accordingly, Justice
White's surplus statements-those not necessary to his decision to affirm the Second Circuit's
denial of compensatory relief-should not be taken as "holding," regardless of how the issue
on which the Court granted certiorari was stated.
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discrimination was required,167 but three of those Justices-Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens--did so in dissent.68 Only four
members of the majority asserted that Title VI forbids only inten-
tional discrimination.'69 As Justice White, the remaining member of
the majority, voted to affirm on other grounds (and did not conclude
that Title VI itself prohibits only intentional discrimination), 170 the
majority did not include at least five members who affirmed on the
basis of a lack of discriminatory intent.171 Under the Court's rule
that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest
grounds,' ,172 Guardians never held that Title VI prohibits only
intentional discrimination.
This observation does not imply, however, that the Supreme Court
has left open the question of whether Title VI forbids only intentional
discrimination. To the contrary, it had already answered that
question before Guardians was decided. In Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, 73 another deeply divisive decision which
generated five opinions, a majority of concurring Justices--Justice
Powell (in his own opinion) and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun (in an opinion by Justice Brennan)--concluded that
Title VI proscribes only those racial classifications that would violate
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.1 " As the
Court two years earlier held that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits only intentional discrimination, not disparate impact, 7 '
Bakke's holding that Title VI does not proscribe more than the
" Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 612 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 607 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1 Id. at 593 (concluding that "the [compensatory] relief denied petitioners . . . is
unavailable to them under Title VI, at least where no intentional discrimination has been
proved, as is the case here," but also that'Title VI reaches unintentional, disparate-impact
discrimination as well as deliberate racial discrimination").
I See supra Table B.
172 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
'73 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
174 Id. at 287 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 325 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 230 (1976).
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Fourteenth Amendment necessarily implies that the statute does not
forbid unintentional disparate impact. In Guardians, seven Justices
merely made explicit this necessary implication of Bakke. The
question of whether Title VI prohibits only intentional discrimina-
tion, then, is not open; the Bakke Court resolved that issue.176 On
the other hand, the question of whether agency regulations promul-
gated under Title VI may prohibit unintentional disparate impact
remains unaddressed.
2. Excessively Prohibitory Regulations: Legislative Constraints on
Agency Rulemaking. Having recognized that, despite Alexanders
dictum to the contrary, the Supreme Court has never squarely
decided whether the disparate impact regulations under Title VI are
valid, let us analyze that open issue. A few moments' reflection
reveals that, if the statute itself prohibits only intentional discrimi-
nation, the regulations adopted "to effectuate the provisions of' the
statute's prohibition must also be limited to proscribing intentional
discrimination.
It is a basic principle of administrative law that federal adminis-
trative agencies are not legislative bodies with general lawmaking
... The Supreme Court has reaffirmed Bakke's holding that the Title VI prohibition
extends no further than that of the Fourteenth Amendment (i.e., that Title VI reaches only
intentional discrimination). In United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992), petitioners
complained that a recipient of federal funds had violated a Title VI regulation that required
the recipient to" 'take affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination.'"
Id. at 732 n.7 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(6)(i) (1991)). The Court found it unnecessary to
consider that alleged violation in addition to the Equal Protection claim asserted. It
reiterated that"[o]ur cases make clear, and the parties do not disagree, that the reach of Title
VI's protection extends no further than the Fourteenth Amendment. We thus treat the issues
in these cases as they are implicated under the Constitution." Id. (citations omitted). The
Court thus suggested that if the Fourteenth Amendment did not require " 'affirmative action
to overcome the effects of prior discrimination,'" neither could the regulations under Title VI.
Id. at 732.
The Chester Residents court appeared troubled by Fordice's assertion that the Title VI
regulations may reach no further than the Fourteenth Amendment. The court admitted that
"[h]idden within the [Fordice] Court's statement may be an indication that implementing
regulations, such as the EPA's, that incorporate a discriminatory effect standard are invalid,
because they extend further than the Fourteenth Amendment." Chester Residents Concerned
for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 931 n.9 (3d Cir. 1997). The court quickly brushed off
its concern, however, noting that it "d[id] not believe that the Court would overturn
Guardians and Alexander in such an oblique manner." Id. Of course, if Guardians and
Alexander never actually held that the disparate impact regulations are valid, as this Article
contends, then the Fordice footnote was not "overturning" anything; it was simply re-stating
well-established law.
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power. 7' In making rules to administer a statute, they may not
forbid behavior that could not possibly be proscribed by the enabling
statute.17 They may "flesh out" the general proscriptions in an
enabling statute, but they may not adopt rules that forbid activities
that are clearly outside the sphere of behavior prohibited by the
legislation. Otherwise, they would end up passing laws without
abiding by the strictures set forth in Article I of the United States
Constitution.179
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, "' the Supreme Court rejected the
view that administrative agencies may adopt rules that forbid
behavior falling outside the sphere of activity proscribed by the
enabling statute. In that case, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) argued that its Rule 10b-5, promulgated pursuant
to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, could forbid
negligent conduct in connection with the sale or purchase of a
"' See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213.14 (1976) CThe rulemaking
power granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal
statute is not the power to make law."); Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965) (stating
that power to administer statute is not the power to make law); Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co.
v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) (stating that "[t]he power of an administrative
officer or board to administer a federal statute is not the power to make law...").
178 See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) ("It is axiomatic that
an administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the
authority delegated by Congress.").
'79 In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Court emphasized that strict adherence to
the legislative constraints on agency rulemaking is necessary to avoid violating Article I of
the United States Constitution. The Court asserted that it is the fact that an agency's
rulemaking may not reach beyond its enabling legislation that permits the agency to engage
in "quasi-legislative" rulemaking without abiding by the strictures of Article I, § 7:
The bicameral process is not necessary as a check on the Executive's
administration of the laws because his administrative activity
cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it-a
statute duly enacted pursuant to Article I, §§ 1,7.
Id. at 953 n.16. The Court further explained:
Executive action under legislatively delegated authority that might
resemble "legislative" action in some respects is not subject to the
approval of both Houses of Congress and the President for the
reason that the Constitution does not so require. That kind of
executive action is always subject to check by the terms of the
legislation that authorized it; and if that authority is exceeded, it is
open to judicial review as well as the power of Congress to modify or
revoke the authority entirely.
Id. The Court thus indicated that agency regulations more proscriptive than their enabling
statutes would amount to legislation violative of Article I. Id.
,8o 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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security.'18 The Court rejected this argument on the ground that the
enabling statute itself, section 10(b), forbade only intentional
acts--"any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance." 18 2 As
the statute itself banned only intentional acts, a regulation promul-
gated thereunder could not forbid mere negligence, a less culpable
behavior. The Court explained:
The rulemaking power granted to an administra-
tive agency charged with the administration of a
federal statute is not the power to make law.
Rather, it is "the power to adopt regulations to
carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed
by the statute.".. . Thus, despite the broad view of
the Rule advanced by the Commission in this case,
its scope cannot exceed the power granted the
Commission by Congress under section 10(b).1 3
,S, Id. at 212. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act makes it unlawful "[t]o use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.. . any manipulative or
deceptive device cr contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). The SEC, acting pursuant to the power
conferred by section 10(b), promulgated Rule 10b-5, which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a)To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b)To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c)To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975). The SEC argued, and the Court agreed, that the language of
subsections (b) and (c) of Rule lOb-5 proscribes negligent, as well as intentional, material
misstatements and omissions. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212. The Court concluded,
however, that such a rule would exceed the SEC's rulemaking power. Id. at 213-14.
Accordingly, it held that Rule 10b-5 may not reach negligent misstatements and omissions.
Id.
182 Id. at 212-21.
'83 Id. at 213-11 (citations omitted).
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In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A.,' 84 the Supreme Court reiterated its general rule that agency
regulations may not be more proscriptive than the enabling statutes
under which they are promulgated. The Central Bank Court held
that a private plaintiff may not bring suit under Rule lOb-5 against
a defendant who aids or abets a securities law violation, because
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the statute authorizing
Rule 10b-5, does not prohibit a class of behavior broad enough to
encompass aiding and abetting.'85 In so holding, the Court empha-
sized that the scope of conduct forbidden by securities regulations
may not exceed that prohibited by the securities statutes. The Court
explained:
[Congress] envisioned that the SEC would enforce
the statutory prohibition through administrative
and injunctive actions.... But the private plaintiff
may not bring a 10b-5 suit against a defendant for
acts not prohibited by the text of section 10(b). To
the contrary, our cases considering the scope of
conduct prohibited by section 10(b) in private suits
have emphasized adherence to the statutory lan-
guage, "[t]he starting point in every case involving
construction of a statute."... We have refused to
allow 10b-5 challenges to conduct not prohibited by
the text of the statute. 186
Later in the opinion, the Court re-emphasized that the lower courts
had erred in permitting the securities regulations to prohibit a
broader category of conduct than the statutes under which they were
adopted:
We reach the uncontroversial conclusion, accepted
even by those courts recognizing a section 10(b)
aiding and abetting cause of action, that the text of
'4 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
'85 Id. at 177.
186 Id. at 173 (citation omitted).
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the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid
and abet a section 10(b) violation. Unlike those
courts, however, we think that conclusion resolves
the case. It is inconsistent with settled methodol-
ogy in section 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond
the scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory
text.187
Ernst & Ernst and Central Bank illustrate a basic principle of
administrative law: Agencies charged with administering laws are
not legislators and have no power to adopt rules that reach further
than the statutes the agencies are charged with administering..8
This is not to say that agencies may not adopt rules that forbid
conduct not expressly forbidden by an enabling statute; indeed, a
primary function of administrative agencies is "gap-filling"-i.e.,
spelling out in detail the prohibitions that are implicit in a statute's
text. The prohibition in the regulation, however, must be capable of
fitting within the statutory prohibition. That is, it must be within
the sphere of the statute's prohibitions. Otherwise, it is a nullity.'89
As Title VI itself prohibits only intentional discrimination, 9 ' the
regulations promulgated thereunder may not ban all agency actions
that have a disparate impact. Otherwise, the sphere of the regula-
tory prohibition (any disparate impact, whether intentional or not)
would be greater than that of the statutory prohibition (intentional
discrimination), just as the regulatory prohibition in Ernst & Ernst
(all falsehoods, whether intentional or negligent) was greater than
the statutory prohibition (intentional falsehoods). Ernst & Ernst and
Central Bank stand for the proposition that a regulatory prohibition
may not be so broad as to render the statutory prohibition under
'67 Id. at 177.
'" Cf. FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284,296 (1954) (agency cannot make
illegal by regulation what is legal under statute).
I" See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) (A
regulation which does not [carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute],
but operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.").
I" As noted above, Bakke held that Title VI prohibitions were co-extensive with that of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits only intentional discrimination. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265, 287 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 328
(Brennan, J., concurring).
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which the regulations are promulgated a mere subset of the prohib-
ited activity; to the extent the regulations reach conduct that is
outside the statutory prohibition, they are invalid. Accordingly, the
Title VI regulations banning unintentional disparate impact are
invalid.
Justice Stevens, joined in Guardians by Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, rejected the view that Title VI regulations may not
prohibit conduct beyond the scope of the statute's prohibition. 9'
Though he concluded that Title VI itself prohibits only intentional
discrimination,'92 he reasoned that federal agencies may validly
implement Title VI by forbidding disparate impacts, regardless of
whether they are intentional.'93 To reach this conclusion, he first
appealed to principles of judicial deference to agency interpretations
of law, and he then analogized agencies' power to regulate pursuant
to statutory authority to Congress's power to legislate under
constitutional authority.'94 Both of his arguments fail to justify his
conclusion that the disparate impact regulations are valid.
Justice Stevens first contended that the disparate impact
regulations must "have the force of law" because they are
"'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling statute.""9 The
principles of judicial deference to agency decisionmaking that were
in place at that time may have made this "reasonable relation to
purpose" inquiry the sole test for whether a regulation was a valid
exercise of agency authority.'96 The Court, however, has since
established that reasonable relation to an enabling statute's purpose
is not enough to render a regulation valid. The first step of the
famous "Chevron two-step" asks whether, in fact, the statute is
' Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 644-45 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
'92 Id. at 645.
'93 Id. at 643.
194 Id. at 644-45.
"m Id. at 643 (quoting Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369
(1973)).
" See Mourning, 411 U.S. at 369 (stating that "the validity of a regulation promulgated
thereunder will be sustained so long as it is 'reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling
legislation! "); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-06 (1979) (stating that there must
be a nexus between regulations and legislative authority delegated by Congress). See
generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.1 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing pre.Chevron
standards for deferring to agency interpretations of statutes).
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ambiguous on the issue addressed in the regulation'S7 -or, in other
words, whether Congress, by leaving an ambiguity, delegated to the
agency the task of filling in the gap by explaining what the ambigu-
ity means. 9 ' An inquiry into the reasonableness of the regulation or
the agency interpretation of law is appropriate only if this first
question is answered in the affirmative. If Congress has not left an
ambiguity (and thereby implicitly delegated the task of gap-filling),
then courts may not defer to a contrary agency regulation, regardless
of how "reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legisla-
tion" the regulation is.199
The Court's holding in Bakke forecloses any claim that the Title
VI definition of discrimination is ambiguous: Bakke held that the
Title VI prohibition is co-extensive with that of the Fourteenth
Amendment 2 ° and thus reaches only intentional discrimination.
2 0 1
Accordingly, there is no ambiguity with respect to what type of
discrimination Title VI prohibits, and the agency regulations that
purport to "effectuate the provisions of' the Title VI intentional
"' Chevron v. NaturalResources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Courtposited
the "Chevron two-step" in the following passage:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is
the queation whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the
court determines Congress has not directly answered the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construc-
tion on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43.
I" See generally K. DAVIS & R. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 3.2-3.3 (3d ed. 1994)
(discussing the Chevron "two-step" and the conceptual foundation for Chevron).
'" See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress."); see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638,649 (1990)
CA precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative
authority.").
o Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,287 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring);
id. at 328 (Brennan, J., concurring).
"' See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that Fourteenth
Amendment forbids only intentional discrimination).
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discrimination prohibition by banning disparate impact are entitled
to no deference, regardless of their "reasonable relation" to Title VI's
"purposes." To use administrative law jargon, the disparate impact
regulations fail under Chevron step one.
Justice Stevens's second argument in favor of the validity of the
disparate impact regulations drew an analogy between the regula-
tions and legislation enacted to implement constitutional
provisions." 2 He cited City of Rome v. United States,"' which held
that even if section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits only
purposeful racial discrimination in voting rules, Congress may
implement that prohibition by banning voting practices that are
discriminatory in effect.20 4 He reasoned that, as Congress may
implement a constitutional prohibition by enacting a prophylactic
statute that bans a broader class of conduct than that prohibited by
the Constitution, an agency must be able to adopt a prophylactic
regulation that prohibits conduct not forbidden by a statute in order
to achieve that statute's prohibition.0 5 In support of his reasoning,
he cited a 1900 case, Boske v. Comingore,"' which he construed as
holding that an administrative regulation's conformity to statutory
authority is measured by the same standard as a statute's confor-
mity to constitutional authority.0 7
2 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 644 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
2s 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
Id. at 173.
Guardians, 463 U.S. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2w 177 U.S. 459 (1900).
' Guardians, 463 U.S. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens quoted the
following passage from Boske:
In determining whether the regulations promulgated by [the
Secretary of the Treasury] are consistent with law, we must apply
the rule of decision which controls when an act of Congress is
assailed as not being within the powers conferred upon it by the
Constitution; that is to say, a regulation adopted under section 161
of the Revised Statutes should not be disregarded or annulled
unless, in the judgment of the court, it is plainly and palpably
inconsistent with law. Those who insist that such a regulation is
invalid must make its invalidity so manifest that the court has no
choice except to hold that the Secretary has exceeded his authority
and employed means that are not at all appropriate to the end
specified in the act of Congress.
Id. (quoting Boske, 177 U.S. at 470).
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There are several problems with Justice Stevens's attempt to
analogize regulations under a statute to legislation under a coistitu-
tional provision. First of all, Justice Stevens failed to appreciate
that, while Congress has independent constitutional authority to
enact any legislation that is "necessary and proper" for carrying into
execution all powers vested by the Constitution in the United States
government, 20 8 administrative agencies, themselves creatures of
statute, do not have general power to adopt any necessary and
proper legislative rules and thus cannot regulate any further than
their enabling statutes permit. In holding that Congress may, under
section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, enact a statute banning
voting practices having a discriminatory effect, even if section 1 of
the Amendment prohibits only intentional discrimination,209 the City
of Rome Court specifically referred to Congress's broad authority
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.210 Administrative agencies
charged with effectuating the provisions of the Title VI intentional
discrimination ban do not have analogous authority to regulate as
"necessary and proper." Indeed, the Constitution denies them such
broad, general authority, for if they had such power, they could
effectively legislate without abiding by the strictures of Article I,
section 7 of the United States Constitution. 21 And, as cases such as
Ernst & Ernst and Central Bank illustrate,212 the Supreme Court has
rejected the view that agencies may promulgate broader-than-
2w See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (stating that Congress shall have power "[t]o make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof').
The Fifteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONSr. amend. XV. The Court held that section 1 of the Amendment is violated only by
intentional discrimination. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61 (1980).
210 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 175 (1980).
211 See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional constraints on
legislative rulemaking).
s2 See supra notes 181 to 190 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
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necessary, prophylactic regulations in fleshing out a statutory
prohibition.213
In addition, Justice Stevens's reliance on Boske for the proposition
that "an administrative regulation's conformity to statutory author-
ity [is] to be measured by the same standard as a statute's confor-
mity to constitutional authority 214 is misplaced. The Boske Court
did not have occasion to decide whether an agency may regulate
conduct outside the ambit of the enabling statute, for the directive of
the enabling statute at issue in that case was extremely
2" A cursory reading of the Supreme Courtes opinion in United States v. OHagan, 521
U.S. 642 (1997), might seem to suggest that the Court has moved away from the position,
articulated in Ernst & Ernst and Central Bank, that prophylactic regulations that exceed the
prohibition of their enabling statute are invalid. But a close reading of O'Hagan indicates
that the enabling statute at issue in that case is distinguishable from the statute at issue in
Ernst & Ernst and Central Bank and from the Title VI enabling provision (section 602 of Title
VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1), and that O'Hagan does not stand for the proposition that agencies
possess general authority to adopt prophylactic, broader-than-necessary rules.
The O'Hagan Court approved a prophylactic regulation adopted by the SEC, but only
because the statute enabling the regulation expressly delegated to the SEC the authority to
adopt prophylactic rules. The governing statutory provision, section 14(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act, states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer .... The [Securities and Exchange Commission] shall,
for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define,
and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and
practices as fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994) (emphasis added). The Court concluded that "[t]he section's second
sentence delegates definitional and prophylactic rulemaking authority to the Commission."
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 667. By contrast, neither the enabling statute at issue in Ernst & Ernst
and Central Bank (section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) nor the
Title VI enabling provision (section 602 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-i) delegates either
definitional authority or the power to "prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent"
violations of the statutory prohibition. Because O'Hagan dealt with a situation where the
statute itself expressly granted prophylactic rulemaking authority, it cannot stand for the
proposition-rejected in Ernst & Ernst and Central Bank-that agencies generally have such
authority even when it is not explicitly granted by the enabling statute.
Section 602 of Title VI does not grant prophylactic or definitional rulemaking
authority; it merely states that federal agencies are authorized to "effectuate the provisions
of' section 601 of Title VI (the direct prohibition of intentional discrimination). 42 U.S.C. §
2000d-1 (1994). There is a tremendous difference between "effectuat[ing] the provisions of'
a statutory command and "prescrib[ing] means reasonably designed to prevent" violations of
the command.
214 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 644 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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broad-certainly broad enough to encompass the regulation at issue.
Indeed, the statutory authority for the regulation at issue in Boske
conferred the general administrative power to adopt rules to carry
out the functions of the agency. '15 Thus, despite the dictum relied on
by Justice Stevens, Boske cannot stand for the proposition that an
agency may regulate beyond the proscriptions of a statute just as
Congress may legislate beyond the Constitution's proscriptions.
Moreover, even if Boske had held that regulations may prohibit more
behavior than their enabling statutes, such a holding would no
longer be good law in light of cases such as Ernst & Ernst216 and
Central Bank.21
3. Legislative Rules Versus Internal Rules. While Justice
Stevens's Guardians dissent fails to establish the validity of
generally binding disparate impact regulations, the opinion does hint
at a persuasive argument in favor of the validity of such rules as
internal agency rules. Title VI is a Spending Clause statute,218 and
the regulations promulgated thereunder ultimately regulate agency
spending. In essence, they assert merely that agencies may not fund
entities that make decisions that have racially disproportionate
effects. The regulations may thus be viewed as a means of agency
prioritization-i.e., as guidelines that assist the agencies in deter-
mining how to allocate federal monies. To the extent the agencies
have some discretion to decide whom to fund, the disparate impact
regulations may represent a valid means of making allocative
decisions." 9 The regulations, then, may be valid because they are
215 See Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 467 (1900) (noting that statute at issue
authorized Secretary of the Treasury "to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for
the government of his department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and
performance ofits business, and the custody, use, andpreservation of the records, papers, and
property appertaining to ie' (internal citation omitted)).
116 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976) (holding that Rule 10b-5
cannot proscribe conduct not proscribed by section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act).
"' Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
173-77 (1994) (holding that there is no Rule 10b-5 action for conduct not forbidden by section
10(b)).
218 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 598-99 (White, J., concurring); id. at 636-38 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668,674 (9th Cir. 1998); Canutillo Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 398 (5th Cir. 1996).
219 A statute may, of course, mandate that agencies provide funds to certain entities, and
the agencies then would not have discretion to deny funding on the basis of the disparate
impact regulations.
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adopted pursuant to funding agencies' inherent power to employ
reasonable "screening devices" in allocating the money they have
been given to manage.220 As Justice Stevens noted, the presumption
of validity applicable to an agency regulation that is reasonably
related to the purposes of enabling legislation is particularly strong
"when [the] regulation does not seek to control the conduct of
independent private parties, but merely defines the terms on which
someone may seek federal money."221 Perhaps, then, the disparate
impact regulations are valid, despite the fact that they are more
prohibitory than Title VI itself, because they do not really derive
their authority from Title VI. To speak in administrative law jargon,
perhaps they are not "legislative rules," grounded in a statutory
grant of rulemaking power, but are instead "general statements of
policy" or "rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice,"
grounded in agencies' inherent authority to manage their internal
affairs (i.e., to determine how they will allocate their limited
budgets).
Courts, following the framework of section 553 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act,222 have distinguished legislative rules, which
purport to bind private entities with the force of law,223 from three
other types of rules-interpretive rules; general statements of policy;
and rules of agency organization, practice, or procedure-which
generally aim at guiding agencies in their exercise of discretion.224
Whereas a legislative rule is valid only if it is authorized by a grant
o In debating Title VI, Congress was aware that agencies dispensing federal funds
already had inherent "authority to refuse or terminate assistance for failure to comply with
a variety of requirements imposed by... administrative action." 110 Cong. Rec. 6546 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
22 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994) (exempting interpretive rules, general statements of policy,
and rules of agency organization, practice, or procedure from Acet's notice and comment
requirements).
' See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33,38 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
C'A properly adopted substantive rule establishes a standard of conduct which has the force
of law.").
' See American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that
these three types of "internal" rules "'express the agency's intended course of action, its
tentative view of the meaning of a particular statutory term, or internal house-keeping
measures organizing agency activities'" (quoting Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 702
(D.C. Cir. 1980))).
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of rulemaking authority from Congress, 225 internal regulations
guiding agencies in the exercise of their discretion do not necessarily
require express congressional authorization. 226 Hence, the disparate
impact regulations may be valid internal rules.
There are two problems with this argument. First, the disparate
impact rules do not fit very well within any of the "non-legislative
rules" categories. The disparate impact regulations obviously could
not be valid "interpretive rules," for their interpretation of the
discrimination prohibited by Title VI (i.e., disparate impact alone,
regardless of intent) is legally incorrect. It is also doubtful that they
could be valid "general statements of policy," because they establish
a binding norm and purport to be finally determinative of regulatees'
right to receive federal funds.22 7 As drafted, they do not even
resemble "rules of agency organization, practice, or procedure," for
they focus primarily on regulatee, not agency, conduct. 228 They are
thus not mere "housekeeping regulations," the type of regulations
that the class of "rules of agency organization, practice, or procedure"
normally encompasses.22
Second, the disparate impact regulations claim on their face to be
implementing Title VI. The EPA's disparate impact regulations, for
example, begin by stating, "This Part implements: Title VI of the
I See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) CThe legislative power of the
United States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority by
governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such power by the
Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes."); 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS &
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.3, at 234 (3d ed. 1994) ("[A]n
agency has the power to issue binding legislative rules only if and to the extent Congress has
authorized it to do so."); supra Part W.A.2.
2" See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 225, at 234 (noting that because interpretive rules
"have no power to bind members of the public, but only the potential power to persuade a
court, and since their issuance provides helpful guidance to the public, courts routinely
conclude that agencies have the power to issue interpretative rules when Congress says
nothing about such power").
22? See Pacific Gas, 506 F.2d at 38 (stating that "[a] general statement of policy... does
not establish a 'binding norm'... [and] is not finally determinative of the issues or rights to
which it is addressed").
' See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1999) (stating, in EPAregulation, that "[a] recipient shall
not use criteria or methods of administering its program which have the effect of subjecting
individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sexe).
2" Bowen, 834 F.2d at 1045.
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Civil Rights Act of 1964... .""30 Accordingly, it is disingenuous to
attempt to construe the regulations as internal agency rules
authorized by the agencies' inherent power to determine their own
budgeting priorities; the agencies themselves proved otherwise when
they purported to be implementing Title VI.
Most importantly for my argument against private disparate
impact suits, however, even if the regulations could be upheld as
valid internal rules, they would be all but useless to private parties
seeking to stop agency action that has a disparate impact. Private
parties may not enforce internal agency rules, and the agencies may
always choose to disregard their own rules.2"1 Indeed, a distinguish-
ing characteristic of a non-legislative agency regulation is that it
lacks the force and effect of law.2"2 Thus, while Justice Stevens may
have correctly noted agencies' inherent power to exercise their
budgeting discretion according to rules, his observation is cold
comfort to those who would like to appeal to those rules to force
agencies to take certain actions. If the disparate impact regulations
are valid internal rules, then they are hortatory at best.
To summarize, Part IV.A has shown that, despite the reasoning of
the lower courts and Supreme Court dicta to the contrary, the
Supreme Court has never held that the disparate impact regulations
under Title VI are valid. The issue of their validity is thus open.
Basic principles of administrative law, derived from Article rs grant
230 40 C.F.R. § 7.10 (1999); see also 5 C.F.R. § 900.401 (1999) (containing statement in
Office of Personnel Management's disparate impact regulations indicating that the
regulationsimplement Title VI); 7 C.F.R. § 15.1(a) (1999) (Dep'tofAgric.); 7 C.F.R. § 1901.201
(Dep't of Agric.); 10 C.F.R. § 4.1(a) (1999) (Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n); 10 C.F.R. §
1040.11(a) (1999) (Dep't of Energy); 13 C.F.R. § 112.1 (1999) (Small Bus. Admin.); 14 C.F.R.
§ 1250.100 (1999) (NASA); 15 C.F.R. § 8.1 (1999) (Dep't of Commerce); 18 C.F.R. § 1302.1
(1999) (Tenn. Valley Auth.); 22 C.F.R. § 141.1 (1999) (State Dep't); 22 C.F.R. § 209.1 (Agency
for Int!l Dev.); 24 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1999) (Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev.); 32 C.F.R. § 195.1
(1999) (Dep't of Defense); 34 C.F.R. § 100.1 (1999) (Dep't of Educ.); 38 C.F.R. § 18.1 (1999)
(Dep't of Veterans' Affairs); 43 C.F.R. § 17.1 (1999) (Dep't of the Interior); 44 C.F.R. §7.1 (Fed.
Emergency Mgt. Agency); 45 C.F.R. § 611.1 (1999) (Nat'l Science Found.); 45 C.F.R. § 1110.1
(Natl Found. on the Arts & the Humanities); 45 C.F.R. § 1203.1 (Corp. for Nat'l & Comm.
Serv.); 49 C.F.R. § 21.1 (1999) (Dep't of Transp.).
231 See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 225, § 6.2, at 228 (stating that "[a] general statement
of policy also is not judicially enforceable against an agency"); id. § 17.7, at 145-46 (discussing
judicial non-enforceability of agencies' internal policies).
2n See id. § 6.2, at 228 (stating that "a valid legislative rule has the same binding effect
as a statute; a general statement of policy has no binding effect on members of the public or
on courts").
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of legislative power exclusively to Congress, indicate that the
regulations cannot be valid legislative rules-i.e., rules that have the
force of law-because they are more proscriptive than their enabling
statutes. The regulations also do not appear to be valid internal
agency rules, and even if they were, they would be merely
aspirational; private plaintiffs could not use them to force agencies
to take particular actions.
C. IMPLICATION DOCTRINE PROHIBITS A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
Even if the disparate impact regulations were valid, however, a
private right of action to enforce the regulations would not be legally
justified. The Supreme Court has now established that solely
legislative intent, properly defined, determines whether there is a
private right of action to enforce a statute that does not expressly
provide for private lawsuits. The courts holding that private
plaintiffs may enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations erred in
applying an implication test that is no longer applicable. Moreover,
they accepted legally incompetent evidence of legislative intent and
ignored legislative history suggesting that Congress intended the
regulations under section 602 to be enforced only through agency
action. 233 Focusing exclusively on whether Congress intended to
authorize private disparate impact suits, and considering only
competent evidence of legislative intent, compel the conclusion that
private disparate impact suits are not legally justified. The
remainder of this Article describes and applies the Court's legislative
intent test for finding implied rights of action, concluding that
private rights of action to enforce the disparate impact regulations
are not legally warranted.
1. History and Description of the Legislative Intent Test. While
the Supreme Court's current test for determining whether an implied
right of action exists focuses exclusively on the presence or absence
of congressional intent to provide such a right, legislative intent has
not always been the touchstone. Early in its history, the federal
' The Sandowal district court's alternative "third.party beneficiary" justification for
private disparate impact suits also fails to justify creation of a private cause of action under
section 602 of Title VI. See supra note 46 (criticizing "third.party beneficiary" rational).
20001 1225
HeinOnline  -- 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1225 1999-2000
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1155
judiciary was much more willing to find implied private rights of
action, reasoning that, as individuals are generally entitled to
adequate remedies for legal wrongs, courts should provide remedies
when Congress has failed expressly to do so. 234 The courts' focus in
the early years of the Republic was on remedial adequacy; the early
cases made little or no reference to legislative intent.2 5 Apparently,
the federal courts did not believe their ability to infer a cause of
action from a federal statute was dependent on the will of
236Congress. While some courts did begin to pay attention to notions
of legislative intent and congressional purpose during the latter half
of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries,2 3 7 the
traditional view persisted, with courts continuing to posit private
rights of action when Congress had indicated no adequate remedy for
legal wrongs.23 8
In addition to the cases inferring private rights of action on the
basis of the need for adequate remedies, a number of federal cases
relied on the "negligence per se" doctrine in finding private rights of
action for violations of statutes not expressly providing for private
' See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (allowing suit to
compel Secretary of State to deliver plaintiffs commission to federal judge on grounds that
every right withheld must have a remedy "and every injury its proper redress" because the
applicable rule of law would be undermined unless plaintiff could sue for his commission);
Bullard v. Bell, 4 F. Cas. 624, 639 (No. 2121) (C.C.N.H. 1817) (relying on Comyn's statement
"that upon every statute made for the remedy of any injury, mischief, or grievance, an action
lies ... by implication; and that such action shall be a recompense to the party"). See
generally Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of
Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 864 (1996) (summarizing
cours attempts in absence of congressional action).
23 Stabile, supra note 234, at 864.
2 Id.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1904) (relying on fact that
purpose of statute was to protect railroad employees and travelers from injury); Groves v.
Wimborne, 2 Q.B. 402 (1898) (allowing private claim based upon legislative intent); Atkinson
v. Newcastle & Gateshead Waterworks Co., 2 Ex. D. 441, 448 (1877) (noting that whether
action was available would depend upon "the purview of the legislature in the particular
statute, and the language which they have there employed"); Stabile, supra note 234, at 865
n.15 (reliance on notions of legislative intent first arose in English courts).
"' See, e.g., Texas Pac. Ry. 6 v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1916) (holding that there was
implied private cause of action pursuant to Safety Appliance Act, as wrong proscribed by that
statute must have adjudicatory consequences); Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood
of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 569-70 (1930) (stating existence of statutory right implies
the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies).
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enforcement.239 The theory underlying those cases was that violation
of a federal statute is, by definition, failure to take reasonable care,
so an aggrieved plaintiff may sue federal law violators for
negligence.240 Of course, negligence per se actions differ somewhat
from actions based directly on violation of a federal statute; the
former actions are state law torts that are governed by state statutes
of limitations and state substantive tort law and may be pursued in
federal court only when there is an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction, while the latter do not require proof of all the elements
of negligence and are always appropriately adjudicated in federal
court. Nonetheless, negligence per se actions based on violations of
a federal statute resemble implied private rights of action in that
they permit private enforcement of statutory commands and involve
the federal courts in determining appropriate remedies for violations
of federal statutes.
With the advent of the New Deal, and the accompanying
proliferation of federal statutes, 24 1 federal courts had many more
opportunities to consider whether statutes contained implied private
rights of action. The judiciary, facing a more active Congress,
became increasingly passive, apparently deciding to rely to a greater
extent on Congress to make express decisions about whether private
rights of action are appropriate. For example, in the 1934 decision
Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.,242 the Supreme Court held
that the adjudicatory consequences of the Federal Safety and
Appliance Act were limited to those expressly provided by
Congress.2 43 In so holding, it reversed its 1916 decision in Texas &
' See, e.g., Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (determining violation of
traffic ordinance constituted negligence per se); Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F.
Supp. 961,965 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (holding that manufacturer's violation of Federal Food, Drug
& Cosmetic Act constituted negligence per se under laws of Wisconsin); cf. Lowe v. General
Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 1373, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding violation of Alabama law is
negligence per se).
'" See, e.g., Lukaszewicz, 510 F. Supp. at965 C'Mhe violation of such a regulation by one
on whom it imposes a duty resulting in occurrence of the harm which the regulation was
designed to prevent constitutes negligence per se. .. ").
"4 The New Deal resulted in a tremendous amount of federal legislation. By 1934,
Congress had enacted 557 basic codes "covering everything from steel production to the
corncob pipe industry." BARBARAHABENSTREIT, CHANGINGAMERICAANDTHESUPREME COURT
97 (1970).
'4 291 U.S. 205 (1934).
14 Id. at 214.
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Pacific Railway v. Rigsby,2 4 which inferred a private right of action
under that same statute.
The negligence per se approach to inferring private rights of
action also declined in this period, particularly in the wake of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,245 in which the Supreme Court rejected
the ability of federal courts to create substantive federal common law
in diversity cases. Though Erie addressed only diversity cases and
really had nothing to do with implication, it generally ended the
previously expansive notion of federal courts' common-law power,246
and federal courts subsequently appeared less willing to borrow state
law negligence concepts to justify inferring implied private causes of
action from federal statutes.2 47
From the time Erie was decided until 1975, the Supreme Court
generally exhibited greater reluctance toward finding implied private
rights of action, particularly when the statute at issue provided an
alternative enforcement mechanism..2 48  The Court, however, did
continue to find implied rights of action when such rights appeared
necessary to provide plaintiffs with some remedy.29- In the securities
law context, the Court appeared particularly willing to find implied
rights of action, even when there were alternative enforcement
2" 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24 See generally John B. Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality of Erie, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1087,
1088 (1992) (discussing Erie's broader implications).
247 See George D. Brown, Of Activism and Erie-The Implication Doctrine's Implications
for the Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IOWA L. REV. 617, 627-37 (1984) (discussing
Erie doctrine in context of implied rights of action); Stabile, supra note 234, at 866.
24 Stabile, supra note 234, at 866 (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963)
(finding no private right of action under Civil Rights Act since suits against federal officials
could have been maintained under state law)); T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464
(1959) (holding that section 216(j) of Motor Carrier Act does not give shippers statutory right
of action because statute only provides for agency enforcement and Congress did not adopt
proposed amendment that would have permitted such suits); General Comm. v. Southern Pac.
Co., 320 U.S. 338 (1943) (noting that Congress intended controversies about section 2 of the
Railway Labor Act to be addressed by agencies or other tribunals); Switchmen's Union v.
National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943) (finding same).
24 See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (recognizing private cause of action
under Social Security Act); Allen v. State Bd. of Elec., 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (Voting Rights Act
of 1967); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899); Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962) (Motor
Carrier Act); Turnstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineermen, 323 U.S. 210
(1944) (Railway Labor Act).
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mechanisms. 21° The general trend, however, was toward relatively
fewer implied rights of action.25'
In 1975, the Supreme Court decided Cort v. Ash,252 a case that
would significantly affect the implied right of action doctrine. In
declining to find an implied private right of action in a statute
prohibiting political contributions by corporations, the Cort Court
articulated four factors courts should consider in determining the
availability of private rights of action: First, is the plaintiff a
member of the class for whose especial benefit that statute was
enacted? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create or deny a private remedy? Third, is
implying such a remedy consistent with the underlying purpose of
the legislative scheme? And fourth, is the plaintiffs cause of action
one that was traditionally relegated to state law so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
253
Though the Court's articulation of the Cort factors may have been
intended to tighten up the requirements for finding an implied
private right of action, the Cort test actually had the opposite
effect:254 Private rights of action proliferated in the lower federal
courts after the Cort test was announced.255
Perhaps because reliance on the Cort factors was resulting in the
discovery of so many implied rights of action, the Supreme Court
soon moved away from reliance on the four factors toward the
current test for discovering implied rights of action, which focuses
exclusively on the second Cort factor-whether there is evidence that
Congress intended to create a private right of action. This move
' See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (holding that private cause of
action was available under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, despite other
means of redress available to plaintiff). See generally 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS B.
LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 2.2, at 462 (2d ed. 1994) (referring
to same period as "expansion era" of inferring private causes of action); LOUIS LOSS,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1058 (1983) (referring to decade prior to 1975 as
"ebullient stage" of implied cause of action doctrine).
11 Stabile, supra note 234, at 866-67.
25 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
23 Id. at 78.
25 Mank, Is There a Private Course of Action?, supra note 18, at 27.
In the four years after Cort, twenty appellate decisions discerned implied private rights
of action in federal statutes. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 741-42 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
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began in Cannon v. University of Chicago,56 where the Court, though
examining each of the four Cort factors in determining that there is
a private right of action to enforce Title IX's prohibition on
intentional discrimination, expressly stated that the four factors are
the means through which congressional intent is discerned.257
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions further confirmed that the
Cort factors are relevant only insofar as they serve as proxies for
legislative intent. For example, in Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington,258 the Court began its inquiry into whether there is a
private cause of action under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 by acknowledging that the issue of whether a private
cause of action should be implied is "one of statutory construction."259
The Court went on to explain that the Cort factors are important
only to the extent that they indicate the presence or absence of
congressional intent to authorize a private right of action:
It is true that in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth
four factors that it considered "relevant" in
determining whether a private remedy is implicit
in a statute not expressly providing one. But the
Court did not decide that each of these factors is
entitled to equal weight. The central inquiry
remains whether Congress intended to create,
either expressly or by implication, a private cause
of action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed
in Cort-the language and focus of the statute, its
legislative history, and its purpose. . . -are ones
traditionally relied upon in determining legislative
intent.2
60
The Touche Ross Court also definitively rejected the early view that
judicial inference of private rights of action is appropriate in order to
441 U.S. 677 (1979).
25 Id. at 688 (referring to "the four factors that Cort identifies as indicative of such an
intent").
2m 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
239 Id. at 568.
Id. at 575-76.
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provide remedies for legal injuries when Congress has failed to do
SO.
2 6 1
Shortly after Touche Ross, the Court decided Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis [hereinafter TAMA], 262 in which it
re-emphasized the primacy of legislative intent, stating that "[t]he
dispositive question remains whether Congress intended to create
any such [private] remedy. Having answered that question in the
negative, our inquiry is at an end."263 The TAMA Court also
discussed how legislative intent to create a private right of action
could be discerned: Such an intent may appear in the legislative
history, language, or structure of a statute, or it may be evident in
the circumstances of the statute's enactment.264
Without doubt, Touche Ross and TAMA signaled a change in the
Court's approach to implied rights of action. According to Justice
Scalia, those opinions "effectively overruled" Cor.265 A number of
lower courts have recognized this "effective overrulingl ' 26 and have
opined that the Court's new emphasis exclusively on legislative
" Id. at 568 C' '[Tihe fact that a federal statute has been violated and some person
harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person.'
Instead, our task is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the
private right of action asserted.... (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
688 (1979) (citation omitted)).
12 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
26 Id. at 24.
Id. at 18.
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Mallett v. Wisconsin Div. of Voc'l Rehab., 130 F.3d 1245, 1249 (7th Cir. 1997)
(questioning viability of Cort); Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617, 623 n.17 (8th Cir. 1989)
(raising same question); Asch v. Philips, Appel & Walden, Inc., 867 F.2d 776, 777 (2d Cir.
1989) (noting same); Burroughs v. Hills, 741 F.2d 1525, 1539 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (questioning same); Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d
434, 437 (5th Cir. 1981) (raising same question); Rompel v. Rinker, 1997 WL 285617, at *4
(N.D. Ill. May 22, 1997) (noting same); Ruccolo v. BDP, Int'l, Inc., 1996 WL 735575, at *5
(D.N.J. Mar. 25, 1996) (raising same question); Olopai v. Gerrero, 1993 WL 384960, at *3
(D.N.I. Sept. 24, 1993) (questioning same); Con-Way Central Express, Inc., v. Fujisawa
U.S.A., Inc., 1992 WL 168553, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 1992) (questioning same); SCFC ILC,
Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 784 F. Supp. 822,826 & n.1 (D. Utah 1992) (noting same question);
Artist M. v. Johnson, 747 F. Supp. 446, 450 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (acknowledging same question);
Park Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Michael Oil Co., 702 F. Supp. 703, 704 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(questioning same); Jiffy Lube Intl, Inc. v. Grease Monkey Holding Corp., 671 F. Supp. 1275,
1276 n.1 (D. Colo. 1987) (raising same question); Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. Federal Home Loan
Bank, 589 F. Supp. 885, 892 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (noting same); McGhee v. Housing Auth., 543
F. Supp. 607, 609-10 (M.D. Ala. 1982) (raising same question); Rich v. New York Stock
Exchange, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 87, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (questioning same).
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intent results in a more stringent test for implied private rights of
action.267 Though more stringent, the current test is also simpler:
A plaintiff may bring a private action, in the absence of express
provision of such an action, only if he proves-from the legislative
history, language or structure of the statute, or from the
circumstances of the statute's enactment 26s--that Congress intended
such private actions to be brought.
269
Despite the Supreme Court's "effective overrul[ing]" of Cort,270 the
courts that have expressly permitted private actions to enforce
section 602 of Title VI have purported to apply the Cort factors in
determining that private actions are appropriate. 271 The remainder
of this Part performs an implication analysis using the legislative
intent test the Court has now embraced-the proper test for
determining whether the section 602 regulations are privately
enforceable.272
I See, e.g., Ruccolo, 1996 WL 735575, at*5 (referring to "less stringent Cort factors" and
noting that "[a]s a result of the focus on congressional intent, it is more difficult to find an
implied private cause of action"); Olopai, 1993 WL 384960, at *3 (noting that "the Supreme
Court has essentially abandoned the four part test it established in Cort in favor of a test that
is stricter, yet easier to apply").
21m TAMA, 444 U.S. at 18.
26 The party attempting to bring an implied private right of action bears the burden of
proving Congress's intent. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1992).
270 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 189 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that Cort has
effectively been overruled).
11 See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 397 (3d Cir. 1999) Cat is by now well-established
that implication of a private right of action for a statute requires analysis of the factors set
forth in Cort v. Ash."); Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seit 132 F.3d 925,
933 (3d Cir. 1997) C'In addressing [whether § 602 permits implication of a private right of
action], a court will consider the factors set out by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash and its
progeny.") (citation omitted); Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1258 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(recognizing same principle).
222 As the focus of Part IV of this Article is positive rather than normative, I have not
focused on defending the legislative intent test for implication. However, as a number of
scholars have criticized the Courts exclusive focus on legislative intent, see, e.g., Richard W.
Creswell, The Separation of Powers Implications of Implied Rights of Action, 34 MERCER L.
REV. 973, 986 (1983) (criticizing use of legislative intent); Stabile, supra note 234, at 877-912
(criticizing same); Bruce A. Boyer, Note, Howard v. Pierce: Implied Causes of Action and the
Ongoing Vitality ofCort v. Ash, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 722,748-49 (1985) (making same criticism),
I feel compelled to offer a brief defense of the legislative intent test. I contend that the
Court's exclusive focus on legislative intent in resolving implication questions is justifiable
on constitutional and prudential grounds.
First of all, the test preserves the separation of powers that is the organizing principle
of the structural Constitution. The Constitution vests legislative power in Congress, see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1, and judicial power in the courts, see U.S. CONST. art. mH, § 1. Restricting
1232
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2. Application of the Legislative Intent Test. Applying the
legislative intent test to the implementing regulations federal
agencies have adopted under section 602 of Title VI reveals that the
regulations are not privately enforceable. There is insufficient
judicial implication of private rights of action to statutes where there is competent evidence
of legislative intent to permit such actions ensures that the courts do not usurp Congress's
power to make federal law. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188-91 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that Court should be reluctant to imply cause of action too
freely because doing so would abridge role of Congress by having Court act in both legislative
and judicial capacity).
Critics of the legislative intent test contend that this argument relies upon a formalist
conception of separation of powers that the Court has rejected. See, e.g., Creswell, supra, at
990-91 (noting literalist approach supplanted); Stabile, supra note 234, at 879-80 (noting that
Court has abandoned literal application of separation ofpowers). Instead of strict formalism,
they contend, courts deciding separation of powers cases have applied a functional analysis
that asks whether action by one branch affects the ability of another branch to carry out its
functions. E.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,698 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S 731, 760-61 (1982) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that purpose of
separation of power3 is to prevent interference or intimidation from other branches). The
critics argue that, from this functionalist perspective, there is no separation of powers
problem when a court recognizes an implied right of action, for Congress could always amend
the statute to exclude the private right of action if it disagreed with the courtfs implication
of such a right. E.g., Creswell, supra, at 993. Because Congress possesses the power to make
legislative corrections, the critics conclude, liberal implication does not adversely affect
Congress's ability to carry out its functions.
But, to the extent courts "force" Congress to amend statutes to deny rights of action
by liberally reading such private rights into the statutes, the courts do affect Congress's
ability to carry out its functions-Congress has to devote scarce resources to correcting rogue
courts. Moreover, Congress frequently may be unable, for a variety of practical reasons, to
make legislative corrections to erroneous judicial decisions implying rights of action. See F.
REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 181 (1975) CIn the
realities of the legislative process, almost no reliable inference of current intent could be
drawn [from failure to correct an erroneous decision]. In many cases, the legislature is
unaware of the relevant court decision. Even where it is fully aware of it, there are often
reasons other than approval why a legislature remains silent or inactive."). In practice, then,
activist implication adversely affects Congress's ability to legislate, even though, in theory,
Congress can always override an erroneous decision granting a private right of action. The
critics of formalism, ironically, are engaging in formalistic thinking themselves in assuming
that a legislative correction will always be available.
In addition, the legislative intent test is justified on the prudential ground that it
reflects institutional competence: Legislatures are better able than courts to determine how
the statutes they enact are to be enforced. Legislatures, with their ability to hold hearings,
commission studies, etc., are much better than courts at determining the effects of various
enforcement mechanisms. They are well-suited to determine whether a private right of action
will result in over-enforcement of a statute or will effectively supplement agency action to
achieve an appropriate level of enforcement. Moreover, legislatures are politically
accountable and must be sensitive to the level of enforcement the citizenry thinks is desirable.
Liberal implication of private rights of action may upset the legislatively drawn balance
between competing parties that desire differing levels of enforcement.
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evidence that Congress intended to provide a private right to sue for
violation of the enabling statute, and the lower courts have thus
erred in permitting private disparate impact suits.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the
implication inquiry here is somewhat unique, because it is ultimately
concerned not with whether there is an implied private right of
action under a statute, but rather whether regulations adopted
pursuant to a statute afford such a right. Nonetheless, the question
of whether there is a private right of action to enforce the enabling
statute necessarily precedes the question of whether the regulations
themselves are privately enforceable in federal court, for only
Congress (in its statutes), not federal agencies (in their regulations),
may expand the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction. 73 Indeed,
each of the three circuits that have expressly mapped out the process
for determining whether there is a private right of action under a
regulation has recognized that a threshold question is whether the
enabling statute permits private enforcement." 4 If the enabling
statute does not permit a private right of action, then the regulations
promulgated thereunder may not either. Thus, in applying the test
for implication to the disparate impact regulations, we must first
21M See U.S. CONST. art. In, § 2; Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804,
807-08 (1986) (holding that federal question jurisdiction conferred under Article III, allowing
federal courts to hear cases "arising under" federal statutes, is not self-executing, and federal
courts have only such federal question jurisdiction as is given them by current congressional
legislation).
24 See generally Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Public Wrongs, Private Rights: Private Attorneys
General for Civil Rights, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 321, 329-39 (1998) (discussing tests employed by
the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits). The Third Circuit asks: (1) "whether the statute under
which the [agency] rule was promulgated properly permits the implication of a private right
of action," (2) "whether the agency rule is properly within the scope of the enabling statute,"
and (3) "whether implying a private right of action will further the purposes of the enabling
statute." Angelastro v. Prudential-Bach Securities, Inc. 764 F.2d 939,947 (3d Cir. 1985). The
Fifth Circuit simply applies the Cort factors to the regulation at issue. See Lowrey v. Texas
A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242,250-51 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying Cort factors in Title IX suit).
It construes the second prong of Cort as asking whether Congress intended to create a private
remedy under the governing statute and thereby ensures that the statutory question (i.e., did
Congress intend the statute to permit private suits?) is prior to the regulatory question (i.e.,
may a private plaintiff sue to enforce a regulation under the statute?). Id. at 253. The Ninth
Circuit asks: (1) whether "the [enabling] statute provides a private right of action as a matter
of legislative intent," and (2) whether the regulation under the statute is "valid and furthers
the substantive purposes of the enabling statute." See Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding private right of action exists under rules
promulgated pursuant to Securities Exchange Act).
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determine whether the statute enabling the regulations permits a
private right of action.
It does not do so. The enabling statute under which the disparate
impact regulations were promulgated is section 602 of Title VI.275
That provision first authorizes federally funded agencies to make
rules "to effectuate the provisions of' section 601, which prohibits
intentional discrimination by federally funded entities:
Each Federal department and agency which is
empowered to extend Federal financial assistance
to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or
contract other than a contract of insurance or
guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate
the provisions of section 2000d [601] of this title
with respect to such program or activity by issuing
rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability
which shall be consistent with the objectives of the
The Powell court mistakenly identified the enabling statute as section 601 of Title VI,
not section 602. The court reasoned:
[Tihe regulation at issue here, although promulgated by the
Department of Education under section 602 of Title VI, implements
section 601 of Title VI. The Supreme Court precedent and our cases
firmly establish that section 601 of Title VI gives rise to an implied
right of action, at least for purposes of securing injunctive relief It
therefore follows that the first prong of Angelastro [which asks
whether a private right of action exists under the statute under
which the rule was promulgated] is satisfied.
Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 399 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Without doubt, the
disparate impact regulations are promulgated pursuant to section 602, not section 601. The
agencies, then, get their quasi-legislative authority from section 602, and in order to
determine whether the regulations are privately enforceable, we should begin by asking
whether that provision of the statute is privately enforceable. In sweeping statutes that
include a number of requirements and prohibitions, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, some
provisions may be privately enforceable and others may not be. Courts cannot assume that
because one section is privately enforceable, so is every other provision of the statute. This
is particularly true in a case such as this, where one provision (section 601) includes a stricter
intent requirement than the other (section 602); if Congress truly intended section 601 to
apply only to intentional discrimination but meant for section 602 to reach all disparate
impacts, intentional or not (an assumption this Article questions, see supra Part IV.A.2
(arguing that Congress did not intend different reach for sections 601 and 602)), then the fact
that Congress meant for section 601 to be privately enforceable in no way implies that it
meant for section 602-a provision that reaches more conduct-also to include a private right
of action.
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statute authorizing the financial assistance in
connection with which the action is taken.
27 6
The provision then specifies, in significant detail, how compliance
with the regulations is to be effected. Notably, it does not mention
a private right of action to enforce the regulations:
Compliance with any requirement adopted
pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the
termination of or refusal to grant or to continue
assistance under such program or activity to any
recipient as to whom there has been an express
finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing,
of a failure to comply with such requirement,... or
(2) by any other means authorized by law:
Provided, however, That no such action shall be
taken until the department or agency concerned
has advised the appropriate person or persons of
the failure to comply with the requirement and has
determined that compliance cannot be secured by
voluntary means. In the case of any action
terminating, or refusing to grant or continue,
assistance because of failure to comply with a
requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the
head of the Federal department or agency shall file
with the committees of the House and Senate
having legislative jurisdiction over the program or
activity involved a full written report of the
circumstances and the grounds for such action. No
such action shall become effective until thirty days
have elapsed after the filing of such report.
27
In the post-Touche Ross!TAMA era, the question of whether this
statutory provision supports a private right of action reduces to the
question of whether there is evidence that Congress intended to
216 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994) (codifying P.L. 88-352, title VI § 602, 78 Stat. 252).
2V Id.
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authorize such a right. The presumption is against implied private
rights of action, so absent evidence suggesting that Congress
intended to provide for private enforcement, courts may not imply
private rights of action.279 Congressional intent to permit private
actions may appear in the section 602 text, legislative history, or
structure, or in the circumstances of the provision's enactment.280
a. Text. The text of section 602 does not indicate any intention
on the part of Congress to provide for private enforcement of the
rules agencies adopt pursuant to the section. Indeed, none of the
three courts that have expressly held that there is a private right of
action to enforce the section 602 regulations has found in the text of
section 602 any evidence of legislative intent to provide for private
enforcement. One might argue that Congress indicated such an
intent in providing for enforcement "by any other means authorized
by law,' 281' but private enforcement of agency regulations is not
"authorized by law"; no statute affirmatively indicates that private
suits are permitted. Things would be different if the statute
provided for enforcement "by any other means not prohibited by
law. ' 282 The law does not affirmatively "prohibit" private suits, so a
7 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979); TAMA, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 24 (1979); see also supra Part IV.B.1 (demonstrating that question of whether
provision supports private right of action is one of congressional intent).
" See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347,363-64 (1992) (holding burden is on party seeking
to assert private right of action to produce evidence of congressional intent to provide such
right).
m TAMA, 444 U.S. at 18.
2" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994) (providing for enforcement of agency regulations by
denial or termination of funding after hearing or "by any other means authorized by law").
2 There is a difference between permitting actions "authorized by law" and permitting
those "not prohibited by law." Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (providing for enforcement by
"any other means authorized by law") with Pub. L. No. 105-313, 112 Stat. 2964 (1998)
(providing, at section 7(d), for "any other resolution process that is not prohibited by law").
In 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, affirmative authorization somewhere in the law is required before the
action is permitted; in Pub. L. No. 105-313, the action is permitted unless it is elsewhere
prohibited. Cf. West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564, 582 (W.D. Va. 1983) (holding that phrase
"permitted by law" in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1629f(1) (1994), does not
mean "not prohibited by law" but instead requires affirmative authorization); Newman v.
Checkrite Cal., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1354, 1368 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (stating, in interpreting
statutory language allowing charges "permitted by law" that "it does not follow.., that any
charges not prohibited by law are necessarily permitted," but that "as a matter of plain
meaning, the word 'permitted' requires that defendants identify some state statute which
'permits,' i.e., authorizes or allows, in however general a fashion, the fees or charges in
question").
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statute to that effect would permit such suits. But the law also does
not "authorize" private suits, so the "by any other means authorized
by law" provision does not encompass such lawsuits. In addition, the
legislative history of the "any other means" language indicates that
the phrase refers to any other means at the agencies'disposal,283 such
as breach of contract suits brought by the agencies." 4 The text of the
statute, then, expressly provides for two types of enforcement: (1)
denial or termination of funding by the agency after a hearing, or (2)
other authorized legal proceedings. Neither of these options includes
private enforcement. Basic principles of statutory construction-i.e.,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the mention of one thing implies
the exclusion of another)-call for reading the text to forbid private
The legislative history of the "by any other means authorized by law" language also
indicates that it meant to approve means that had been affirmatively authorized by other
legislation. 110 Cong. Rec. 7060 (1964). Asked what the "any other means" language means,
Senator Pastore stated, "This language means that there shall be no repeal of laws which
Congress has already enacted." Id. When asked, "Is the only purpose of that phrase to show
that there is no repeal of existing law?', he responded, "Yes. I except, of course, the'separate
but equal' laws." Id. These statements by "one of the principal spokesmen for Title VI,"
United States v. Marion County Sch. Dist., 625 F.2d 607, 613 n.12 (5th Cir. 1980), indicate
that the only "other means" referred to were those expressly provided for by statute.
" In a long discussion of the meaning of the "by any other means authorized by law"
language, Senator Pastore explained:
If voluntary means fail [to bring a fund recipient into compliance
with the section 602 regulations], then the agency has a choice. On
the one hand, it can terminate the grant, loan, or contract, refuse
further payment under it, refuse to make a new grant or loan, or
refuse to enter into a new contract. Alternatively, the agency may
use "any other means authorized by law." This phrase does not
confer any new authority. It simply makes it clear that Federal
departments and agencies may carry out the purposes of title VI by
using the powers they now have under the laws creating them or
authorizing particular assistance programs.
110 Cong. Rec. 7060 (1964).
'" Agencies may enter contracts with regulatees conditioning receipt of federal funds on
compliance with Title VI regulations. The agencies may then institute breach of contract
actions against regulatees who fail to comply with the regulations. As Senator Pastore
explained, "Again, if an agency's nondiscrimination requirement is embodied in a contractual
commitment, the agency may be able to bring suit to enforce its contract." 110 Cong. Rec.
7060 (1964); see also id. at 7066 (remarks of Sen. Ribicof) (calling such suits "the most
effective way for an agency to proceed"); Marion Co. Sch. Dist., 625 F.2d at 613 (holding that,
in addition to instituting agency procedures to terminate or deny federal funding, federal
agencies may sue in federal court to enforce contractual assurances of compliance with Title
VI's prohibition against discrimination in the operation of federally funded schools).
1238
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enforcement.8 5
b. Legislative History. Finding in the text no evidence of
legislative intent to provide a private right of action, the Chester
Residents, Powell, and Sandoval courts focused their attention on the
legislative history of section 602. They claimed to find there
affirmative evidence of congressional intent to permit private
enforcement. 286 Examination of this "evidence," however, indicates
that it is incompetent; indeed, the legislative history the courts
examined was that of a subsequent statute enacted by a different
Congress! The Supreme Court has indicated that such "subsequent
legislative history"-the term itself is an oxymoron-is of extremely
limited value in attempting to ascertain the intention of an enacting
Congress. 287 Moreover, despite the Chester Residents court's
suggestion to the contrary,288 there is affirmative evidence in the
legislative history of section 602 that Congress did not mean to
permit private enforcement.
Each piece of legislative history that the Chester Residents and
Sandoval courts pointed to as evincing an "intent to create a private
right of action" to enforce the disparate impact regulations289 relates
2" See 73 AM. JUR.2D Statutes § 211 (1999) (stating that, under expressio unius canon of
construction, statute that provides for thing to be done in given manner "normally implies
that it shall not be done in any other manner").
See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 399 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting Chester Residents courts
determination that legislative history of Title VI indicated intent to permit private suits
under section 602); Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 934
(3d Cir. 1997); Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1258-59 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (quoting
Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 934).
' Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980); United
States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) ("[The views of a subsequent Congress form a
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of as earlier one.").
2 See Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 934 (stating that legislative history showing
congressional intent to permit private enforcement of section 602 is "uncontroverted" and
noting that "PADEP does not.., cite to any statements in the Congressional Record or
elsewhere that would undermine those" establishing that Congress intended private suits to
enforce section 602); see also Sandoval, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1259 (adopting this statement from
Chester Residents).
' Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 933-34; Sandoval, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1258-59. The Powell
court did not delve into the legislative history of section 602 in a search for congressional
intent to create a private right of action. Rather, the court (incorrectly) reasoned that the
relevant inquiry was whether section 601, not section 602, created a private right of action,
and, as the Supreme Court had already answered that question in the affirmative, see Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,688-89 (1979) (finding implied rightofaction to enforce
section 601 of Title VI), the Powell court saw no need to search the legislative history for a
2000] 1239
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to the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, a statute enacted to
amend an unrelated provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.2 90 First,
a House report on an early version of the ultimately enacted bill
referred to the "private right of action which allows a private
individual or entity to provide the vehicle to test [certain] regulations
in Title IX and their expanded meaning to their outermost limits."291
Second, statements of several legislators suggested that there is a
private right of action based on violations of either Title VI or Title
IX regulations. 92 Finally, testimony at congressional hearings on
congressional intent to permit private enforcement of section 602. See supra note 275
(describing error of Powell court).
2 See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1994)). The purpose of the 1987 Act was to repudiate Grove
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), a Supreme Court decision that applied the intended
beneficiary doctrine to Title IX of the Civil Rights Act by holding that federal funds received
by a subunit of an educational institution did not subject the entire institution to the non-
discriminatory demands of the statute. Under the intended beneficiary rule, if a subunit did
not receive federal funds, then the presumption was that participants in its activities were
not the intended beneficiaries of the federal aid at issue. Though it was a Title IX case, Grove
City essentially restricted standing in Title VI cases to intended beneficiaries because the
language of Title IX was expressly modeled after Title VI and the Supreme Court had
frequently relied on the construction of one title in interpreting the other. The 1987 Act
repudiated Grove City by broadly defining the term "institution-wide basis" to include "all of
the operations" of the recipient. Thus, under the 1987 Act, if a state or local government
program receives federal assistance, then Title VI governs all operations of the agency
administering the program. Mank, Is There a Private Course of Action?, supra note 18, at 42-
43. Because the purpose of that Act was to address the Supreme Courts Grove City decision,
not to ratify or create a private right of action under section 602 and its implementing
regulations, the legislative history of the 1987 Act is irrelevant to the question at hand.
Indeed, the official history of the Act explains that its amendments directly "address[ ] only
the scope of coverage under Title VI, Title IX, section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act], and Age
Discrimination Act of recipients of federal financial assistance." S. REP. No. 100-64, at 28
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 30. Moreover, the official history cautions that
statements of individual members of Congress "made during consideration of the earlier
versions of this legislation... as well as the current versions, merely reflect the views of
individual members of Congress. Such statements are not relevant to the interpretation of
S.557." Id. at 31; Mank, Is There a Private Course of Action?, supra note 18, at 43-44.
2' H.R. REP. No. 99-963, at 24 (1986).
The Chester Residents court noted Senator Hatch's statement that:
The failure to provide a particular share of contract opportunities to
minority-owned businesses, for example, could lead Federal agencies
to undertake enforcement action asserting that the failure to provide
more contracts to minority-owned firms, standing alone, is
discriminatory under agency disparate impact regulations
implementing Title VI.... Of course, advocacy groups will be able
to bring private lawsuits making the same allegations before federal
judges.
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the 1987 Act indicated that witnesses believed there is a private
right of action to enforce the regulations adopted pursuant to the
1964 Act. 93 In particular, a memorandum by the Office of
Management and Budget stated that office's opinion that "every
licensed attorney would be empowered to file suit to enforce the
'effects test' regulations of agencies, challenging practices in every
aspect of every institution that receives any Federal assistance." 94
The Chester Residents and Sandoval courts concluded that these
items of legislative history were sufficient to establish a
congressional intent to provide a private right of action to enforce the
disparate impact regulations adopted pursuant to section 602. The
courts apparently reasoned that the statements show that Congress
knew, when it amended Title VI in 1987, that courts were
interpreting the Act to permit private disparate impact suits.
Because Congress did not amend the Act to forbid such private suits,
the reasoning continues, it implicitly approved the lawsuits.
Even proponents of private rights of action to enforce the
disparate impact regulations have acknowledged that the Chester
Residents and Sandoval courts erred in looking to the legislative
history of 1987 legislation to discern the intentions of the legislators
that enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act.295  Indeed, courts and
commentators alike treat subsequent legislative history as the least
reliable form of legislative history.9 6 For one thing, the meaning
Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 934 n.13 (quoting 134 Cong. Rec. 4257 (1988) (remarks of Sen.
Hatch)). The Chester Residents court also quoted Representative Fields: "If a greater
percentage of minority than white students fail a bar exam or a medical exam .... will a State
be subject to private lawsuits because the tests have a disproportionate impact on
minorities?' Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 934 n.13 (quoting 130 Cong. Reec. 18880 (1984)
(remarks of Rep. Fields)).
2" See Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 934 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1984: Hearings on
S. 2568 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
2d Seas. 23-24, 153-54, 200 (1984); Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1985: Joint Hearings on
H.R. 700 Before the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil and Const.
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 734, 1095, 1099 (1985)).
2" See Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 934 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1984: Hearings on
S. 2568Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
2d Seas. 527 (1984)).
M See Mank, Is There a Private Course of Action?. supra note 18, at 43-45 (noting courts'
error).
2" E.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980);
United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) (CTlhe views of a subsequent Congress form
a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.'); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
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members of a subsequent Congress ascribe to previously enacted
legislation is irrelevant because the subsequent Congress is a
separate decisionmaking body that has no constitutional role in
explaining or interpreting statutes that a prior body enacted. 97 In
addition, the possibility of strategic behavior by legislators raises
prudential concerns about the reliability of subsequent congressional
commentary for ascertaining the intent of the enacting legislature.298
For example, a member of a subsequent Congress, though he knows
that the enacting Congress intended a meaning other than the one
he desires, may nonetheless make floor statements or submit
material to the Congressional Record suggesting that the meaning
of the prior legislation is what the member desires. In addition,
members of subsequent Congresses may, in attempting to paint a
dire picture of the effects of pending legislation, misconstrue the
effects of previously enacted legislation.
Indeed, the latter strategy may have influenced some of the
statements the Chester Residents court pointed to as establishing
that Congress intended the section 602 regulations to be privately
enforceable. Senator Hatch and Representative Fields opined that
the 1987 Act would make private lawsuits even more damaging, 299
but they really may not have believed that such private suits are
actually authorized by Title VI. As opponents of the 1987 Act, they
were trying to show the disastrous results of adopting the legislation,
and in order to paint the most damaging picture possible, they may
have misstated their actual beliefs about what types of lawsuits Title
VI permits. Hence, their statements, on which the Chester Residents
DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 222 (1994); James J. Brudney, Congressional
Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93
MIcH. L. REV. 1, 61-66 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Post-Enactment Legislative Signals, 57
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75,79 (1994); Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory
Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?.: Why PragmaticAgency DecisionmakingIsBetter Than
Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1231, 1274 (1996).
' See Brudney, supra note 296, at 61 C([O]nce Congress has acted, the formal
responsibility for saying what the law means rests with the courts, not Congress. When
congressional committees purport to ratify or reject judicial interpretations of earlier-enacted
text, they are improperly interfering with the function of the judiciary.").
See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566-67 (1988) (finding legislative history not
"authoritative interpretation" of what Congress intended); Brudney, supra note 296, at 62-63
(questioning reliability of legislative history in explaining what current Congress intends).
I See supra note 292 (quoting comments of Hatch and Fields).
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and Sandoval courts relied, are perhaps untrustworthy-as well as
constitutionally irrelevant.
During recent years, the Supreme Court has become increasingly
reluctant to consider post-enactment legislative history."'0 For
example, it announced, in Public Employees Retirement System of
Ohio v. Betts,3 'O that "[wie have observed on more than one occasion
that the interpretation given by one Congress (or a committee or
member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little assistance in
discerning the meaning of that statute.""3 2 Accordingly, it seems
clear that the Chester Residents and Sandoval courts erred in
discerning a congressional intent to provide a private right of action
to enforce the section 602 disparate impact regulations solely from
the legislative history of a statute that was adopted twenty-three
years after the statutory provision whose interpretation was at issue
and that dealt with a wholly different subject."0 '
Not only did the Chester Residents and Sandoval courts
improperly rely on incompetent evidence that Congress intended to
permit private disparate impact suits, those courts also failed to
acknowledge items in the legislative history of Title VI that
affirmatively indicate that Congress did not envision private
enforcement of the section 602 regulations. Addressing concerns of
some southern Congressmen that Title VI remedies were too harsh,
Representative Gill noted that section 603 only permits lawsuits by
entities whose funding has been cut off under section 602, not by
individuals who are the victims of agency action that violates section
602."04 In addition, a number of items in the legislative history to
See Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc. 486 U.S. 825, 838-40 (1988)
(discussing extensively limited value of subsequent legislative history); Eskridge, supra note
296, at 83-85 (arguing that Rehnquist Court has been more hostile to post-enactment
legislative history than Burger Court). But see Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 504
U.S. 60 (1992) (accepting congressional adoption, or acquiescence, by silence).
301 492 U.S. 15.3 (1989).
302 Id. at 168.
30 See supra note 290 (discussing the subject of the 1987 Civil Rights Restoration Act).
Representative Gill explained:
[Title VI provides very clearly that the person or the agency which
is denied the money, if it desires, can go to the courts--to the
Federal district court in the district where the question arises-and
that court can determine whether or not the cutoff is in accord with
law and whether or not it was properly done under this statute.
Nowhere in this section do you find a comparable right of legal action
20001 1243
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section 602 indicate that Congress desired to preserve agencies'
ability to respond with flexibility to violations of the Title VI
regulations."°5 The availability of private suits to enforce the
regulations greatly hinders Congress's goal of flexible enforcement,
for with private enforcement the agencies' option of declining to
punish a violation of the regulations is eliminated; agencies lose the
ability to ignore (or "nullify")80 6 the regulations in exceptional
for a person who feels he has been denied his rights to participate in
the benefits of Federal funds. Nowhere. Only those who have been
cut off can go to court and present their claim.
110 Cong. Rec. 2467 (1964) (statement of Rep. Gill) (emphasis added).
' For example, in describing the enforcement provisions of Title VI to a subcommittee
of the House Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Robert Kennedy explained:
Numerous proposals relating to this problem [of discrimination by
federally funded entities] have been made in Congress in recent
years. In general they have provided that Federal backing be
withdrawn automatically and without exception from any program
when discriminatory practices occur. The principle that these
programs be nondiscriminatory is sound, but I think that a
mandatory requirement that federal financial assistance be
withdrawn is too sweeping. Title VI would specifically provide
authority to the executive branch to withhold financial support in
any program when discrimination is found, regardless of the
provisions of existing law. However, the exercise of the authority
would not be mandatory. This approach, I believe, is directed to the
heart of the problem, yet will not force the government into
inappropriate action in the exceptional situation which may arise.
Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons within the
Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1381-82 (1964) (testimony of Att'y Gen. Kennedy); see also id. at 1544
(testimony of Sec'y Celebrezze, Dept of Health, Educ. & Welfare) CEnactment of title VI of
the bill before you will be a direction from Congress to discontinue support of programs that
entail racial discrimination, placing discretionary power in the administrator as to the time
and manner of implementation .... A measure of discretion in the application of the provision
is essential.. . . We interpret title VI as permitting us to pinpoint withholding to the
situations where discriminatory practices prevail."); id. at 1890 (statement of Rep. Celler,
Chairman of Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary) "[I]t strikes me that this
provision of title VI offers wide discretion. There is no question about it. Those who want to
give that kind of discretion will vote for title VI. Those who don't want to give that kind of
discretion will vote against title VI .... You have a wholesale variety of cases; all manners
and kinds of cases are going to crop up. You can't envision them in advance. You just
therefore give the widest kind of discretion"); 110 Cong. Rec. 2467 (1964) (statement of Rep.
Gill) ( I think you will note that flexibility and caution is the rule of this title VI. It allows the
administrative agency to try to work out special problems and to ask for compliance. It sets
no time limit in which this compliance must be achieved. I submit that if title VI errs it is on
the side of mildness.")
' See supra Part I.B.3 (explaining agency nullification).
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situations. As Part III explained," 7  while intentionally
discriminatory actions by federally funded entities are always
undesirable and ought to be deterred absolutely, some actions by
federal fund recipients may have disparate racial impacts but
nonetheless be desirable actions. Congress recognized that agencies
may, at times, need to ignore technical violations of the regulations
promulgated under section 602 in order to achieve another objective.
Accordingly, members of Congress expressed concerns about
preservation of enforcement flexibility.
Granting private individuals a right to sue to enforce the Title VI
regulations runs contrary to Congress's apparent desire to maximize
agency enforcement flexibility. Hence, contrary to the conclusion of
Chester Residents and Sandoval, there is affirmative evidence in the
legislative history of section 602 that Congress did not intend to take
away agencies' nullification powers by providing a private right of
action to enforce the section 602 regulations."0 '
c. Statutory Structure. Congress included an elaborate
mechanism for enforcing the regulations agencies adopt under
section 602, thereby indicating that it did not intend to provide for
private enforcement of the regulations. Besides specifying that
compliance shall be effected through denial or termination of funding
(after opportunity for a hearing) or through any other means
expressly authorized by law,"0 9 section 602 provides that no
enforcement action (denial of funding or other action) shall be taken
until the funding agency has advised the regulatee of its
' See supra Part III (explaining that some decisions resulting in disparate impact are
desirable).
There is no evidence in the legislative history of Title VI that Congress was concerned
about preserving agency flexibility when it came to intentional discrimination. Indeed, there
would seem to be no need to grant agencies any power to nullify section 601 intentional
discrimination prohibition, for intentional discrimination ought always to be deterred. Hence,
the argument presented here (Le., that evidence of a need to protect agency flexibility
indicates that Congress did not want private enforcement) does not apply to section 601. I
am in no way suggesting that Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)
(recognizing private right of action to sue for intentional discrimination), is at odds with the
legislative history of Title VI.
"o 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1999) ("Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to
this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue
assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an
express finding on the record, after opportunity for a hearing, of a failure to comply with such
requirement. ... or (2) by any other means authorized by law.").
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noncompliance and has determined that compliance cannot be
effected by voluntary means.310 In addition, section 602 specifies
that funding denial or termination may not occur until thirty days
after the head of the funding agency has filed a written report of the
circumstances and grounds of such action with the congressional
committees having jurisdiction over the programs or activities that
were denied funding.31 The fact that Congress included in section
602 so detailed an enforcement scheme strongly suggests that it did
not intend to permit, in the alternative, private lawsuits to enforce
section 602.12 Indeed, when a statute contains an elaborate
remedial scheme, courts have been particularly reluctant to imply
additional remedies. 313
3"' Id. C'[N]o such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has
advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and
has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.").
"' Id. C'In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, assistance
because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head
of the Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and Senate
having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of
the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall become effective
until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report.").
3 2 This is really a variation on the expressio unius argument raised in Part IV.B.2.a
(addressing whether text of section 602 supports finding of legislative intent to permit private
lawsuits). The expression of one elaborate enforcement scheme implies the exclusion of
alternative means of enforcement. See supra note 286 and accompanying text (discussing
congressional intent to provide private enforcement of section 602).
"' See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 13-15 (1981) (concluding that, given "unusually elaborate enforcement provisions" of
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and in absence of strong evidence of contrary
congressional intent, Congress provided "precisely the remedies it considered appropriate");
Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (reaching similar conclusion in
contextof antitrust laws); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77,
93-94 (1981) (holding that comprehensive character of Equal Pay Act and Title VII
presumptively evinces congressional intent not to authorize an implied remedy); TAMA, Inc.
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) (noting that where statute provides particular remedy, courts
"must be chary of reading others" in); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571-74
(1979) (noting same); Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc., v. Dow Chem. Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1108, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (noting that private cause of action would undermine
comprehensive scheme of CERCLA); cf. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984)
(concluding that § 1983 claim was precluded because of "carefully tailored" statutory
enforcement scheme established by Education of the Handicapped Act); Great Am. Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (noting that comprehensive remedial scheme
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 precludes bringing of private cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
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The courts that have expressly approved private disparate impact
suits rejected the argument that the structure of section 602
indicates that private suits are unwarranted. Deciding to follow
(their understanding of) the "spirit" of section 602 rather than its
"letter," the courts reasoned that section 602 procedural require-
ments are merely concerned with providing notice of enforcement
action to defendant regulatees, a concern that is always met in
private lawsuits. As the Chester Residents court explained:
The procedural requirements in section 602 provide
a fund recipient with a form of notice that the
agency has begun an investigation which may
culminate in the termination of its funding. We
note that a private lawsuit also affords a fund
recipient similar notice. If the purpose of the
requirements is to provide bare notice, private
lawsuits are consistent with the legislative scheme
of Title VI. Furthermore, unlike the EPA, private
plaintiffs do not have the authority to terminate
funding. As a result, the purpose that the require-
ments serve is not as significant in private law-
suits, where the potential remedy does not include
the result (i.e., termination of funding) at which
Congress directed the requirements. Stated differ-
ently, the requirements were designed to cushion
the blow of a result that private plaintiffs cannot
effectuate. Based on the foregoing, we find that the
implication of a private right of action would be
consistent with the legislative scheme of Title VI.314
Besides the problems inherent in an interpretive approach that
flouts plain text in favor of the "policy" underlying the text,315 the
"' Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925,935-36 (3d Cir.
1997) (quoted approvingly in Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 392 (3d Cir. 1999); Sandoval v.
Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1260 (M.D. Ala. 1984)).
"' For a lucid discussion of these problems, see generally ANTONIN SCALIA, AMATTEROF
INTERPRETATION (1997).
12472000]
HeinOnline  -- 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1247 1999-2000
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
reasoning presented above is flawed for another reason: It assumes
that the sole purpose of section 602 procedural requirements is to
provide notice to defendant regulatees, when a careful examination
of the procedural requirements indicates that Congress probably had
additional objectives in mind when it crafted the section 602
elaborate enforcement scheme. Indeed, in addition to ensuring that
notice is provided, Congress may have been pursuing at least two
other objectives that cannot be obtained through private lawsuits.
First of all, the structure of section 602 indicates that Congress
was attempting to keep agencies involved in enforcement in order to
utilize their expertise. Section 602 provisions do not aim simply to
"provide bare notice." They also expressly state who must provide
that notice: "[N]o such [enforcement] action shall be taken until the
department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person
or persons of the failure to comply" with the section 602
regulations."1 6 In a private lawsuit, the private plaintiff, by filing a
complaint, "notifies" the fund recipient of its alleged noncompliance,
but the funding department or agency may be completely out of the
loop. The agency may never have an opportunity to discuss noncom-
pliance with the regulatee that has been sued. Given that agencies
possess a measure of expertise on what constitutes disparate impact
in the areas they regulate or oversee and what alternatives may
avoid such disparate impact, Congress wisely chose to specify that
the "department or agency concerned" be the one to "advise[ ] the
appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the
requirement[s]" of the section 602 regulations. 1 '
In addition, the procedural requirements of section 602 aim to
keep litigation costs in check by ensuring that litigation does not
commence until serious efforts have been made to achieve voluntary
compliance. The provisions state that "no [enforcement] action shall
be taken until the department or agency concerned.., has deter-
mined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means."3 8
Again, this requirement is aiming at more than simply providing
bare notice to the regulatee. Congress was pursuing an efficiency
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objective by ensuring that costly enforcement actions would not
commence until the agency and the regulatee had reached a
stalemate over voluntary compliance.
In short, the structure of section 602 indicates that Congress had
in mind the "agency gatekeeping" objective argued for throughout
this Article. In addition to providing notice, section 602 procedural
requirements, by insisting on the involvement of the departments or
agencies concerned and requiring a determination that voluntary
compliance is infeasible, ensure that it is not too easy to enforce the
disparate impact regulations. The requirements thereby attempt to
avoid deterrence of "good" disparity-causing actions and decisions.
d. Circumstances of Enactment. The Supreme Court has
indicated that legislative intent to provide a private right of action
may appear in the circumstances of a statute's enactment, as well as
in its text, legislative history, or structure. 19 With section 602, no
particular historical circumstances stand out as indicating a
congressional intent to provide or deny a private right of action. But
one "general" historical circumstance is always relevant: the view
among courts at the time of enactment as to when implication of a
private cause of action is appropriate.3 2' The idea is that Congress
legislates with the common law background in mind and intends for
its statutes to be interpreted in accordance with that background. 1
The question at hand, then, is how courts in 1964 viewed implication.
As Part IV.B.1 explained, between the time of the New Deal
proliferation of federal statutes (coupled with Erie's abrogation of
federal courts' general common law power)3 22 in the 1930s and Cort
v. Ash323 in 1975, the Supreme Court generally denied private rights
of action when other means were available to enforce the statutory
. TAMA, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979).
Stabile, supra note 234, at 888.
' See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97 (1979) CIt is always
appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the
law .... "); Siebert v. Conservative Party, 724 F.2d 334, 337 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Congress is
presumed to be aware of the judicial background against which it legislates.").
See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that Federal courts should
follow state common-law principles rather than develop and apply "general" common law).
32 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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duty at issue. 24 The Court, however, did create implied private
rights of action when they were thought to be necessary to grant a
plaintiff a remedy.325 It thus appears that the prevailing view among
the judiciary in 1964 was that private rights of action would be
implied in order to provide some remedy, but if an alternative
remedy were available, the courts would not generally permit private
enforcement without congressional approval.
This view of implication doctrine as understood in 1964 indicates
that Congress likely did not intend to permit private lawsuits to
enforce section 602 of Title VI. As Part IV.B.3.c discussed, section
602 includes an elaborate enforcement scheme that does not mention
private lawsuits. Given the general tendency of post-Erie/pre-Cort
courts not to imply private rights of action when other remedies were
available, the 1964 Congress presumably knew that in spelling out
a particular remedy for violations of section 602, it was foreclosing
" See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (holding
there is no private right of action under Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, which is
enforceable by administrative proceedings and government suits); National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (finding no private right of
action under Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 in light of Attorney General's express
enforcement authority); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964) (finding no private right of
action to enforce Title IV of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, given
administrative remedies for enforcement); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963) (holding
there is no private right of action under Civil Rights Act since suits against federal officials
could have been maintained under state law); T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464
(1959) (holding section 216(j) of Motor Carrier Act does not give shippers statutory cause of
action since statute only provides for agency enforcement and since Congress failed to adopt
recommended amendment that would have permitted such suits); General Comm. v.
Southern Pac. Co., 320 U.S. 338 (1943) (concluding Congress intended that controversies
about section 2 of Railway Labor Act be addressed by agencies or tribunals other than courts);
Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943). See generally Stabile,
supra note 234, at 866-67. But see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964)
(suggesting implication of private cause of action appropriate if private remedy would further
larger policies and purpose of Congress and finding that private enforcement of section 14(a)
of Securities Exchange Act was necessary supplement to public enforcement by SEC).
2 See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (approving private right of action for
Social Security Act of 1935, as amended in 1967); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544
(1969) (approving same for Voting Rights Act of 1965); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899); Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Easter
Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962) (Motor Carrier Act); Turnstall v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) (Railway Labor Act). Courts were
particularly willing to imply causes of action in order to afford a remedy in the securities law
context. See LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SEcURITIES REGULATION 1058 (1983) (referring
to decade prior to 1975 as "ebullient stage" of implied cause of action doctrine within
securities law context).
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private lawsuits as a remedy. By contrast, section 601 of Title VI
contains no express remedy, indicating that Congress was leaving
the door open for courts to imply a private right of action as a
remedy, which the Supreme Court did in Cannon.326
To summarize, Subpart B has described and applied the Supreme
Court's current "legislative intent" test for determining whether it is
proper to infer a private right of action to enforce a statute that does
not expressly provide for private enforcement. As neither the text,
legislative history, structure of section 602, nor the context in which
the provision was enacted indicates a congressional intention to
provide a private right of action to enforce the agency regulations
adopted thereunder, there is no such private right of action. The
courts concluding otherwise have erred.
V. CONCLUSION
Rules sometimes misfire. In other words, strict application of
well-intentioned policies or legal commands may occasionally lead to
results that are, on the whole, undesirable. Given this fact,
rulemakers should tailor enforcement mechanisms to account for the
extent of the misfiring. Rules that almost never misfire should be
easily enforced by a large class of potential enforcers; those that
misfire more frequently should be more selectively
enforced-perhaps exclusively by experts who are democratically
accountable to society as a whole. Those experts could then nullify
the prone-to-misfire rules in appropriate situations.
In this Article, I have attempted to show that, while the ban on
intentional discrimination by federally funded entities almost never
misfires and should thus be privately enforceable, federal agencies'
rules banning disparate impact require selective enforcement. The
best way to guarantee sound enforcement decisions is to leave such
decisions to federal agencies themselves-politically accountable
bodies that possess a measure of expertise on which disparity-
causing decisions should be forbidden.
I have also attempted to demonstrate that private disparate
impact suits are unwarranted as a matter of positive law. First of
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 711-12.
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all, the rules banning disparate impact-to the extent they are more
prohibitory than their enabling statute-are legally invalid.
Supreme Court suggestions to the contrary, I have shown, amount
to dicta. If the disparate impact rules are valid at all, they must be
merely internal regulations, which are not enforceable by parties
outside the agencies. In addition, even if the rules were valid
legislative regulations, they would not be privately enforceable
because there is no evidence that Congress intended the statute
enabling the rules (section 602 of Title VI) to include a private right
of action. There is, in fact, evidence that Congress intended section
602 to be enforceable only by agency action.
In sum, then, the commentators that have argued for private
disparate impact suits, and the courts that have permitted such
suits, have adopted a position that is both unwise and legally
unjustified. Considerations of policy and settled positive law argue
against permitting private disparate impact suits.
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